

Palm Beach Country, Florida Crime Gun Intelligence Center (CGIC) Final Report



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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION

Palm Beach County (PBC), Florida is home to approximately 1.47 million residents and 8 million tourist visitors each year (pbc.gov), where extreme wealth exists alongside abject poverty. Concentrations of high unemployment, unstable housing, community divestments, large immigrant populations, segregated neighborhoods, and gross inequities in the distribution of resources have contributed to the later. Crime is, unfortunately, an artifact of these conditions, with some areas in PBC experiencing violent crime nearly twice national and state averages. In these communities, there is a large gang presence, human trafficking, and drug activity. In 2019, nearly half (46.6%) of violent crimes in PBC involved a firearm, including a high rate of nonfatal shootings and rising homicide rates. Within this context, the bereaved, injured, and communities in PBC often live in fear of retaliation, are intimidated away from cooperating with law enforcement, and are innocent bystanders in gang-related incidents. Substantively, PBC needed to take immediate action to address firearm-related crime.

As the largest law enforcement agency in PBC and with its lengthy history of community-wide initiative leadership, the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office (PBSO) is poised to inform and lead a response to these issues. In fact, there are several intelligence, technology, coordination, and engagement efforts already underway with the PBSO. They, for example, manage the only Forensic Criminal Laboratory in the County and the PBC Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC). They also have strategically placed ShotSpotters and license plate readers throughout PBC. Additionally, the PBSO has developed several meaningful collaborations in PBC in response to gun crime, which appears in the National Resource and Technical Assistance Center (NRTAC) Business Process Maps (see Appendix A). In the last six years, for example, the PBSO has participated in many law



Figure 1.01 Law Enforcement and Community-Based Task Forces

enforcement- and community-based task forces (see Figure 1.01). While these partnerships have effectively started the conversation around violence and gun crime, a community-wide, coordinated gun strategy has been without technical assistance and is resource-limited in PBC.

CALL, PROPOSAL, AND AWARD

On March 12, 2020, the Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, and Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) put out a call for applications for the Local Law Enforcement Crime Gun Intelligence Center Integration Initiative. Through the proposal and in partnership with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), local law enforcement was charged with establishing a Crime Gun Intelligence Center (CGIC) that leverages intelligence, technology, and community engagement to address illegal firearm-related crime and forensics. With an emphasis on swift identification of unlawful firearms and their sources, the CGIC was designed to facilitate effective prosecutions of perpetrators of violent crime.

To advance crime gun intelligence (CGI) in PBC, the PBSO applied for and was awarded funding to lead the development of a regional CGIC (henceforth 'PBC CGIC'). To achieve this goal, the PBC CGIC identified four program objectives:

1. Establish the PBC CGIC
2. Make data-driven decisions
3. Develop comprehensive training and community awareness
4. Increase prosecution capacity

These objectives and their deliverables were subsequently elaborated upon and aligned using the Model CGIC 7-Step Process (Bureau of Justice Assistance, n.d.; see Table 1.01 below for an alignment guide). The CGIC workflow, depicted in Figure 1.02, is a rubric for CGIC site success and the overarching goal for these objectives and deliverables is to establish a collaborative PBC CGIC that strategically



Figure 1.02. Crime Gun Intelligence Center Workflow for Federal Local Partnerships

coordinates and utilizes intelligence, technology, and community engagement to swiftly identify crime guns, their sources, and effectively prosecute perpetrators of gun crime. As one of the first sheriff's offices awarded a CGIC grant on October 26, 2020, the efforts of the PBSO and the PBC CGIC stakeholders are poised to achieve these objectives and inform subsequent CGIC sites.

Regarding the former, a subject matter expert (SME) and training and technical assistance (TTA) provider stated, that through this award “we [the NRTAC] are trying to learn from you [PBC]” (August 10, 2021, in a personal communication).

Table 1.01 PBC Proposal Objectives and 7-Step CGIC Model Process Alignment Guide

<u>Proposal Objective</u>	<u>Corresponding CGIC Model CGIC 7-Step Process</u>
<i>Objective 1. Establish the PBC CGIC</i>	
A. Establish a multidisciplinary CGIC through a formalized MOU	2.2
B. Hire (1) fulltime Detective who will be assigned CGIC coordination	2.3 and 4.2
C. Assign (1) crime analyst to the CGIC through the PBSOs Violent Crime Division (VCD)	3.1
D. Develop formal policies & practices that align and incorporate the Crime Gun Intelligence Best Practices Guide	1.1
E. Conduct monthly CGIC collaborative meetings to facilitate case triage, coordination, resource sharing, policy/practice development, data collection, and feedback loop	5.2 and 7.1
<i>Objective 2. Make Data Driven Decisions</i>	
A. Contract with Florida Atlantic University (executed on December 29, 2020)	
B. Develop & implement a data collection, analysis, and information sharing plan	
C. Utilize data collected and analyzed to modify project activities (see Appendix B for Strategic Plan Logic Model submitted as part of the Strategic Plan submitted to BJA in August 2021)	
D. Provide all required performance measurement data for DOJ	
E. Conduct ongoing project evaluation and complete a final project evaluation report	
Table 1.01 continues on the next page ...	

Table 1.01 PBC Proposal Objectives and 7-Step CGIC Model Process Alignment Guide
(continued)

<u>Proposal Objective</u>	<u>Corresponding CGIC Model CGIC 7-Step Process</u>
<i>Objective 3. Develop Comprehensive Training and Community Awareness</i>	
A. Identify training needs and available training resources, including through our ATF partners	1.2
B. Develop and implement comprehensive training program	1.2
C. Establish CGIC subcommittee for public awareness campaign, develop, and deliver zero tolerance messaging	7.2 and 7.4
D. Assign Gang Coordinator as community outreach liaison	7.4
E. Develop and implement plan to provide information and general awareness to targeted community groups serving at risk youth	7.4
<i>Objective 4. Increase Prosecution Capacity</i>	
A. Utilize CGIC developed policies and practices, the CGIC Coordinator, the Assigned Crime Analyst, the Firearms Analyst Unit Manager, and our FAU partners as described previously to support the tracking and prosecution prioritization of CGIC cases	4.5 and 4.7
B. Subcontract with local State Attorney's Office (SAO) for additional administrative support and data collection	2.3, 5.4, and 5.5
C. Contract with DNA Labs International to provide prioritized DNA forensic analysis	2.1
<p><i>Note:</i> In the right column, the first number references the step within the model CGIC 7-step process, and the second number references the corresponding NRTAC recommendation (e.g., 2.3 indicates CGIC Step 2, Recommendation 3).</p>	

PBC CGIC STAKEHOLDERS

As part of their response to BJA's call for proposals, the PBSO brought together a coalition of stakeholders to develop and implement the collaborative PBC CGIC. Figure 1.03 displays the initial federal, state, local, and community stakeholders.



Federal-level stakeholders

1. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
3. United States Attorney's Office (USAO)



State-level stakeholders

1. State Attorney's Office (SAO) - 15th Judicial Circuit
2. Florida Atlantic University (FAU)



Local-level stakeholders

1. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office (PBSO)



Community stakeholders

1. DNA International

Figure 1.03. PBC CGIC Stakeholders

The ATF has strong ties in PBC. There are, for example, two full-time and 10 part-time ATF Task Force Officers (TFOs) at the PBSO and three ATF TFOs at West Palm Beach Police Department, which also has a Brass Tracks system. The ATF hired additional ATF TFOs that are housed in the Boynton Beach, Delray Beach, and Rivera Beach Police Departments. Similarly, the State Attorney's Office, which is comprised of approximately 120 prosecutors, is heavily invested in PBC, with half of their cases originating with the PBSO.

The PBSO itself has approximately 4,500 employees, including approximately 1,800 sworn deputies. In addition to traditional policing services, the PBSO also manages the two county correctional facilities, the only forensic criminal laboratory in PBC, and PBC's Real-Time Crime Fusion Center.

The PBC CGIC operates primarily out of the PBSO Violent Crimes Division (VCD), which directs the PBSO efforts to combat violent crime. In doing so, the VCD coordinates and integrates all available internal resources and technologies in support of the overarching PBC violent crime reduction strategy. The VCD, for example, works closely with the Real-Time Crime and Fusion Center, Narcotics Division, Human Trafficking Unit, and Forensic Crime Laboratory- Firearms Analysis Unit. The VCD is part of the Major Crimes Bureau's branch of the Department of Strategic Operations at the PBSO. There are four divisions in the Major Crimes Bureau, including:

- Criminal Investigations Division
- Forensic Sciences Division
- Technical Services Division
- Violent Crimes Division

The Technical Service Division houses the PBSO Crime Laboratory, which includes the Firearms Analysis Unit and provides forensic analyses for all PBC law enforcement agencies. Additionally, the Technologies Service Division provides oversight to specialized investigative strategies related to gun crime, including strategically placed shot spotters, specialized cameras and license plate readers, two National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) systems, the ATF's eTrace system, and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) of individuals and firearms.

The VCD includes the:

- Cold Case Unit
- Crime Stoppers
- Firearms Investigative Unit
- Gang Unit
- Jail Investigations Unit
- Homicide Unit (which also works non-fatal shootings)
- Robbery Unit

All VCD Units are housed together, which enhances cross-unit communication and teamwork among the nearly 110 VCD personnel. Each of the primary units (Cold Case, Gang, Homicide, and Robbery Units) are comprised of five Detectives and a civilian Crime Analyst that is overseen by a Sergeant. Crime Analysts are specialized to their units but centralized in the PBSO. Specific to the PBC CGIC, the Firearms Investigative Unit (FIU) is comprised of:

- a Sergeant
- a full-time Detective (an ATF TFO and PBSO Detective; hired with grant support¹)
- a part-time Detective

¹ The current full-time Detective, hired through the grant, was originally intended to be a hybrid Detective/Coordinator position. However, through the planning of this project, the CGIC team and NRTAC assessment determined a separate, full time CGIC Coordinator was needed.

- a NIBIN technician
- two part-time Crime Analysts
- a full-time ATF Level III Contractor

Personnel in the FIU test fire firearms, conduct microscopic comparisons (for all PBC), conduct serial number restoration, enter samples into NIBIN, and process evidence for latent prints and DNA. Each day, PBSO's Evidence Department notifies the FIU with the number of guns that have come into the agency so that they can be picked up for validation and analysis. A NIBIN Technician retrieves the firearms from the Evidence Department and triages them in determining the next steps in processing gun evidence. More recently, the FIU began providing social media reviews of photos and videos to identify adjudicated delinquents, gang members, and people with felony convictions. These activities are also available to state, federal, and special jurisdiction law enforcement agencies operating in PBC.

Finally, the National Policing Institute (formerly the Police Foundation) provided TTA through their NRTAC and in coordination with three SMEs and TAA providers.

METHODOLOGY

The PBSO partnered with Drs. Seth Fallik (Principal Investigator; PI), Cassandra Atkin-Plunk (Co-PI), and Vaughn Crichlow (Co-PI), of Florida Atlantic University, to conduct a process and outcome evaluation of the PBC CGIC. The PBC CGIC is one of several stakeholders and evidence-based initiatives between PBSO and the research partner. As such, PBSO and the research partner are committed to effecting positive change in policing and crime control strategies through innovative research. More specifically, the research partner has a longstanding history of field research with criminal justice and community-based entities. Likewise, the research partner has been with this endeavor since its inception and worked closely with the VCD and PBSO, using an action research model, as they developed, established, and implemented the PBC CGIC.

In this capacity, the research partner attended and actively participated in monthly meetings relating to the PBC CGIC. Communication among stakeholders (e.g., VCD leadership, detectives, and crime analysts) occurred daily and weekly via email, telephone, video conferencing, face-to-face, and on an *ad hoc* basis. The frequency and quality of these interactions was enhanced by the research partner being in PBC, which promoted real-time sharing of information and data between PBSO and the research partner. More specifically, the research partner observed all aspects of CGIC planning/implementation and oversaw an impact evaluation plan by providing scholarly feedback and conducting a process and outcomes evaluation.²

² In addition to this final report, the research team provided systematic and ongoing feedback on an annual basis to promote mid-program adjustments (i.e., a feedback loop of information to enhance project outcomes).

Process Evaluation

The proposed outcomes evaluation is grounded in specific deterrence and incapacitation theoretical frameworks. Specific deterrence refers to focused efforts on individuals known to be involved in gun crime (see, e.g., Braga, 2008), while incapacitation purports that gun crime is often relegated to a select group of people (often gang affiliated individuals), and it is hypothesized that their identification, location, and apprehension will lead to a reduction in gun crime. Similarly, a relatively small number of high-risk guns are associated with a large proportion of gun crimes, which indicates that their removal from public circulation will also make a meaningful impact on gun crime (Fox & Novak, 2018). Since CGICs target both frequently used crime guns and their users, these frameworks present the most likely mechanisms to understand how a CGIC would impact gun crime and public safety.

The outcome evaluation presented herein, therefore, assesses the effectiveness of PBC's CGIC utilizing a pre-, ongoing, and post-analyses.³ When considered alongside the process evaluation, the outcomes evaluation takes a mixed methods approach and adds the following data sources:

- descriptive analyses of administrative data; and
- statistical and anecdotal evidence of the program's effects using currently collected and unique data sources.

Regarding statistical analyses, data from four data sources are presented: weekly firearms data, monthly National Policing Institute (NPI) reports, monthly ShotSpotter reports, and monthly BrassTrax submissions.

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³ This study design was selected because it is the most feasible and rigorous approach available. More specifically, a randomized control trial or true experimental design, whereby one geographic area receives the treatment and is compared to a control area that does not, is not ethical nor feasible. Several reports, for example, have demonstrated the crime control effectiveness of CGICs (Bureau of Justice Assistance, n.d.b), and we, therefore, have an obligation to provide the program to all PBC residents where possible. While a quasi-experimental design among non-equivalent matched groups could overcome some of these ethical concerns, it is not feasible for PBC's regional CGIC model, which seeks to engender a collaborative approach to CGI. In other words, the county-wide CGIC does not lend itself to control group comparisons.

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Regarding statistical analyses, data from four data sources are presented: weekly firearms data, monthly National Policing Institute (NPI) reports, monthly ShotSpotter reports, and monthly BrassTrax submissions.

Weekly Firearms Data. Firearms data are tracked by a Firearms Investigative Unit (FIU) detective and shared weekly with a VCD lieutenant, FIU sergeant, a full-time ATF Level III contractor, ATF TFO, FIU detective, PBSO crime analysts, and PBSO NIBIN technicians. There are nine measures shared in the weekly firearms data, including:

1. Firearms entered into evidence;
2. Firearms validated by the FIU;
3. Firearms e-Traced;
4. NCIC corrections;
5. Background returns;
6. FIU test-fired/entered into NIBIN by the VCD;
7. Casings entered into NIBIN by the VCD;
8. Firearm leads checked online; and
9. Individual leads checked online.

Two additional rate measures are provided in this report based on the weekly firearms data:

1. The proportion of firearms entered into evidence that are validated by the FIU (i.e., the number of firearms validated by the FIU divided by the number of firearms entered into evidence).
2. The proportion of firearms entered into evidence that the FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN (i.e., the number of firearms FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN divided by the number of firearms entered into evidence).

Weekly firearms data are disaggregated into weekly counts between July 1, 2019 (prior to PBC CGIC) and March 31, 2024 (a 57-month period).

Monthly National Policing Institute Reports. Data used to generate monthly NPI reports come from a variety of sources, including FIU daily firearm processing reports, Firearms Laboratory evidence processing reports, linked case profiles generated by the ATF Level III contractor, ShotSpotter portal, PBSO record management system (RMS) case data on shooting responses, and crime analyst reports on area crime and calls for service. Monthly NPI reports are shared with a VCD lieutenant, FIU sergeant, PBSO senior planner, NPI project associate, and NPI senior program manager, in compliance with grant reporting requirements. They observe a slightly more limited reporting period, between November 26, 2021 and March 31, 2024 (i.e., 28 months), but offer a total of 34 measures, including:

1. Full/part-time crime analysts assigned to the CGIC program;
2. Calls for service regarding shots;
3. Gunshot detection system alerts;
4. Confirmed non-fatal shootings;
5. Confirmed fatal shootings;
6. Ballistics recovered;
7. Crime guns recovered;
8. Ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN;
9. Ballistics from test-fired crime guns entered into NIBIN;
10. Ballistics entered into NIBIN with a business day;
11. Ballistics from test-fired crime guns entered into NIBIN within a business day;
12. Ballistics linked to another incident or item via NIBIN;
13. Crime guns linked to another incident or item via NIBIN;
14. Perceived firearms linked but not yet recovered;
15. Crime guns traced through the ATF (e-Traced);
16. Crime guns traced through the ATF (e-Traced) within a business day;
17. Traces resulting in a hit in the e-Trace system;
18. Policies or procedures adopted as a result of the CGIC program;
19. Cases referred to the CGIC investigative team;
20. Cases cleared by arrest or exceptional means by the CGIC team;
21. Suspects identified in CGIC cases;
22. Suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the state level;
23. Suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the federal level;
24. New defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the state level;
25. New defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the federal level;
26. Defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the state level;
27. Defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the federal level;
28. Trainings;
29. Active partnerships;
30. Partnerships with MOUs;
31. Straw gun purchases;

32. Gun probable cause search warrants via video evidence;
33. Probable cause cases developed out of DNA evidence;
34. Ghost gun seizures;

Though titled “monthly,” in some instances data from the Monthly NPI reports were disaggregated weekly. “Monthly,” in this sense, refers to how frequently the data are shared.

Monthly Shot Spotter Reports. Also found in this report are data from Monthly ShotSpotter reports among two locations (see Images 1.01):


1. Town of Lake Park
2. Palm Beach County

ShotSpotter generates monthly reports for these locations that are distributed to the PBSO District 13 Captain, PBSO Crime Prevention Specialist, a PBSO Criminal Intelligence Analyst II, PBSO Dispatcher, and PBC CGIC Coordinator. The observational period for these data in this report is between July 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024 (a 34-month period).


Monthly BrassTrax Submissions. The final data source found in these analyses, Monthly BrassTrax submissions, are derived from the City of West Palm Beach Police Department’s Crime Scene Section and are shared with a FIU sergeant, PBSO senior planner, NPI project associate, and NPI senior program manager. City of West Palm Beach Police Department’s Crime Scene Section processes all other municipal police departments ballistic evidence, providing a more complete understanding of crime gun data in PBC. Data from the Monthly BrassTrax submissions are available between January 1, 2022 and March 31, 2024 (i.e., a 27-month period) and for the following jurisdictions within Palm Beach County:

1. Boca Raton
2. City of Boynton Beach
3. City of Delray Beach
4. Jupiter
5. City of Palm Beach Gardens
6. Palm Springs
7. Riviera Beach
8. City of West Palm Beach

Town of Lake Park



Palm Beach County



Images 1.01. ShotSpotter Geo-Fence

Data Analysis Plan

With each of these data, compiled statistical counts for PBC CGIC activities and outcomes are tabulated weekly/monthly and discussed in three ways. First, data are plotted along a continuum of time and fit with a red dotted trendline (i.e., the line of best fit) to express change over time. Second, data are aggregated into annual statistics to observe year-over-year changes. The former presents a linear understanding of change, while the latter better accounts for seasonal changes in crime perpetration (McDowall, Loftin, & Pate, 2012). Finally, measures of central tendency, where relevant, are presented, which describe the data parameters. These are overwhelmingly quantitative observations and are best contextualized alongside process related information and within the Model CGIC 7-Step Process.

Finally, this report was also informed by the following documents:

- Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) call for proposals (BJA-2020-17017);
- the PBSO's program narrative that was submitted in response to BJA's call for proposals;
- contracted scope of services with FAU;
- NRTAC's April 2021 recommendations;
- strategic plan submitted to BJA in August 2021; and
- the extant literature.

Ultimately, the process and outcomes evaluation seeks to provide an understanding of how the CGIC process was executed in PBC and its impact.

PLANNING MEETINGS AND MILESTONES

As noted above, the PBSO received notice of funding for the PBC CGIC initiative on October 26, 2020. Since then, and as can be seen in Figure 1.04, PBC CGIC stakeholders held numerous planning meetings and achieved several milestones. PBC CGIC stakeholders began meeting on December 1, 2020, which was followed by a fiscal year 2021 site awardee orientation. With every site differing, however, the NRTAC conducted a two-day site visit March 8-9, 2021, to offer feedback specific to the PBC CGIC Project. During their site visit, SMEs met face-to-face and remotely with PBC CGIC stakeholders to learn about the PBSO's current processes and capacities to investigate and prosecute gun crimes. They summarized their findings in an April 2021 report that contained tailored recommendations for advancing the PBC CGIC Project, which overwhelmingly align with the program narrative the PBSO submitted in response to BJA's call for proposal. The PBSO stakeholders met with the NRTAC training and technical assistance (TTA) providers and internally to discuss the development of a strategic plan, which was finalized and submitted to BJA in August 2021.




Figure 1.04. PBC CGIC Planning Meeting and Milestones

To follow through with the strategic plan, stakeholders from the PBSO also convened several additional times in 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024.⁴

REPORT OUTLINE

This is the final report of the PBC CGIC grant and is organized into 11 additional sections. Sections II – VIII detail trends in case processing and outcomes within the Model CGIC 7-Step Process. More specifically, [Section II](#) documents work to comprehensively collect cartridge cases and crime guns (Step 1), while [Section III](#) presents NIBIN entry and correlation data (Step 2). Additionally, [Section IV](#) explores efforts to engage in crime gun intelligence analysis (Step 3), and [Section V](#) notes evidence of NIBIN hit/lead assignments and investigation (Step 4). [Section VI](#) documents law enforcement and prosecution collaborations in achieving arrests (Step 5), whereas [Section VII](#) presents data on state and federal prosecutions (Step 6). Data relating to the final Step in the Model CGIC 7-Step Process are presented in [Section VIII](#) and explores feedback provided to CGIC process participants (Step 7). The primary goal of every CGIC program is to prevent violent crime, particularly relating to gun crime. In [Section IX](#) of this report, trends in macro-level crime measures are presented. Finally, this report concludes with a summary, discussion, recommendations ([Section X](#)), references ([Section XI](#)), and appendices ([Section XII](#)) presented throughout the report.

⁴ At the onset of PBC’s CGIC, the world was amid a global pandemic. While the evaluation was designed to be COVID-19 resilient, our CGIC partners were on the frontlines of the pandemic, which differentially impacted the project’s workflow. More specifically, PBC CGIC stakeholders confronted challenges from COVID-19 exposure, virus variants, and differing access to vaccinations. In the summer of 2021, for example, the VCD returned to limited office capacity to slow the transmission of COVID-19 after several deputies and staff tested positive for the delta variant. The VCD returned to full office capacity before 2022 and was able to continue with the mission of the project while working remotely. The State Attorney’s Office also experienced issues due to COVID-19; however, they remained in their offices throughout the pandemic, unlike most State Attorney’s Offices throughout the Nation. There was, nevertheless, a small backlog of cases with the State Attorney’s Office because they primarily held shorter one- or two-day trials during the initial part of the pandemic; however, all trials resumed in 2022 with some restrictions on the number of people in the courtroom. In the United States Attorney’s Office, grand juries resumed in December 2021, but they had not returned to full office capacity before the end of the year. To this point, a Chief Assistant State Attorney stated, that “the pandemic has not impacted state or federal prosecutor’s ability to address violent crime” (October 14, 2021, in a personal communication). Finally, project training and technical assistance was also different during these difficult times, with most of it provided through Zoom and in-person peer-to-peer learning limited or nonexistent due to travel restrictions.

SECTION II. COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF CARTRIDGE CASES AND CRIME GUNS (STEP 1)

CGICs are most efficacious when law enforcement personnel (e.g., patrol officers, crime scene technicians, and detectives) are called to gun crime scenes to collect cartridge casings and crime guns (Step 1). To advance the comprehensive collection of cartridge cases and crime guns, law enforcement agencies should develop policies and procedures that are communicated to personnel relating to gun crime responses and evidence collection. As it relates to the PBC CGIC, the NRTAC made five recommendations relating to the comprehensive collection of cartridge cases and crime guns, including:

- 1.1 Reevaluate the Property Collection Procedure and Policy for Fired Cartridge Cases and Crime Guns to Evidence
- 1.2 Implement Training to Address Firearms Packaging and Marking Errors that Result in a Delay of the Test Firing
- 1.3 Designate a Crime Gun Liaison Officer in Each Department Patrol Area
- 1.4 Institute Procedures for the Recanvass of Shooting Scenes for Ballistic Evidence
- 1.5 Explosives Detection Canine

RE-EVALUATE THE PROPERTY COLLECTION PROCEDURES AND POLICY FOR FIRED CARTRIDGE CASES AND CRIME GUNS TO EVIDENCE (1.1)

At the onset of the project, evidence was picked up from the 13 property substations each day; however, it was discovered that this activity would be delayed to every other day where there was limited person-power and lengthy travel between sights in the County. These delays slowed the processing of cartridges and crime guns for DNA, fingerprinting, test firing, and NIBIN entry. As such, the NRTAC recommended generating a policy that all recovered fired cartridge cases and crime guns be submitted to the Evidence Department by the end of the shift. Additionally, the NRTAC recommended that efforts should be made to minimize the amount of time fired cartridge cases and crime guns spend in property substation locations prior to being transferred to the crime laboratory. Doing so, the NRTAC reported, would improve the timeliness of evidence processing into NIBIN.

As the largest jurisdiction – in terms of square miles – to be awarded a CGIC grant, the PBSO has unique considerations for timely evidence collection. Though evidence was being collected regularly, the timeliness of collection was not mandated in policy. To provide greater specificity to evidence processing, the Major Crimes Bureau (Major Masri) spoke with patrol leadership and circulated a policy memo on May 11, 2021. The policy memo directed deputies to place evidence in precinct storage lockers by the end of their shifts and notify the PBSO's Evidence Department and VCD Sergeant of its log entry and location (see Appendix C). The Evidence Department

subsequently dispatches a deputy (or staff member) to retrieve the evidence no later than the next business day, regardless of where evidence is being stored in the County.⁵

In practice following the memo being issued, the VCD Sergeant receives patrol officer communications and sends a deputy to retrieve the evidence immediately. Concurrent with evidence retrieval, the VCD Sergeant assembles background information on the case to avoid additional case processing delays. The goal of this policy, the Major wrote, is “to have these items processed within 72 hours of recovery.”

Since this evidence processing protocol was adopted, there have been anecdotal reports of its observance – even in remote parts of the County and while deputies are still on the scene. To quantify evidence collection in PBC throughout the project, several measures are observed. More specifically, Table 2.01 identifies the measures and data sources that capture the comprehensiveness of evidence collection throughout the project.

Table 2.01. Measures and Data Sources on the Comprehensive Collection of Cartridge Cases and Crime Guns (Model CGIC 7-Step Process: Step 1)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Ballistics recovered	Monthly NPI reports
Crime guns recovered	Monthly NPI report
Firearms entered into evidence	Weekly firearms data
Firearms validated by the FIU	Weekly firearms data
Firearms entered into evidence by the FIU that were validated	Weekly firearms data
Firearms e-Traced	Weekly firearms data
Crime guns traced through the ATF (e-Traced)	Monthly NPI report
Crime guns traced through the ATF (e-Traced) within a business day	Monthly NPI report
Traces Resulting in a hit in the e-Trace system	Monthly NPI report
Background returns	Weekly firearms data

⁵ Unfortunately, data on the number of policies and/or procedures developed and adopted because of the PBC CGIC program are not available.

NCIC corrections	Weekly firearms data
Firearm leads checked online	Weekly firearms data
Individual leads checked online	Weekly firearms data
Gun probable cause search warrants via video evidence	Monthly NPI report
Probable cause cases developed out of DNA evidence	Weekly firearms data
Suspects identified in CGIC cases	Monthly NPI report

These measures are subsequently discussed in greater detail in the following subsections.

Ballistics Recovered

The number of ballistics recovered are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 2.01. Month-to-month, it is difficult to determine a pattern among ballistics recovered, as there is substantial missing data during 2022; however, reporting appears to become more stable in June 2023 and was trending upward through the end of the observational period.




Figure 2.01. Monthly Ballistics Recovered (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, as many as 389 ballistics were recovered during a single month (February 2024), whereas one piece of ballistic evidence was collected in October 2022. On average, however, 141 pieces of ballistic evidence were recovered per month between November 26, 2021 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2022 and 2023 indicate significant growth in the number of pieces of ballistic evidence recovered ($n = 1,611, 1,627\%$). Unfortunately, these estimates are impacted by missing data.

Crime Guns Recovered

In Figure 2.02, the number of crime guns recovered are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 26, 2021-March 31, 2024). As can be seen, there were great fluctuations in the number of weekly crime guns recovered but they were trending slightly downward during the observational period.




Figure 2.02. Weekly Crime Guns Recovered (November 26, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though crime guns were regularly recovered, their recovery rate was somewhat sporadic and ranged between a high of 163 crime guns recovered in the fourth week of June 2022 and low of 19 crime guns recovered in the second week in September 2023. Weekly spikes in crime recoveries, however, tended to be followed by 2-3 weeks of lows before spiking again. Fifty-two crime guns were recovered weekly (on average) during the period of observation. Between 2022 and 2023, 9% ($n = 223$) fewer crime guns were recovered.

Firearms Entered into Evidence

In Figure 2.03, the number of firearms entered into evidence each week is plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024). Unlike other measures from the weekly firearms data source, data for firearms entered into evidence between July 1, 2019 and July 31, 2020 were not available, which limits our ability to draw inferences about the PBC CGIC. Data thereafter, however, were exhaustive and demonstrate great week-to-week fluctuation in the number of firearms entered into evidence. The number of weekly firearms entered into evidence appears to be trending stable, if not slightly upward, during the period of observation.




Figure 2.03. Weekly Firearms Entered into Evidence (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

As many as 142 firearms were entered into evidence in a single week during the observational period (first week of April 2023), whereas 14 firearms were entered into evidence in the second week of November 2020 (i.e., prior to PBC being awarded CGIC grant funding). On average, however, 43 firearms were entered into evidence weekly between July 1, 2019 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2021, 2022, and 2023 indicate 4% ($n = 71$) and 17% ($n = 338$) growth in the number of firearms entered into evidence year-over-year.

Firearms Validated by the FIU

The number of validated firearms by the FIU each week are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 2.04. Week-to-week, there was great change in the number of firearms validated by the FIU but is trending upward across the period of observation.




Figure 2.04. Weekly Firearms Validated by the FIU (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, as many as 142 firearms were validated by the FIU in a single week (first week of April 2023), whereas no firearms were validated by the FIU during five weeks of the observational period. On average, however, 29 firearms were validated by the FIU weekly between July 1, 2019 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 demonstrate significant growth with the largest leap occurring prior to and after the initiation of PBC CGIC (2020-2021). The number of firearms validated by the FIU per week grew by 154% ($n = 508$) during 2020 and 2021 and continued to grow year-over-year by 42% between 2021 and 2022 ($n = 352$) and 91% between 2022 and 2023 ($n = 1,081$).

Firearms Entered into Evidence that were Validated by the FIU

In Figure 2.05, the proportion of firearms entered into evidence that were validated by the FIU are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024). Proportions were derived by dividing the weekly number of validated firearms by the FIU (see Figure 2.04) by the weekly number of firearms entered into evidence (see Figure 2.03). There is great week-to-week fluctuation in the proportion of firearms entered into evidence that were validated by the FIU

but is trending upward across the period of observation. Of note is the fourth week of January 2022 when more firearms were validated by the FIU than entered into evidence. This occurred as holdovers from prior weeks were processed. Spikes in the proportion of firearms entered into evidence followed each of the five weeks without firearm evidence validation, which likely occurred due to mandatory unit training.




Figure 2.05. Proportion of Firearms Entered into Evidence that were Validated by the FIU (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

Though the bulk of crime guns entered into evidence were validated by the FIU per week (x-bar = 65%), this rate ranged from 0% to 122% during the observation period. There is, however, a noticeable difference in the rate of firearms entered into evidence that were validated by the FIU following September 2022. More specifically, 43% of crime guns entered into evidence were – on average – validated by the FIU per week between August 2020 and mid-September 2022. Thereafter (between mid-September 2022 and March 2024), the rate of firearms entered into evidence grew to 95%. The rate of firearms entered into evidence that were validated by the FIU grew year-to- year. Between 2021 and 2022, for example, there was an 18% growth in the rate of firearms entered into evidence that were validated by the FIU. The rate of firearms entered into evidence that were validated by the FIU grew by another 37% between 2022 and 2023.

Firearms e-Traced

The number of firearms e-Traced each week are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024) in Figure 2.06. Week-to-week, there was great change in the number of firearms e-Traced, but they were trending slightly upward during the period of observation.




Figure 2.06. Weekly Firearms e-Traced (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

On average, 36 firearms were e-Traced a week during the period of observation; however, there was great variation week-to-week, which ranged between a high of 142 firearms e-Traced during the first week of April 2023 and low of 8 firearms e-Traced during the first week of January 2020. Nevertheless, the year-to-year rate of firearms e-Traced grew (or remained somewhat steady) during the period of observation. Between 2020 and 2021, for example, 35% (n = 522) more firearms were e-Traced. The rate of firearms e-Traced between 2021 and 2022 remained somewhat the same (n = -37, -2%), but grew by 17% (n = 343) between 2022 and 2023.

Crime Guns Traced through the ATF (e-Traced) within a Business Day

The number of crime guns traced through the ATF (e-Traced) within a business day each week are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 2.07. Unfortunately, data based on the number of crime guns traced within a business day only became available in June 2023.




Figure 2.07. Weekly Crime Guns Traced through the ATF (e-Traced) within a Business Day (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though only 10 months of data are available, there are early trend indicators of note. Among the available data, for example, the number crime guns traced through the ATF (e-Traced) within a business day ranged between a high of 177 during the fourth week of February 2024 and low of 1 during the second week of April 2023. Moreover, the average number of crime guns traced though the ATF (e-Traced) within a business day was 43 per week among the available data.

Traces Resulting in a Hit in the e-Trace System

Data for one month were reported during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) and indicate that there were only three hits from traces in the e-Trace system in November 2021. Unfortunately, there is not enough data to reliably observe patterns, annual trends, or measures of central tendency for the number of traces resulting in a hit in the e-Trace system.

Background Returns

The number of background returns each week are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024) in Figure 2.08. Week-to-week, there was great change in the number of weekly background returns but was trending upward at the end of the period of observation.




Figure 2.08. Weekly Background Returns (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

The number of background returns completed weekly ranged between a high of 40 during the fourth week of October 2019 and low of 0 seventeen times during the period of observation. On average, 17 background returns were completed per week. Yearly comparisons indicate a 158% (n = 593) growth in the number of background returns completed between 2020 and 2021. Between 2021 and 2022, however, the number of background returns completed fell by 11% (n = 107) but grew by 8% (n = 70) the following year (2022-2023).

NCIC Corrections

In Figure 2.09, the number of NCIC corrections are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). There appears to be relative consistency in the number of NCIC corrections prior to 2023 and, thereafter, an upward trend in the number of NCIC corrections through the end of the period of observation.




Figure 2.09. Weekly NCIC Corrections (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, as many as 34 NCIC corrections were performed in a single week (first week of August 2023), whereas no NCIC corrections were performed throughout nine weeks. On average, however, three NCIC corrections were performed a week. Yearly comparisons between 2020-2023 indicate a 45% ($n = 44$), 33% ($n = 47$), and 151% ($n = 284$) growth in the number of NCIC corrections performed year-over-year, respectively.

Firearm Leads Checked Online

In Figure 2.10, the number of firearm leads checked online each week are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024). There initially appears to be great week-to-week fluctuation in the number of weekly firearm leads checked online. In 2022, however, there was little consistency in reporting (as indicated by the dissipating blue line). Nevertheless, the number of weekly firearm leads checked online appears to be trending downward across the period of observation.




Figure 2.10. Weekly Firearms Lead Checked Online (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

Though data are not available following 2021, there are early trend indicators of note. Among the available data, for example, the number of weekly firearm leads checked online ranged between a high of 332 during the fourth week of July 2019 and zero, which occurred three times among the available data. One average, 111 online firearm lead checks were performed weekly among the available data. Nevertheless, 51% ($n = 2,589$) fewer firearms lead checks online occurred between 2020 and 2021.

Individual Leads Checked Online

The number of individual leads checked online are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024) in Figure 2.11. There initially appears to be great week-to-week consistency in the number of weekly individual leads checked online, with a noticeable spike early in 2020; however, there was little consistency in reporting (as indicated by the dissipation of the blue line) in 2022. Nevertheless, the number of weekly individual leads checked online appears to be trending downward across the period of observation.




Figure 2.11. Weekly Individual Leads Checked Online (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, as many as 992 individual lead checks online were performed the first week of March 2020, whereas zero individual lead checks online were performed the first three weeks of August 2021. On average, 99 individual lead checks online were performed among the available data; however, no data were made available following 2021. Moreover, there was a 59% ($n = 2,891$) decline in the number of individual leads checked online between 2020 and 2021.

Gun Probable Cause Search Warrants Via Video Evidence

In Figure 2.12, the number of gun probable cause search warrants received via video evidence each month are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). While initially infrequent, there was greater reporting consistency in the number of gun probable cause search warrants received via video evidence over time. Moreover, there appears to be several months without any gun probable cause search warrants received via video evidence and the rate appears to be trending downward during the period of observation.




Figure 2.12. Monthly Probable Cause Cases Developed out of Video Evidence (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though most months were without data or had no probable cause cases developed out of video evidence, five probable cause cases were developed out of video evidence in February 2023, while the average number of probable cause cases developed out of video evidence among the available evidence was 1.7. Unfortunately, the infrequency of available data and these occurrences limits our ability to draw year-to-year inferences other than to report that the former arose less often in 2023.

Probable Cause Cases Developed Out of DNA Evidence

In Figure 2.13, the number of probable cause cases developed out of DNA evidence are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Week-to-week, it is difficult to determine a pattern among probable cause cases developed out of DNA evidence because of missing data. Nevertheless, the number of probable cause cases developed out of DNA evidence appears to be trending slightly downward across the period of observation.




Figure 2.13. Monthly Probable Cause Cases Developed out of DNA Evidence (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, 13 probable cause cases were developed out of DNA evidence in a single month (November 2021); however, most months were without data or had no probable cause cases developed out of DNA evidence. There were, on average slightly more than 2 probable cause cases developed out of DNA evidence per month among the available data. Unfortunately, the infrequency of available data and these occurrences limits our ability to draw year-to-year inferences among probable cause cases that were developed out of DNA evidence.

Suspects Identified in CGIC Cases

In Figure 2.14, the number of suspects identified in CGIC cases for each month are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). While initially infrequent, there was greater reporting consistency in the number of suspects identified in CGIC cases over time. Nevertheless, the number of suspects identified in CGIC cases for each month appears to be trending downward.




Figure 2.14. Monthly Suspects Identified in CGIC Cases (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

The available data suggest that as many as 15 suspects were identified in CGIC cases during September 2022. It was far more likely, however, for there to be missing data ($n = 7$) or no suspects to be identified in CGIC cases during any given month among the available data ($n = 7$). Nevertheless, there were, on average, three suspects identified in CGIC cases per month during the period of observation. Unfortunately, the infrequency of available data and these occurrences limits our ability to draw year-to-year inferences among the number of suspects identified in CGIC cases.

IMPLEMENT TRAINING TO ADDRESS FIREARMS PACKAGING AND MARKING ERRORS THAT RESULTS IN A DELAY OF THE TEST FIRING (1.2)

Errors in packaging and firearms evidence markings get “held” for up to 72 hours for correction before being transferred to the laboratory or the FIU. Though the PBSO provides extensive training and feedback on firearms issues, the NRTAC recommended roll call refresher training. The training, they contended, should detail the proper packaging and marking of ballistic evidence to address the most common errors, as well as advanced training for individuals serving in a leadership capacity. Consideration, the NRTAC reported, should be given to developing printed reference materials for deputies. They also recommended that the PBSO create a feedback system to address errors in packaging for both deputies and their supervisors.

Though evidence packaging errors have occurred, they appear to be rare and the PBSO has informal procedures in place to address these occurrences. More specifically, an individual from the Evidence Unit notifies the deputy and their supervisor of the error. In addition to rectifying the error, VCD detectives use this communication as a training opportunity to prevent future issues.

In this, and many other ways, the PBSO is a regional leader in firearm markings and packaging training. Internally, for example, deputies are provided a firearms recovery checklist (see Appendix D), firearms recovery questionnaire (see Appendix E), and trained on how to handle firearms and firearm evidence upon being hired (see Appendix F for a flowchart of the firearms protocol taught). This type of training is tracked through the Power DMS system and required because the Crime Scene Unit was reportedly “extremely short staffed.” Regarding the former, supervisors are notified when training and training assessments are outstanding. Additionally, more advanced training is offered to detectives. VCD detectives, for example, offer training on how social media can be used to enhance investigative intelligence.



Image 2.01. Attendees listening to a Firearms Training at the Palm Beach County Police Benevolent Association

The PBSO also offers training externally to neighboring agencies and prosecutor offices (see Appendix G and Appendix H for sample single and multi-day training announcements). An all-day training occurred on November 23, 2021, for example, and included five external agencies,

including Orlando (FL) Police Department (OPD; see Image 2.01). OPD is developing a new gun squad and attended the training to jumpstart this unit. These trainings provide guidance, expertise, and support for firearms investigations (see Image 2.02) and collectively ensure consistency in firearm evidence processing throughout South Florida.



Image 2.02. Training moniker of PBSO's Firearms Investigative Unit

Table 2.02 documents the measures collected and their respective data source in observance of this specific strategic priority.

Table 2.02. Measures and Data Sources on Feedback to CGIC Process Participants (Model CGIC 7-Step Process: Step 7)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Trainings	Monthly NPI reports

Trainings

The number of trainings that support the CGIC program are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 2.15. Month-to-month, it is hard to determine a pattern among trainings that support the CGIC program because there appears to be a lot of missing data early in the observational period. This is likely due to no trainings being offered early in the grant, as other tasks were being prioritized. Nevertheless, trainings that support the PBC CGIC program appear to be trending upward across the period of observation.




Figure 2.15. Monthly Trainings (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, as many as nine trainings were held in a month (June 2023), though some months went without a training ($n = 4$). On average, however, three trainings were delivered per month between November 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2022 and 2023 indicate a 33% ($n = 8$) increase in the number of trainings offered to support the

PBC CGIC program, which is consistent with the upward trend. In total, there were 72 trainings provided to support the PBC CGIC program during the period of observation.

DESIGNATED A CRIME GUN LIAISON OFFICER IN EACH DEPARTMENT PATROL AREA (1.3)

To augment and reinforce the CGIC/NIBIN training currently provided by the FIU, the NRTAC recommended that the PBSO consider designating experienced deputies as point of contacts (POCs) who are familiar with procedural and legal issues relating to firearms (i.e., firearms identification, interpreting trace results, ShotSpotter, etc.) and laboratory/evidence submission procedures as liaisons to the PBC CGIC team. When a shooting incident occurs, these liaisons would share their knowledge about the role of the PBC CGIC and answer gun crime-related questions. Liaisons would also receive specialized training in NIBIN, preserving crime guns appropriately for forensic laboratory processes, firearms identification, crime gun scene documentation, direct referral for federal prosecution, and other relevant issues relating to the recovery of crime guns. Consideration towards advanced training in on-scene DNA swabbing of crime guns, like the Indianapolis Police Department's "Save-a-Cop" program, was recommended.

To enhance the dissemination of PBC CGIC information, senior deputies were identified in each patrol region. The approximately 12-16 deputies, also known as PBC CGIC POCs, were identified based on their procedural and legal knowledge relating to firearms. To that point, a VCD Sergeant noted that these deputies also tend to "make good cases involving gun crimes" (June 3, 2021, in a personal communication) and that "everyone has bought into this" idea (December 8, 2021, in a personal communication).

INSTITUTE PROCEDURES FOR THE RECANVASS OF SHOOTING SCENES FOR BALLISTIC EVIDENCE (1.4)

Several environmental and geographic factors (i.e., tall grass, inclement weather, low-light conditions, etc.) can challenge the comprehensive collection of fired cartridge cases from a shooting scene. A best practice is a secondary search for ballistic evidence at scenes where the initial search was difficult or where investigators found no ballistic evidence. Accordingly, the NRTAC recommended that PBSO institute a policy that directs officers or investigative personnel to recanvass all shooting scenes the following day, particularly in those instances of ShotSpotter alerts where no or limited ballistic evidence was recovered. In conjunction with this process, follow-up neighborhood canvassing can occur. Potential witnesses may be more willing to speak with officers the following day, outside of an active crime scene. Incorporating "door hangers" to solicit information and sustain community/police relations, the NRTAC reported, should be implemented as well. Engaging the community after a shooting incident further enhances community and police communication and trust.

Upon review, the PBSO and their partners regularly recanvass shooting scenes the following day when no or limited ballistic evidence is recovered. In the event of a ShotSpotter alert, road patrol is dispatched to the area to canvass for evidence. With discoveries, they typically call the Crime Scene Unit to collect evidence that is packaged separately. DNA evidence is also processed by request.

As it relates to the NRTAC's "door hangers" recommendation, the PBSO had previously tested this community engagement and neighborhood canvassing approach but did not find it to be "fruitful" and reported that it may have an unintended consequence of placing "potential witnesses/neighbors at risk" (comments from Strategic Plan submitted to BJA in August 2021). In stakeholder meetings, SMEs acknowledged that door hangers are not right for every agency.

As an alternative to door hangers, the PBSO utilized two approaches: 1) established community relationships and 2) undercovers/informants. In the Strategic Plan, the PBSO also acknowledged their willingness to expand these efforts with, for example, "general community awareness, targeting specific areas with high rates of shootings and ShotSpotter activities, with a general message of 'contact us,' 'we are here.'" Additionally, an agreement with the Tactical Intelligence Unit was developed to respond, as needed, to VCD requests for K-9 recanvassing (see [NRTAC Recommendation 1.5](#)).

EXPLOSIVES DETECTION CANINE (1.5)

The PBSO, according to NRTAC, should explore using an explosives detection canine as an added resource in locating cases or firearms. NRTAC went on to note that if this recommendation was pursued, PBSO should develop an accompanying policy to direct canine officers to recanvass the neighborhood the following day, particularly in instances where there were ShotSpotter alerts or multiple calls for shots fired but minimal or no ballistic evidence was recovered.

The Tactical Intelligence Unit has two "gun" dogs dedicated to locating gun casings and projectiles. Approximately half of the remaining canines at the PBSO are trained to detect explosives. The ATF has a gun dog, as well. Since this recommendation, the VCD made an informal agreement with the Tactical Intelligence Unit to respond to shooting scenes, including ShotSpotter alerts, when detectives make a request. In December 2021, a VCD Sergeant reported that gun dogs had responded to two ShotSpotter alert scenes when no evidence was recovered and are generally "effective when they are sent."

SECTION III. NIBIN ENTRY AND CORRELATION (STEP 2)

Step 2 of the Model CGIC 7-Step Process entails the prompt processing of gun crime evidence. More specifically, it promotes gun crime evidence processing within 24-hours, including the processing of forensic evidence, test-fired and recovered crime scene cartridge casings into NIBIN, and NIBIN correlations to associated crimes. Gun crime evidence processing also includes trace requests submitted through the e-Trace system at the ATF's National Tracing Center. The NRTAC made three NIBIN entry and correlation recommendations for the PBC CGIC:

- 2.1 Develop a fast-track process for NIBIN eligible crime guns submitted to the laboratory
- 2.2 Develop a regional MOU for outside jurisdictions
- 2.3 Explore the hiring of a NIBIN coordinator

DEVELOP A FAST-TRACK PROCESS FOR NIBIN ELIGIBLE CRIME GUNS SUBMITTED TO THE LABORATORY (2.1)

At the onset of the grant, there was a 72-hour hold period for investigators to submit their requests for processing crime guns. However, guns recovered in domestic violence incidents, found guns, and other firearms not recovered from crime scenes had no such delay. Because every recovered NIBIN eligible crime/found gun has the potential to have been used in a violent crime, it was recommended that all NIBIN eligible firearms be processed for DNA swabbing and latent fingerprints and test fired. The event in which the firearm was recovered should not impact processing, nor should the recovering officer or detective be obligated to request any forensic processing for NIBIN eligible firearms.

In response to this recommendation, the Major of the PBSO's Major Crimes Bureau sent a memo on June 16, 2021 to the Captain of the PBSO's VCD and Director of the Technical Services Unit. In part, the Major's directive sought to "establish a new standard in handling all NIBIN suitable firearms" by requiring that "All applicable firearms [...] be validated, processed for DNA, and fired no longer than 48 hours from the time they are received into evidence" (see Appendix I). In practice, deputies no longer needed to request firearm evidence testing because training is required when it is available. To facilitate DNA processing, a contract with DNA International was fully executed on June 2, 2021 to provide prompt and comprehensive DNA analysis on pre-screened ballistic evidence. When coupled with existing and daily communication with the Firearms Investigative Unit, it was anticipated that this directive would make an immediate impact on timely CGI because, according to a SME, "once a weapon is fired twice, there is a 50% chance it will be used again in the coming days."

Table 3.01 observes process related measures and their respective data sources among NIBIN eligible crime guns.

Table 3.01. Measures and Data Sources on NIBIN Entries and Correlations (Model CGIC 7-Step Process: Step 2)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Casings the VCD entered into NIBIN	Weekly firearms data
Ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN	Monthly NPI report
Ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN within a business day	Monthly NPI report
Ballistics from test-fired crime guns entered into NIBIN	Monthly NPI report
Ballistics from test-fired crime guns entered into NIBIN within a business day	Monthly NPI report
Crime guns the firearms investigations unit test-fired and entered into NIBIN	Weekly firearms data
Firearms entered into evidence that were test-fired/entered into NIBIN by the FIU	Weekly firearms data
Perceived firearms linked but not yet recovered	Monthly NPI report
Ballistic evidence linked to another incident or item via NIBIN	Monthly NPI report
Crime guns linked to another incident or item via NIBIN	Monthly NPI report

Casings the VCD Entered into NIBIN

The number of casings the VCD entered into NIBIN are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 3.01. Week-to-week, there was great change in the number of weekly casings the VCD entered into NIBIN and was trending upward at the end of the period of observation.




Figure 3.01. Weekly Casings Entered into NIBIN by the VCD (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

The VCD entered casings into NIBIN sporadically, which ranged between a high of 84 casings entered during the third week of February 2023 and low of zero ($n = 8$) during the period of observation. Weekly spikes in casings the VCD entered into NIBIN, however, tended to be followed by lows before spiking again. On average, the VCD entered 16 casings into NIBIN between July 1, 2019 and March 31, 2024. Year-over-year casings the VCD entered into NIBIN tended to grow. Between 2020 and 2021, for example, the number of casings the VCD entered into NIBIN grew by 43% ($n = 290$). Similarly, the number of casings the VCD entered into NIBIN grew by another 28% ($n = 272$) between 2021 and 2022. Thereafter (between 2022 and 2023), the number of casings the VCD entered into NIBIN remained somewhat stable ($n = -8, -1\%$).

Ballistic Evidence Entered into NIBIN

The number of pieces of ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN is plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 3.02. Week-to-week, there was some consistency in the number of pieces of ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN (outside of a few spikes early) during the period of observation. Nevertheless, the number of pieces of ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN trended slightly downward.




Figure 3.02. Weekly Ballistics Evidence Entered into NIBIN (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, the number of pieces of ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN peaked at 157 pieces during the fourth week of November 2021. Alternatively, the third week of September 2023 was associated with the fewest pieces of ballistic evidence being entered into NIBIN ($n = 1$). On average, however, 22 pieces of ballistic evidence were entered into NIBIN between November 1, 2021 and March. 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2022 and 2023 indicate that the number of pieces of ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN fell by 11% ($n = 159$) during the period of observation. This is overwhelming due to two outlying spikes in ballistic evidence being entered into NIBIN during March and April 2022.

Ballistic Entered into NIBIN within a Business Day

The number of pieces of ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN within a business day is plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 3.03. Early in the project these data were unavailable but began being collected in mid-2023. Available data indicate that the number of pieces of ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN within a business day trended upward.





Figure 3.03. Weekly Ballistics Evidence Entered into NIBIN within a Business Day (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though data early on the project is not available, the number of pieces of ballistics entered into NIBIN within a business day was somewhat sporadic and ranged between a weekly high of 19 pieces of ballistic evidence entered into NIBIN within a business day (during the second week of March 2024) and a number of weeks ($n = 3$) without any pieces of ballistic evidence being entered into NIBIN within a business day among the available data. Six pieces of ballistics evidence were entered into NIBIN within a business day weekly (on average) among the available data.

Ballistics from Test-Fired Crime Guns Entered into NIBIN

In Figure 3.04, the number of ballistics from test-fired crime guns entered into NIBIN are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Though there is some missing data at the beginning of the observational period, there is some consistency in the number of weekly ballistics from test-fired crime guns entered into NIBIN, which trended slightly upward.






Figure 3.05. Weekly Ballistics from Test-Fired Crime Guns Entered into NIBIN within a Business Day (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though data early on the project is not available, the number of ballistics from test-fired crime guns entered into NIBIN within a business day was somewhat sporadic and ranged between a weekly high of 110 ballistics from test-fired crime guns entered into NIBIN within a business day (during the August 2023) and a number of weeks ($n = 5$) without any ballistics from test-fired crime guns entered into NIBIN within a business day among the available data. On average, 33 ballistics from test-fired crime guns were entered into NIBIN within a business day among the available data.

Crime Guns the Firearm Investigations Unit Test-Fired and Entered into NIBIN

In Figure 3.06, the number of crime guns the FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN each week are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). There appears to be great week-to-week fluctuation in the number of crime guns the FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN but trended upward during the period of observation.




Figure 3.06. Weekly FIU Test-Fired and Entered into NIBIN (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, on average, the FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN 17 pieces of evidence. The greatest amount of evidence the FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN ($n = 75$) occurred during the fourth week of February 2023, while the FIU did not test-fire and enter evidence into NIBIN during several weeks ($n = 31$) between July 1, 2019 and March 31, 2024. Year-over-year the amount of evidence FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN grew, which is consistent with the broader upward trend. Between 2020 and 2021, for example, the amount of evidence FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN grew by 75% ($n = 255$), and another 48% ($n = 283$) between 2021 and 2022. Similarly, the amount of evidence FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN grew by 74% ($n = 650$) between 2022 and 2023.

Firearms Entered into Evidence that the Firearm Investigations Unit Test-Fired/Entered into NIBIN

Figure 3.07 plots the proportion of firearms entered into evidence that the FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN during the period of observation (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024). Proportions were derived by dividing the weekly number of firearms the FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN (see Figure 3.06) by the weekly number of firearms entered into evidence (see Figure 2.03). Though data were not available until mid- to late-2020, there appears to be great week-to-week fluctuation in the proportion of firearms entered into evidence that the FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN but trended upward across the period of observation. Moreover, there appears to be periods where backlogs of entered evidence were processed in subsequent months alongside

existing evidence that was test-fired and entered into NIBIN, which is evident by proportions that exceed 100% during the period of observation.




Figure 3.07. Proportion of Firearms Entered into Evidence that were Test-Fired/Entered into NIBIN by the FIU (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024)

Though firearms entered into evidence were regularly test-fired and entered into NIBIN by the FIU, the rate that entered evidence was test-fired and entered into NIBIN by the FIU varied considerably during the period of observation. At its height, 177% entered firearms were test-fired and entered into NIBIN by the FIU during the first and second week of January 2024, which is indicative of carry-over from the prior week(s). There were, however, four weeks during the period of observation that no firearms were entered into evidence were test-fired and entered into NIBIN by the FIU. Weekly spikes in firearms entered into evidence were frequently followed by a week or two of lows before spiking again. Nevertheless, the FIU test-fired and entered into NIBIN 51% of firearms that were entered into evidence a week (on average). The proportion of firearms entered into evidence that were test-fired and entered into NIBIN grew between 2021 and 2022 by 14% and another 29% between 2022 and 2023. This is consistent with the upward trajectory during the period of observation.

Perceived Firearms Linked but Not Yet Recovered

In Figure 3.08, the number of firearms perceived to be linked but not yet recovered each month are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Though data were not available until 2023 and there appears to be some fluctuation, the number of firearms perceived to be linked by not yet recovered trended upward among the available data.




Figure 3.08. Monthly Firearms Perceived to be Linked but Not Yet Recovered (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, firearms perceived to be linked but not yet recovered spiked during March 2024 ($n = 16$) and were non-existent prior to Jun 2023. On average, however, there were 4 firearms perceived to be linked but not yet recovered per month among the available data.

Ballistic Evidence Linked to Another Incident or Item Via NIBIN

The number of pieces of ballistic evidence linked to another incident or item via NIBIN is plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 3.09. Early in the project, data were sporadically available but became more consistently reported in the middle of 2023. Available data indicate that the number of pieces of ballistic evidence linked to another incident or item via NIBIN trended downward, but this is likely most attributable to missing data.




Figure 3.09 Monthly Ballistic Evidence Linked to Another Incident or Item via NIBIN (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though irregularly reported, on average, 6 pieces of ballistic evidence were linked to another incident or item via NIBIN per month. The greatest number of pieces of ballistic evidence were linked to another incident or item via NIBIN ($n = 21$) occurred early in the project (November 2021), while no pieces of ballistic evidence were linked during the first and third week of October 2023.

Crime Guns Linked to Another Incident or Item Via NIBIN

In Figure 3.10, the number of crime guns linked to another incident or item via NIBIN is plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Though data were not available until 2023 and there appears to be some fluctuation, the number of crime guns linked to another incident or item via NIBIN trended upward among the available data.




Figure 3.10 Monthly Crime Guns Linked to Another Incident or Item via NIBIN (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, data related to crime guns linked to another incident or item via NIBIN was not available until 2023. Among the available data, the number of crime guns linked to another incident peaked in March 2024 ($n = 16$) and no crime guns were linked to another incident between January and May 2023. On average, however, four crime guns were linked to another incident or item via NIBIN per month among the available data.

BrassTrax Submissions

As part of the development of a fast-track process for NIBIN eligible crime guns submitted to the crime laboratory, BrassTrax submission data were collected. Table 3.02 identifies the participating agencies and data sources for BrassTrax submissions between January 1, 2022 and March 31, 2024.

Table 3.02. Measures and Data Sources on NIBIN Entries and Correlations (Model CGIC 7-Step Process: Step 2)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Boca Raton BrassTrax submissions	Monthly BrassTrax submissions

City of Boynton Beach BrassTrax submissions	Monthly BrassTrax submissions
City of Delray Beach BrassTrax submissions	Monthly BrassTrax submissions
Jupiter BrassTrax submissions	Monthly BrassTrax submissions
City of Palm Beach Gardens BrassTrax submissions	Monthly BrassTrax submissions
Palm Springs BrassTrax submissions	Monthly BrassTrax submissions
Riviera Beach BrassTrax submissions	Monthly BrassTrax submissions
City of West Palm Beach BrassTrax submissions	Monthly BrassTrax submissions
Summary of BrassTrax submissions	Monthly BrassTrax submissions

Boca Raton BrassTrax Submissions. In Figure 3.11, the number of BrassTrax submissions in Boca Raton are plotted over time during the period of observation (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024). Month-to-month, there is little consistency among the number of BrassTrax submissions by Boca Raton. Nevertheless, the number of BrassTrax submissions in Boca Raton appears to grow across the period of observation.




Figure 3.11 Monthly Boca Raton BrassTrax Submissions (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024)

Boca Raton irregularly made BrassTrax submissions and monthly submissions ranged between a high of 14 during the month of February 2023 and low of no submissions during several months ($n = 10$). Boca Raton made (on average) three BrassTrax submission per month between January 1, 2022 and March 31, 2024. Additionally, the number of BrassTrax submissions submitted by Boca Raton grew by 68% ($n = 21$) between 2022 and 2023, which is consistent with the broader upward trend.

City of Boynton Beach BrassTrax Submissions. The number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of Boynton Beach are plotted over time during the period of observation (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024) in Figure 3.12. Month-to-month, there appears to be peaks and valleys in the number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of Boynton Beach during the period of observation. Nevertheless, the number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of Boynton Beach appears to trend slightly upward across the period of observation.




Figure 3.12 Monthly City of Boynton Beach BrassTrax Submissions (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, monthly BrassTrax submissions by the City of Boynton Beach peaked in December 2023 ($n = 48$) with a low of no submissions during several months ($n = 5$). On average, however, the City of Boynton Beach made 17 BrassTrax submission per month between January 1, 2022 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2022 and 2023

indicate that the number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of Boynton Beach grew by 2% ($n = 3$), which is consistent with the slight upward trend.

City of Delray Beach BrassTrax Submissions. In Figure 3.13, the number of BrassTrax submissions in the City of Delray Beach are plotted over time during the period of observation (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024). Month-to-month, there is little consistency among the number of BrassTrax submissions by the City of Delray Beach. Nevertheless, the number of BrassTrax submissions in the City of Delray Beach appears to decline across the period of observation.




Figure 3.13 Monthly City of Delray Beach BrassTrax Submissions (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024)

Though the City of Delray Beach regularly made submissions to BrassTrax, the submission rate was somewhat inconsistent and ranged between a high of 24 in October 2022 and low of 4 during several months ($n = 3$). The City of Delray Beach submitted, on average, 12 submissions to BrassTrax per month between January 1, 2022 and March 31, 2024. Between 2022 and 2023, the City of Delray Beach made 9% ($n = 12$) fewer submissions to BrassTrax, which is consistent the broader downward trend.

Jupiter BrassTrax Submissions. Data based on the number of BrassTrax submission in Jupiter were not available during the period of observation (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024).

City of Palm Beach Gardens BrassTrax Submissions. The number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of Palm Beach Gardens are plotted over time during the period of observation (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024) in Figure 3.14. Month-to-month, there appears to be peaks and valleys in the number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of Palm Beach Gardens during the period of observation. Nevertheless, the number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of Palm Beach Gardens appears to trend upward across the period of observation.




Figure 3.14 Monthly City of Palm Beach Gardens BrassTrax Submissions (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, the BrassTrax submission rate for the City of Palm Beach Gardens varied and ranged between a high of 10 in March 2023 and low of zero during several months ($n = 11$). On average, however, there were 2 BrassTrax submissions for the City of Palm Beach Gardens between January 1, 2022 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2022 and 2023 indicate that the number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of Palm Beach Gardens grew by 200% ($n = 24$), which is consistent with the broader upward trend.

Palm Springs BrassTrax Submissions. In Figure 3.15, the number of BrassTrax submissions in Palm Springs are plotted over time during the period of observation (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024). It appears as though data were unavailable in Palm Springs until late 2023. From the available data, however, data indicate an upward trend in the number of BrassTrax submissions in Palm Springs.




Figure 3.15 Monthly Palm Springs BrassTrax Submissions (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024)

Though data were not available until October 2023, Palm Springs averaged 3.5 BrassTrax submission per month among the available data and ranged between a high of six (during October and December 2023) and low of 1 submission during January 2024.

Riviera Beach BrassTrax Submissions. In Figure 3.16, the number of BrassTrax submissions by Riviera Beach are plotted over time during the period of observation (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024). Month-to-month, the number of BrassTrax submissions by Riviera Beach fluctuated but appeared stable during the period of observation.




Figure 3.16 Monthly Riviera Beach BrassTrax Submissions (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, the BrassTrax submission rate for Riviera Beach varied and ranged between a high of 92 in April 2023 and low of three during December 2022. On average, however, there were 37 BrassTrax submissions for Riviera Beach between January 1, 2022 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2022 and 2023 indicate that the number of BrassTrax submissions for Riviera Beach fell by 1% ($n = 24$), which is consistent with the broader stable trend.

City of West Palm Beach BrassTrax Submissions. The number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of West Palm Beach are plotted over time during the period of observation (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024) in Figure 3.17. Month-to-month, there appears to be some consistency in the number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of West Palm Beach during the period of observation. Nevertheless, number of BrassTrax submissions for the City of West Palm Beach appears to trend slightly upward across the period of observation.




Figure 3.17 Monthly City of West Palm Beach BrassTrax Submissions (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024)

The City of West Palm Beach frequently and consistently made submissions to BrassTrax during the period of observation and ranged between a high of 85 during July 2023 and low of 11 during December 2022. On average, however, 37 BrassTrax submissions were made per month between January 1, 2022 and March 31, 2024. Between 2022 and 2023, the City of West Palm Beach made 9% ($n = 40$) more submission to BrassTrax, which is consistent with the broader slightly upward trend.

Summary BrassTrax Submissions. In Figure 3.18, the total number of BrassTrax submissions are plotted over time during the period of observation (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024). Month-to-month and across all the available sites, there is some consistency in the number of BrassTrax submissions until the end of the period of observation, which was trending upward.




Figure 3.18 Monthly Summary of BrassTrax Submissions (January 1, 2022-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, the number of BrassTrax submissions across the available sites varied from a high of 179 in July 2023 and low of 18 in December 2022. On average, however, there were 107 BrassTrax Submissions across the available sites between January 1, 2022 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2022 and 2023 indicate that the number of BrassTrax submission across the available sites grew by 14% (n = 170), which is consistent with the broader upward trend.

DEVELOP A REGIONAL MOU FOR OUTSIDE JURISDICTIONS (2.2)

Collaboration is a central function of developing NIBIN based intelligence. As such, the NRTAC recommended that the PBSO develop protocols to involve other municipalities in the CGIC process, including the entry of fired cartridges and test firing of crime guns. The ATF, they noted, could support outreach and training of other jurisdictions along with the PBSO NIBIN coordinator. The NRTAC also encouraged the PBSO executive staff to troubleshoot procedural differences or participation questions in the executive stakeholders meeting.

Effecting change throughout PBC requires a coordinated effort among all PBC law enforcement agencies. In addition to the PBSO, which provides law enforcement services to 17 incorporated municipalities and all unincorporated areas in PBC, there are 21 additional municipal law enforcement agencies operating in PBC (see Figure 3.19 and Table 3.03). Each agency has a separate dispatch system, services unique populations, adheres to their own policies/procedures,

and has distinct resource limitations. These differences are at odds with a coordinated, regional response to CGI and often have the unintended consequence of cases falling out of the criminal justice system. More specifically, PBSO detectives frequently reported sharing CGI with other PBC law enforcement agencies, only to receive no response, limited investigative follow-up, or they did not communicate their investigative efforts back to the PBSO. This has been described as “leads going into blackholes,” which is especially concerning in PBC where it is estimated that 65-70% of NIBIN leads have ties to other agencies. Many leads dissipate, according to PBSO detectives, because it is not clear who should be contacted or who is responsible for following-up on CGI at other agencies.




Figure 3.19. District Map of PBC

In a coordinated effort, accountability is equally as important as communication. An ATF TFO and PBSO detective who typically shares CGI with external agencies when it becomes available stated that “if people are ignoring me, I become a pain in the neck” wherein they note in the casefile that the agency was not responsive and then loop in their supervisor. The success of this approach was overwhelmingly attributed to his personal connections throughout the County. Nevertheless, and to better understand what happens to these leads, an ATF TFO and PBSO detective suggested developing a tracking system that prompts

investigative follow-up.

Communication and accountability deficiencies, however, are not universal in PBC. In fact, each agency has had varying degrees of buy-in to CGI. To enhance communication and accountability, NRTAC recommended expanding PBC’s CGIC network by entering into Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) with the other 21 municipal law enforcement agencies operating in PBC. MOUs would standardize the sharing of CGI in PBC and create partnership expectations, protocols, and a venue for advancing CGI through training and outreach throughout the County. Additionally, with each MOU the PBC CGIC would gain legitimacy and be sustained beyond any one individual or agency. Though simple in form, MOUs are often legally complicated, which prompted a former VCD captain to state that the “biggest issue will be getting the city agencies on board.”

To overcome these issues, the PBSO adopted an incremental approach. Agencies in PBC were first exposed to the PBC CGIC through two existing County entities: the PBC International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and PBC Criminal Justice Commission (CJC). In 2006, a VCD detective and FIU analyst, on behalf of the PBSO, gave a presentation to the PBC IACP encouraging agencies to join a regional CGI effort. Though there was great interest in a PBC CGIC, there was little to no follow-up.

Table 3.03 PBC Municipalities and their Law Enforcement Agency

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Law Enforcement Agency</u>
Atlantis	Atlantis Police Department
Belle Glade	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Boca Raton	Boca Raton Police Department
Boynton Beach	Boynton Beach Police Department
Briny Breezes	Boynton Beach Police Department
Cloud Lake	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Delray Beach	Delray Beach Police Department
Glen Ridge	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Golf	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Greenacres	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Gulf Stream	Gulf Stream Police Department
Haverhill	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Highland Beach	Highland Beach Police Department
Hypoluxo	Lantana Police Department
Juno Beach	Juno Beach Police Department
Jupiter	Jupiter Police Department
Jupiter Inlet Colony	Jupiter Inlet Colony Police Department

Table 3.03 continues on the next page ...

Table 3.03 PBC Municipalities and their Law Enforcement Agency (continued)

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Law Enforcement Agency</u>
Lake Clarke Shores	Lake Clarke Shores Police Department
Lake Park	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Lake Worth Beach	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Lantana	Lantana Police Department
Loxahatchee Groves	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Manalapan	Manalapan Police Department
Mangonia Park	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
North Palm Beach	North Palm Beach Police Department
Ocean Ridge	Ocean Ridge Police Department
Pahokee	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Palm Beach	Palm Beach Police Department
Palm Beach Gardens	Palm Beach Gardens Police Department
Palm Beach Shores	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Palm Springs	Palm Springs Police Department
Riviera Beach	Riviera Beach Police Department
Royal Palm Beach	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
South Bay	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
South Palm Beach	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Tequesta	Tequesta Police Department
Wellington	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Westlake	Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
West Palm Beach	West Palm Beach Police Department

As it relates to the PBC CJC, there is a history of supporting CGI. In fact, the PBC CJC has a CGI protocol and agreement in place that was last modified on February 11, 2010 (see Appendix J). The PBC CJC, through the Law Enforcement Planning Council, also employs an analyst that, according to a VCD Sergeant, is “always looking for projects.” This analyst is being leveraged to aid the PBC CGIC initiative since the PBC CJC has a county-wide mission.

Thereafter, the PBSO focused their efforts on developing MOUs with the 13 smallest agencies in PBC. Many of these agencies do not have the capacity for CGI and it was believed that collaborating with the PBSO would yield the greatest amount of probative CGI evidence. Alternatively, many of the larger agencies in PBC have a patchwork of agreements with each other and buy-in from the ‘Big Four’ (i.e., the cities of West Palm Beach, Boynton Beach, Delray Beach, and Riviera Beach) “should not be a problem” according to a VCD Sergeant. At the onset of collaborating with the 13 smallest agencies in PBC, it was discovered that many of these agencies had guns sitting in their property storage facilities that had never been examined, validating the hypothesized theory of where the greatest amount of probative CGI evidence would be procured.

Given an MOU’s potential for promoting territorial issues, it is critical for known and trusted voices to deliver the promise of a PBC CGIC. In PBC, ATF TFOs, PBSO detectives, and the CGIC Coordinator have longstanding partnerships with most of the law enforcement agencies operating in PBC and were critical to garnering buy-in from other agencies. In some instances, agency buy-in needed to be cultivated. The ATF, SAO, and USAO took a share in this responsibility. Regardless of who directs these efforts, a community of collaborative law enforcement seeking to enhance public safety should be the primary objective of any regional CGIC effort and was an often-repeated approach to CGI in the VCD.

EXPLORE THE HIRING OF A NIBIN COORDINATOR (2.3)

According to the NRTAC, a NIBIN Coordinator would advance PBSO’s capabilities and enhance regional collaboration and communication. The NIBIN Coordinator would be responsible for training, overseeing tracking, gathering statistical data, and program operational and administrative functions. At the onset of the project, a detective handled these responsibilities, because the PBSO did not have this position written into their CGIC implementation plan nor budget. In fact, oversight of the PBC CGIC was originally proposed as a halftime position with additional investigative responsibilities. In review of the grant proposal and NRTAC recommendations, the PBSO hired a CGIC Coordinator (as opposed to just a NIBIN Coordinator). With additional grant funds not forthcoming and an expectation for the PBSO to continue funding the position at the completion of the grant, a joint decision among PBC CGIC stakeholders was made to appropriate previously budgeted money for a SAO analyst toward a CGIC Coordinator. This budget modification was requested (and approved on August 10, 2021), in part, because the duties of the CGIC Coordinator would support the SAO. The CGIC Coordinator was identified, then hired on October 13, 2021. This individual was a former ATF TFO with a law degree. Though

hired as a civilian, the CGIC Coordinator had worked in PBC for 33 years, ascending to the captain rank with the West Palm Beach Police Department, and had worked with the SAO in PBC.

In coordination with project partners, the role of the CGIC Coordinator was subsequently clarified and distinguished from ATF TFOs and PBSO detective responsibilities. It was determined, for example, that the CGIC Coordinator would primarily provide operational day-to-day support to PBC's CGIC by assisting with training, tracking evidence/cases through their dispositions, and gathering statistical information, especially relating to manually collected data points. The CGIC Coordinator was also a program ambassador to PBC CGIC stakeholders, liaising with other agencies, and occasionally following up on leads that do not appear to be going anywhere, which differs from pushing out leads (i.e., the role of ATF TFOs and PBSO detectives). In this capacity, the CGIC Coordinator was well suited to hear/share success stories and advocate for the distribution of resources to PBC CGIC stakeholders. Finally, the CGIC Coordinator also centralized data collection efforts and freed up additional investigative time that would otherwise be spent administrating the PBC CGIC.

SECTION IV. CRIME GUN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS (STEP 3)

The third step in the Model CGIC 7-Step Process relates to crime gun intelligence analysis. CGICs should receive NIBIN leads and e-Trace results and, with support from local law enforcement, the ATF should conduct a comprehensive analysis of crime gun data. Data analyses are then to be rapidly disseminated to detectives for investigative follow-up. As it relates to the PBC CGIC, the NRTAC made six recommendations relating to crime gun intelligence analysis:

- 3.1 Assign a full-time intelligence analyst to the FIU
- 3.2 Develop protocols with the real-time crime center (RTCC) to communicate intelligence analysis for homicides & nonfatal shootings
- 3.3 Standardize triage process to determine investigative potential of NIBIN leads
- 3.4 Develop a standardized/NIBIN lead notification numbering system
- 3.5 Review intelligence lead package & raw lead dissemination
- 3.6 Conduct a trace study of NIBIN firearms

ASSIGN A FULL-TIME INTELLIGENCE ANALYST TO THE FIREARM INVESTIGATIONS UNIT (3.1)

At its core, a CGIC is an intelligence unit dedicated to the analysis and referral of actionable intelligence related to gun crime. Intelligence resources are often limited, making a careful selection of assignments and processes critical for CGIC success. Having an analyst assigned directly to the FIU, according to the NRTAC, would significantly improve their capabilities.

Prior to this recommendation, two Criminal Intelligence Analysts were assigned to the FIU halftime. Furthermore, the VCD has additional analysts assigned fulltime to each Unit. The existing Analysts, however, are working with the CGIC Coordinator to provide data to support BJA performance metrics.

In observance of this specific strategic priority are the following measures and their respective data source (see Table 4.01).

Table 4.01. Measures and Data Sources on Crime Gun Intelligence Analysis (Model CGIC 7-Step Process: Step 3)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Full/part-time crime analysts assigned to the CGIC program	Monthly NPI report

Full/Part-Time Crime Analysts Assigned to the CGIC Program

In Figure 4.01, the number of combined full and part-time crime analysts assigned to the CGIC program are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). There appears to be great week-to-week fluctuation in the number of combined full and part-time crime analysts assigned to the CGIC but was trending upward at the end of the period of observation.




Figure 4.01. Monthly Full/Part-Time Crime Analysts Assigned to the CGIC Program (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Between November 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024, the average number of monthly full and part-time crime analysts assigned to the CGIC program was 3.8. During the period of observation, however, the number of full and part-time crime analysts assigned to the CGIC varied between a high of 8 (January and April 2023) and low of 1 in January 2022. Yearly comparisons indicate a 90% (n = 2.3) growth in the number of full and part-time crime analysts assigned to the CGIC program between 2022 and 2023, which is consistent with the broad upward trend.

DEVELOP PROTOCOL WITH THE REAL-TIME CRIME CENTER (RTCC) TO COMMUNICATE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS FOR HOMICIDES AND NONFATAL SHOOTINGS (3.2)

The PBSO has an RTCC staffed with crime analysts that provide actionable intelligence related to shootings. The NRTAC recommended that the PBSO consider developing a protocol to communicate any intelligence surrounding shootings from the RTCC to the analyst working NIBIN leads. If homicide or assault with a firearm is later linked through NIBIN to other shootings, the initial intelligence report produced under these protocols can quickly inform NIBIN lead triage and be made part of the NIBIN lead intelligence package.

While the RTCC does have crime analysts, they do not provide actionable NIBIN intelligence in homicides or nonfatal shootings. NIBIN intelligence, to that effect, does not originate in the RTCC. Rather, the VCD, through the Correlation Center and ATF, investigates and refers NIBIN leads to neighboring jurisdictions for investigative follow-up. Substantively, this recommendation was not applicable to PBC's CGIC.

STANDARDIZE TRIAGE PROCESS TO DETERMINE INVESTIGATIVE POTENTIAL OF NIBIN LEADS (3.3)

According to the NRTAC, the PBSO did not have a formal triage system to determine the investigative potential of NIBIN leads. As such, they encouraged the PBSO to adopt the G.E.T.S. process. G.E.T.S. focuses on the following solvability criteria:

- **Geography.** Provides the physical location of all events, in relation to each other, that are involved in the shooting cycle and includes the initial and subsequent purchase/transfer of a firearm, the linked shooting events, and recovery of a linked crime gun.
- **Event.** Provides the type of shooting events that are linked such as homicide, robbery, or shots fired.
- **Time.** Provides the number of days between linked events which is an important factor in determining investigative potential. A small number of days between linked events increases the possibility that they were perpetrated by the same suspect(s).
- **Solvability.** Provides non-ballistic links between events or information that raises investigative potential such as a witness statement, crime camera video, or modus operandi.

G.E.T.S., according to the NRTAC, creates a standardized triage process but maintains necessary flexibility to include localized priorities relating to violent gun crime.

Though flexible in determining and objectives, the G.E.T.S. process does not provide guidance for establishing priorities among conflicting values. This was discussed as problematic when bringing together PBC CGIC stakeholders, who inherently value their own geography in the prioritization of NIBIN leads. The G.E.T.S. process, however, can be used to find common ground among PBC CGIC constituents. PBC CGIC stakeholders, for example, likely agree that investigative priority

should be given to NIBIN leads linked to homicides with known suspects, regardless of the location.

DEVELOP A STANDARDIZED/NIBIN LEAD NOTIFICATION NUMBERING SYSTEM (3.4)

At the onset of the project, the PBSO used ATF's NIBIN Enforcement Support System's (NESS) crime gun ID for internal tracking purposes. According to NRTAC, PBSO should consider developing their own unique numbering system (NIBIN #21-001, 21-017, 765, 766...), which they contend is a best practice utilized by police departments around the country. Furthermore, the NRTAC encouraged the PBSO to work with their local ATF counterparts to develop a RMS bridge with NESS to fully actualize its capabilities and enhance their partnership with the ATF.

This NRTAC recommendation was discussed and found to be inconsistent with the PBC CGIC needs. More specifically, the PBSO and the other 21 municipal law enforcement agencies operating in PBC were familiar with the ATF's NESS system and numbering, which best supports the PBC CGIC intention to be a regional hub. The ATF's NESS numbering system is standardized and more exhaustively linked to NIBIN data (e.g., acquisitions, cases, firearms, leads, and hits), eTrace information (FTS ID, trace, FFL theft, multiple sale, and purchase date), Law Enforcement Record Management System (containing people, locations, and narratives), and ATF data (used to produce information reports, triage cases, and display results). A new numbering system would be redundant, offer less utility, and be an unnecessary complication to an already nuanced phenomenon. When confronted with these facts, a SME stated "I would take back this recommendation" on September 2, 2021. Substantively, the PBSO and PBC CGIC continued to use the ATF's NESS numbering system.

REVIEW INTELLIGENCE LEAD PACKAGE AND RAW LEAD DISSEMINATION (3.5)

Timely intelligence analysis of raw NIBIN lead information is critical for consistently successful outcomes. Adding context to raw NIBIN leads during the intelligence analysis process, according to the NRTAC, is essential to investigators and senior leadership. This information also becomes part of the triage process. According to the NRTAC, all investigators should get the basic or raw lead and be provided with a standardized NIBIN intelligence package. The NIBIN intelligence package should be rapid, within 24 hours of lead receipt, to ensure important intelligence is in the hands of investigators in a timely fashion. Additional information, the NRTAC reported, can be forwarded as a supplemental intelligence report. In developing the intelligence lead package and process for disseminating intelligence leads in the region, the NRTAC encouraged the PBSO to work with the ATF Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) and VCD detectives to develop an intelligence package useful to investigators from the region.

Timely CGI is emphasized and addressed in several NRTAC recommendations (see e.g., [NRTAC Recommendation 1.1](#) and [2.1](#)). Contextualizing evidence, such as NIBIN leads, in available intelligence is equally as important. Though the PBSO provides intelligence lead packages, an informal process continues to determine which cases receive attention and the content appearing in packages.

CONDUCT A TRACE STUDY OF NIBIN FIREARMS (3.6)

Since the NIBIN firearms are known to have been used in shootings, the trace patterns associated with these firearms could prove insightful in many ways, to include identifying unique differences in time to crime, weapons of choice for trigger pullers, and common sources of firearms used in shootings. The NRTAC, therefore, encouraged the ATF Miami Field Division IRS to partner with the PBSO to conduct a trace study of all recovered firearms over the past 12 to 18 months. The study, they further elaborated, should identify all firearms with a NIBIN link, the number of shootings associated with each of those firearms (specifically, identifying those firearms used to commit a homicide or nonfatal shooting), and a calculation of true time to crime (time of purchase to the time of first NIBIN lead).

Furthermore, the study should include comparing trace results of all firearms recovered to those with a NIBIN link over the same period. The NRTAC also recommended that the study include Geographic Information System (GIS) street-level mapping of all recovered firearms during the period, highlighting those with a NIBIN link. Mapping could be used to facilitate proactive patrolling areas and targeted investigation strategies for focused deterrence in those areas where firearm crimes are most prevalent. Finally, they noted that the results of the study should be shared with prosecutors so they can make informed charging decisions to aid in closing crime gun sources.

These types of analyses, according to the PBSO, have some limitations because they offer less discriminant evidence as other types of analyses. FIU Criminal Intelligence Analysts, nevertheless, informally but frequently evaluated these types of trends.

PRIVATELY MANUFACTURED FIREARMS AND 3-D PRINTED FIREARM ACCESSORIES

According to NRTAC, crime gun intelligence and analysis collectively uncovered new gun crime issues, like privately manufactured firearms and 3-D printed firearm accessories. Privately manufactured firearms (PMFs) are weapons produced outside a commercial factory without a serial number. Ghost guns, as they are also known, can be 3-D printed by anyone and the absence of a serial number makes tracing PMFs extremely difficult. In a peer jurisdiction, nearly half of guns recovered in the commission of a crime were ghost guns, according to a SME.

3-D printers can also generate illegal firearm accessories that convert semi-automatic weapons into automatic weapons (e.g., Glock switches and bump stocks). Given their potential to disrupt the efficacy of crime gun intelligence, PMFs and 3-D printed firearm accessories warrant special attention that likely includes monitoring, training, and innovation in investigative and prosecutorial techniques. Table 4.02 presents the measure and data source for this somewhat ongoing strategic priority (i.e., one not identified by the NRTAC in their summarized their findings April 2021 report).

Table 4.02 Measures and Data Sources for Macro-Level Crime Measures

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Privately manufactured firearm seizures	Monthly NPI reports
Glock-switch seizures	Weekly firearms data

Privately Manufactured Firearm Seizures

In Figure 4.02, the number of privately manufactured firearm seizures are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Though data are unavailable for 2022, there appears to be a downward trend through the observational period.




Figure 4.02. Monthly Privately Manufactured Firearm Seizures (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though there is not enough data to reliably observe patterns or measures of central tendency, the number of ghost gun seizures appears to be a rare phenomenon during the period of observation ($n = 14$). Though ghost guns do not appear to be as prominent an issue in PBC, as evident by their recovery infrequency, an early indicator of their growth in popularity would be the recovery of manufactured gun parts and pieces (like Glock-switches) because only 80% of a gun can be lawfully privately manufactured.

Glock-Switch Seizures

The number of Glock-switch seizures that occurred during the period of observation (July 1, 2019-March 31, 2024) are plotted over time in Figure 4.03. Early in the project these data were unavailable but began being collected in the middle of 2023. Available data indicate that the number of Glock-switch seizures trended upward.




Figure 4.03. Weekly Glock Switch Seizures (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

From the nine months of available data (i.e., not enough to reliably observe patterns or measures of central tendency), Glock-switch seizures appear to be a rare phenomenon during the period of observation ($n = 6$)

SECTION V. NIBIN HIT/LEAD ASSIGNMENT AND INVESTIGATION (STEP 4)

According to the Model CGIC 7-Step Process, NIBIN leads and hits are to be assigned and investigated (Step 4). Though all crime gun data should be uniformly examined and investigated, it should be triaged by detectives and leverage CGIC partnerships to identify individuals who are violent and unlawfully use firearms. The NRTAC made seven NIBIN hit/lead assignment and investigation recommendations for the PBC CGIC:

- 4.1 Consider a dedicated investigative team
- 4.2 Recommend an additional PBSO TFO or special deputy assigned long-term to CGIC
- 4.3 Create a NIBIN lead assignment process
- 4.4 Create a NIBIN accountability and information sharing briefing
- 4.5 Data management in tracking outcomes
- 4.6 Develop a NIBIN standard operating procedure to assist in tracking leads & NIBIN success
- 4.7 Prioritize the identification and arrest of the most active trigger pullers

CONSIDER A DEDICATED INVESTIGATIVE TEAM (4.1)

According to the NRTAC, Firearms Investigation Unit (FIU) resources were stretched thin at the onset of the project, leaving little opportunity for investigative follow-up, especially for cases with potential for federal prosecution or where NIBIN leads tie to multiple jurisdictions. More specifically, they reported that the PBSO firearm trafficking caseloads indicate there is more than enough work for one detective and it becomes increasingly difficult to continue the mission of a regional CGIC when the sole detective is on leave. The ATF, they reported, had allocated resources to support a regional CGIC, but asked the PBSO to consider adding at least one additional detective to the FIU to assist with investigative follow-up.

A team of detectives, dedicated to the assignment and investigation of NIBIN hits, would likely benefit the FIU but was assessed as beyond the scope of this grant. The grant, however, did support the addition of a halftime detective that was subsequently converted to a fulltime role when the CGIC Coordinator was hired (see [NRTAC Recommendation 2.3](#)). In this regard, an ATF Level III Contractor received and pushed out NIBIN leads, emphasizing those with federal prosecution potential or cases tied to multiple jurisdictions. His duties were delegated to other FIU detectives in his absence. Likewise, the ATF Level III Contractor was in constant communication with the ATF to prevent cases from falling through the cracks. Substantively, the FIU expanded the role of the grant supported detective and has a plan for continuous NIBIN productivity (regardless of the ATF Level III Contractor availability) but does not foresee additional resources being delegated

to this NRTAC recommendation at the conclusion of the grant. Nevertheless, according to monthly NPI reports, the CGIC Coordinator was assigned 68 cases between November 26, 2021 and March 31, 2024, which is approximately two cases a month.

RECOMMEND AN ADDITIONAL PBSO TASK FORCE OFFICER (TFO) OR SPECIAL DEPUTY ASSIGNED LONG-TERM TO CGIC (4.2)

Similarly, the NRTAC recommended that the ATF and PBSO examine the possibility of designating PBSO investigators as additional TFO's or special deputies at the onset of the project. They went on to note that NIBIN leads, and trafficking investigations often cross jurisdictional boundaries and these investigators should anticipated long-term assignments on active trigger pullers. This, the NRTAC contented, would allow TFO's to pursue investigative leads with federal authority outside the County's jurisdictional boundaries and coordinate with TFOs from other jurisdictions. Finally, they reported that TFOs or special deputies will be authorized to access NESS and tracing information to enhance intelligence sharing.

Throughout the project, the PBSO had two ATF TFOs assigned to the VCD and Tactical Intelligence Unit. Additionally, the ATF had assigned special agents in other PBSO units. The ATF TFOs and special agents have access to NESS and frequently work with local municipalities when NIBIN leads extend beyond the PBSO's jurisdiction. A point of emphasis of their work is active trigger pullers (see also [NRTAC Recommendation 4.7](#)). An ATF TFO and PBSO Detective, for example, reported that he currently receives 40-50 NESS related information requests a week, which are overwhelmingly related to the ATF's eTrace system.

While additional personnel would provide greater investigative attention to cases and enhance PBC CGIC outcomes (see also [NRTAC Recommendation 4.1](#)), an additional ATF TFO and/or PBSO detective was not supported by grant funds, and the PBSO was unable to delegate additional resources for this NRTAC recommendation. Additional AFT agents assigned to the FIU long-term, however, are welcome at the PBSO, according to a VCD Sergeant.

CREATE A NIBIN LEAD ASSIGNMENT PROCESS (4.3)

As the number of NIBIN leads rises, the PBSO, according to the NRTAC, will need to establish a dedicated team of detectives and ATF personnel for follow-up investigation. This, they report, will require the FIU to develop a process for determining if the responsibility for investigative action related to a NIBIN lead will remain with the originally assigned detectives or be managed by the dedicated investigative FIU personnel. Case assignment, the NRTAC reported, should be guided by a priority system that emphasizes solvability and department priorities. They went on to note that this is a critical part of a regional MOU with other law enforcement jurisdictions.

In response to this recommendation, the PBSO generated a NIBIN lead notification form to standardize this information (see Appendix K). Moreover, the PBSO articulated their informal process for determining who will take the investigative lead following NIBIN intelligence. If, for example, NIBIN intelligence is based on events within the PBSO's jurisdiction, it is discussed internally on an as needed basis, which is typically daily. At the PBSO, determining which detective will take the case is balanced against investigative history, ongoing workload distributions, and the efficacy of investigative follow-up. Where NIBIN intelligence is derived in part (or in full) from other jurisdictions, the PBSO will partner with the ATF and other municipalities for follow-up investigation. Investigative lead, in these cases, prioritizes more serious cases with the most actionable intelligence.

CREATE A NIBIN LEAD ACCOUNTABILITY AND INFORMATION SHARING BRIEFING (4.4)

According to the NRTAC, NIBIN leads can become increasingly complex, involving the investigative actions of multiple detectives. Complexity is increased when leads link cases across jurisdictional boundaries or when one or more of the NIBIN linked shootings have been accepted for prosecution at the state or federal level. To support NIBIN lead accountability, the NRTAC encouraged members of the PBSO FIU, VCD detectives, ATF special agents, and investigators from surrounding jurisdictions to attend routine PBC CGIC meetings. During the meetings, the NRTAC encouraged the examination of cases for investigative potential, with a crime analyst sharing and receiving new intelligence information. Case assignment by supervisors and accountability of actionable work should also take place at these meetings, according to the NRTAC.

Shared responsibility is critical to the efficacy of the PBC CGIC and, as such, should be observed in an accountability structure built into the regional CGIC MOU (see also [NRTAC Recommendation 2.2](#)). To that end, aligning PBC CGIC stakeholder expectations requires frequent communication and regular meetings. These efforts in PBC are overwhelmingly informal, situationally structured, and on an as needed basis. To focus investigative attention during discussions on probative evidence (e.g., NIBIN leads) and efficacious cases, an intelligence lead package was developed and disseminated to PBC CGIC stakeholders (see [NRTAC Recommendation 3.5](#)).

DATA MANAGEMENT IN TRACKING OUTCOMES (4.5)

At the onset of the project, the PBSO used NESS to keep track of NIBIN leads. This, according to the NRTAC, is a limited data management tool because NESS does not track investigative follow-up and prosecutions. They went on to recommend that the PBSO, ATF, United States Attorney's Office (USAO), Office of the State's Attorney, and other NIBIN stakeholders, discuss utilizing an

existing records system or develop a single comprehensive record management system (RMS) to track NIBIN activity from lead generation through prosecution. Additionally, the NRTAC encouraged the PBSO to work with the ATF to access NESS through an RMS bridge to more fully utilize its capabilities.

In the absence of a formal case management system, an RMS to ATF's NIBIN Enforcement Support System (NESS) bridge system (like the eTrace system bridge to NESS) was proposed. While an ATF centric data management system that triages and prioritizes efforts has advantages, NESS can only capture some investigative follow-up and does not track prosecutorial outcomes as the NRTAC noted. With regards to how prosecutorial outcomes are tracked, the PBSO and State Attorney's Office have access to each other's RMSs, but they are not integrated and, therefore, do not provide feedback loops. Additionally, an RMS bridge to NESS layers agency information and tends to only provide information unidirectionally. Regarding the former, NESS users require individual agency access to transcend information layers, which is not always granted. Regarding the latter, agencies tend to feed NESS information through their RMSs, but NESS does not provide agencies with information. The PBSO also noted that it is moving to a new RMS because their existing system is 25 years old causing a bridge to their existing system to be short-lived. Substantively, a SME stated "I would take back this recommendation" if limitations of NESS were known prior to their report (September 2, 2021, in a personal communication).

As an alternative to existing systems and bridges, a web-based portal that captures all firearms related cases was adopted by the PBC CGIC in October 2022. This effort was spearheaded by a VCD detective and was built inhouse. The State Attorney's Office was consulted in the construction of the "Firearms Web Portal," as it is more commonly known, and the portal now serves as a clearinghouse for NIBIN leads.

More specifically, an access tab on the VCD portal page has been generated (see Image 5.01). As NIBIN leads are populated, users can select who they want to be notified (see Image 5.02). Once the VCD portal page is accessed, the FIU portal page (see Image 5.03) should contain the FIU Clearinghouse form (see Appendix L) and NIBIN lead notification form (see Appendix K). Regarding the former, the FIU Clearinghouse form was adopted from the Robbery Clearinghouse form to enhance user friendliness and county-wide accessibility. More specifically, the FIU Clearinghouse form retains information on day-to-day firearm related incidents, seizures, recoveries, and arrests that is searchable and has a notifications system for items/issues requiring additional investigative attention. Substantively, the FIU portal page contains an access tab and links (see Image 5.04).




Image 5.01. Access Tab Location on the VCD Portal Page



Image 5.03. FIU Portal Page

Image 5.02. Sample Notification Page of the Firearms Web Portal when NIBIN Leads are Populated




Image 5.04. FIU portal page Access Tabs and Links

The CGIC Coordinator, in reference to the Firearms Web Portal, stated that “this is a game changer as to how gun crimes will be investigated in Palm Beach County.”

DEVELOP A NIBIN SOP TO ASSIST IN TRACKING LEADS & NIBIN SUCCESS (4.6)

Additionally, the NRTAC encouraged the PBSO to implement standard operating procedures (SOP) that increase investigative accountability for NIBIN generated leads. The SOP, according to the NRTAC, should provide details relating to NIBIN entries, test firing of crime guns, and investigative protocols that enhance cooperative efforts and reduce duplicative action among affected operational units. Furthermore, an SOP should define what unit will be responsible for oversight and accountability of NIBIN cases. Thereafter, a SOP should evaluate and track its success in an internal and external feedback processes.

The PBSO has had a SOP for firearm processing since January 30, 2018, which includes potential NIBIN evidence (see Appendix M). Additionally, the PBSO delineated investigative responsibilities in the presence of NIBIN evidence to an ATF Level III Contractor that disseminated and tracked NIBIN leads. Alternatively, the CGIC Coordinator coordinated the standardization of information sharing (see [NRTAC Recommendation 2.2](#)) and provided investigative follow-up to external agencies. Though the work of the ATF Level III Contractor was a continuation of their role at the onset of the project, the duties of the CGIC Coordinator enhanced investigative accountability from NIBIN generated leads. Moreover, the CGIC Coordinator provided investigative flexibility to triage the most probative evidence and cases (see [NRTAC Recommendation 3.3](#)). These efforts were featured in formal and informal feedback systems (see [NRTAC Recommendations 7.1](#) and [7.2](#)), for the purpose of furthering agency buy-in and cultivating additional PBC CGIC resources.

PRIORITIZE THE IDENTIFICATION AND ARREST OF THE MOST ACTIVE TRIGGER PULLERS (4.7)

The identification and arrest of the most active trigger pullers in PBC is likely to have the greatest and most immediate impact on gun crimes in the County. To that end, yet to be recovered firearms tied to several incidents are likely to be at the forefront of a prioritization system that assesses NIBIN lead investigative potential (see [NRTAC Recommendation 3.3](#)). Accordingly, the NRTAC recommended that the PBSO prioritize the identification and arrest of the most active trigger pullers. In doing so, they encouraged the PBSO and ATF to develop a list of firearms associated with multiple leads, where the associated firearm had not yet been recovered. To triage their investigative efforts, the NRTAC encouraged FIU detectives and ATF special agents to utilize the G.E.T.S. approach. Moreover, they encouraged VCD detectives, FIU detectives, and ATF special agents to pool their resources in joint/parallel/coordinated investigations with the investigator originally assigned to the case. Doing so, the NRTAC reported, would facilitate the identification of the most prolific trigger pullers associated with firearms and disrupt the shooting cycle as quickly as possible.

This type of information was never collected during the grant because it was believed that this kind of intelligence is less probative in PBC where there tends to be a disconnect between crime guns and trigger pullers. To this point, a VCD Sergeant and Lieutenant noted, that “our [the PBSOs] guns are more community guns” and “we have more active guns than trigger pullers,” respectively (December 8, 2021, and June 15, 2021, in personal communications). Trigger pullers, in other words, do not often use the same gun repeatedly and crime guns are likely used by different trigger pullers in separate events. Yet to be recovered firearms tied to several incidents, when paired with additional intelligence, can be associated with networks of individuals. Though less discriminant, analyses of yet to be discovered firearms still hold probative value and, therefore, the PBSO should continue, as a VCD Lieutenant stated, to “chase guns.”

SECTION VI. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTION COLLABORATION AND OFFENDER ARREST (STEP 5)

Step 5 of the Model CGIC 7-Step Process is associated with law enforcement and prosecution collaboration and arrests. More specifically, actionable crime gun intelligence should be disseminated to CGIC partners and available resources, in conjunction with state and federal prosecution, should be leveraged to affect arrests. As it relates to the PBC CGIC, the NRTAC made five recommendations relating to law enforcement and prosecution collaboration and suspect arrest:

- 5.1 Victim and witness cooperation
- 5.2 Regular meetings with all NIBIN stakeholders
- 5.3 Written protocols for case assignment
- 5.4 CGIC prosecutor liaison
- 5.5 Track NIBIN-related leads and cases

VICTIM AND WITNESS COOPERATION (5.1)

Detectives and deputies, according to the NRTAC, should receive training on investigations and awareness with uncooperative victims and witnesses to further the prosecution of violent crimes. Victim/witness support, they noted, begins with the initial contact and victims and witnesses of violent crime are frequently reluctant to work with law enforcement. It is critical, therefore, that violent gun crime investigations develop strategies to engage this population. The NRTAC, therefore, recommended that the PBSO study how to improve victim and witness cooperation from the time of the incident to trial. They went on to note that the PBSO should receive input from the local prosecutors and external resources, since prosecutions cannot be based on NIBIN leads/hits alone.

Additionally, the NRTAC encouraged the PBSO to review the services provided by victim advocates, seek to enhance courtroom security, and activate community outreach. Regarding the former, victim advocates and investigators from the PBSO have the ability to provide support that is essential to improving witness cooperation. To that end, the NRTAC encouraged PBSO to consider applying for federal funding to pay for additional victim advocates.

Certainly, NIBIN leads, in a vacuum, do little to advance cases in the criminal justice system. In fact, victim and witness cooperation is often as, if not more, important to case advancement. Prior to 2021, victim services in PBC were delivered through the State Attorney's Office and PBC Victim Services. Victim advocates with PBC Victim Services rarely responded to crime scenes and overwhelmingly only worked cases being adjudicated. Criminal cases, however, sometimes take months before they come to the attention of the State Attorney's Office, and some do not

progress as actionable cases when there is insufficient evidence for them to be prosecuted. These victims, however, are no less traumatized by their victimization and are often in need of support and service referrals.

To fill this service gap in PBC, the VCD was awarded an Office for Victims of Crime multiyear grant to develop a trauma-informed victim advocacy program. Victim advocacy programs, like the one being established in the VCD, are known to promote victim and witness engagement in criminal justice processes and enhance their experiences with law enforcement (Takahashi & James, 2019). In its first year of existence, the program hired two victim advocates and has since facilitated victim services in over 1,000 cases. As part of this initiative, the VCD is engaged in community outreach and partnering with the Coalition for Independent Living Operations (CILO), Compass (a community entity seeking to “engage, empower, and enrich the lives of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people” [<https://compassglcc.com/about-compass/>]), and Southeast Florida Behavioral Health Network (SEFBHN) to ensure victim advocacy services are provided to PBC’s most venerable populations. Likewise, victim advocates in the VCD are receiving training from and coordinating with PBC Victim Services to advance the quality of victim advocacy services in PBC and avoid service duplication.

REGULAR MEETINGS WITH ALL NIBIN STAKEHOLDERS (5.2)

According to the NRTAC, the PBC CGIC should host periodic meetings with all NIBIN stakeholders, including the ATF, PBSO, NIBIN liaisons, federal and local prosecutors, regional partners, probation and parole, and other investigative units within PBSO. During meetings, stakeholders should share information, intelligence, and review specifically chosen NIBIN leads for solvability. In doing so, the NRTAC reported, it would allow for the effective allocation of resources, enhanced communication of criminal intelligence, and the sharing of essential guidance from prosecutors. Additionally, they noted that meetings will help track investigations related to NIBIN leads and provide a leadership forum for the assignment of tasks.

In response to this recommendation, the CGIC Coordinator led an effort to consolidate existing CGI related meetings with other PBC CGIC stakeholders and establish a regularly held CGIC meeting. PBC CGIC meetings were used to:

- 1) track the evolution of NIBIN leads when they were sent to external agencies (see [NRTAC Recommendation 4.5](#))
- 2) discuss ongoing and successful cases
- 3) provide a setting for prosecutorial guidance (see [NRTAC Recommendation 6.2](#)), when appropriate.

The meetings themselves were attended by lower-level personnel to avoid the formalization of a Task Force. As one person stated, “when supervisors get involved, they muck it up.” Table 6.01

observes the frequency and depth of these collaborations among two measures and their respective data source.

Table 6.01. Measures and Data Sources on Feedback to CGIC Process Participants (Model CGIC 7-Step Process: Step 7)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Active partnerships	Monthly NPI reports
Partnerships with MOUs	Monthly NPI reports

Active Partnerships

In Figure 6.01, the number of active partnerships each month is plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Data from several months, however, do not appear to be available making patterns, annual trends, and measures of central tendency somewhat unreliable. Nevertheless, the number of active partnerships appears to be trending downward among the available data.




Figure 6.01. Monthly Active Partnerships (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though missing data persists throughout the observational period ($n = 10$), there were 53 active partnerships observed during the period of observation. Furthermore, there were approximately 3 active partnerships per month among the available data.

Partnerships with MOUs

The number of partnerships with MOUs each week are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 6.02. Like the number of active partnerships, data from most months are not available making patterns, annual trends, and measures of central tendency somewhat unreliable. Nevertheless, the number of partnerships with MOUs appears to be trending downward among the available data.




Figure 6.02. Weekly Partnerships with MOUs (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, there were 13 partnerships with MOUs, which were procured during the first three weeks of September 2022. Previously and thereafter is overwhelmingly missing data for the number of partnerships with MOUs.

WRITTEN PROTOCOLS FOR CASE ASSIGNMENT (5.3)

At the onset of the project, the NRTAC encouraged the development of written policies that detail criteria for determining whether a case is prosecuted on a local or federal level and the process for

transferring cases from one office to the other. This, they contended, would create a stable, predictable system, even if there are changes in personnel.

Decisions at the PBSO are made through a working decision tree, regular communication, and ongoing collaboration, not requiring a written protocol. In doing so, gun related cases are currently pursued in PBC with a preference for federal prosecutions and deference to the venue with the highest likelihood of securing a conviction/plea bargain and/or promptness in prosecution. This informal arrangement is aided by cross-sworn personnel and is sensitive to differences in courtroom/working group culture. It requires constant coordination (see [NRTAC Recommendation 6.1](#)), which was aided by regularly scheduled meetings with PBC CGIC stakeholders (see [NRTAC Recommendation 5.2](#)). The CGIC Coordinator, in coordination with the State Attorney's Office and United States Attorney's Office, should continue to question if a more formal case assignment protocol best serves the PBC CGIC. At the conclusion of the grant, however, this does not appear to be necessary.

CGIC PROSECUTOR LIAISON (5.4)

According to the NRTAC, local and federal prosecutors should each assign a CGIC prosecutor liaison. The prosecutor liaison should investigate/prosecute violent crime and should be familiar with the existing crime drivers in their jurisdiction. The prosecutor liaison should be actively involved in reviewing NIBIN leads and providing guidance on the investigations most amenable to prosecution and prioritizing cases. The liaison can also track NIBIN cases referred for prosecution and advise other prosecutors who have received a NIBIN-related case and are less familiar with the issues raised.

As previously noted, money budgeted for a State Attorney's Office analyst was reappropriated to support a fulltime CGIC Coordinator to support the State Attorney's Office. Additionally, the State Attorney's and United States Attorney's Offices assigned a CGIC Prosecutor Liaison with specialized training and experience working NIBIN lead cases. They served as the 'go-to' person for gun related prosecutions and provide investigative guidance for prosecutorial prioritization in the State Attorney's Office. The CGIC Prosecutor Liaison is also the head of the intake unit and is cross sworn with the United States Attorney's Office, which is an additional advantage to the PBC CGIC.

TRACK NIBIN-RELATED LEADS AND CASES (5.5)

According to the NRTAC, federal and local prosecutor liaisons should develop protocols to track NIBIN lead developments through conviction. In doing so, they encouraged discussions on how to define NIBIN related cases. Thereafter, a NIBIN flag can be entered into the prosecutor's case management system so that the case can be tracked from intake through disposition. Tracking, the

NRTAC reported, will allow the prosecutor liaisons to monitor NIBIN-related cases handled by anyone within the local or federal office. To that end, the NRTAC suggested that record management systems among PBC CGIC partners may need to be evaluated to determine how best to capture, share, and report critical case information.

In response to this recommendation, the PBSO clarified how they track NIBIN-related leads and cases with their federal and local prosecutors' office. More specifically, they noted that the State and United States Attorney's Offices are included on all NIBIN-related leads, regardless of where the lead originates. This is done to ensure that named subjects in NIBIN leads receive special attention from prosecutors when existing outstanding cases are brought before them. Prosecutors, in these cases, evaluate if the NIBIN lead is probative to their cases. This information also gives them a sense of how "deep the defendant is in the gun violence culture" in PBC, according to one PBC CGIC stakeholder. When a case is filed and when a case is closed out, the lead detective in the case is notified. NIBIN-related cases that are followed are tracked on notebook paper and excel spreadsheets (see Image 6.01). This is due, in part, to the absence of a shared records management system connecting law enforcement and prosecutors.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
	Date	Case Number(s)	NIBIN Lead Notification Number	ATF Reference Number	Initial Investigator(s)	Assigned FIU Investigator	Notes			
1	9/13/2022	22-*****	*****	*****	D/S *****	Det. Foster	EXAMPLE: Det. Foster contacted initial investigator and POC. Discussed further investigation.			
2										
3										
4										
5										
6										
7										
8										
9										
10										
11										
12										
13										
14										
15										
16										
17										
18										
19										

Image 6.01. Sample Tracking File for NIBIN-Related Cases

To better understand the frequency and nature of law enforcement and prosecutor collaborations, Table 6.01 presents three measures collected and their respective data source in observance of this specific strategic priority.

Table 6.01. Measures and Data Sources on Law Enforcement and Prosecution Collaboration and Suspect Arrest (Model CGIC 7-Step Process: Step 5)

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the state level	Monthly NPI reports

Suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the federal level Monthly NPI reports

Cleared by arrest or exceptional means by the CGIC team Monthly NPI reports

Suspects Arrested in CGIC Cases at the State Level

In Figure 6.03, the number of suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the state level each month is plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Missing data is prevalent early in the observational period making patterns, annual trends, and measures of central tendency somewhat unreliable. Nevertheless, the number of suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the state level appears to be trending downward among the available data.




Figure 6.03. Monthly Suspects Arrested in CGIC Cases at the State Level (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, there were 11 suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the state level. Among the available data, there was (on average) one suspect arrested in a CGIC case at the state level every two months.

Suspects Arrested in CGIC Cases at the Federal Level

The number of suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the federal level each month are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 6.04. Similar to the number of suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the state level, missing data is prevalent early in the observational period making patterns, annual trends, and measures of central tendency somewhat unreliable. Nevertheless, the number of suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the federal level appears to be trending downward among the available data.




Figure 6.04. Monthly Suspects Arrested in CGIC Cases at the Federal Level (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

There were 18 suspects arrested in CGIC cases at the federal level during the observational period. Among the available data, there was (on average) one suspect arrested in a CGIC case at the federal level every month.

Cases Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means by the CGIC Team

In Figure 6.05, the number of cases cleared by arrest or exceptional means by the PBC CGIC team each month is plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2019-March 31, 2024). Data appear to be mostly available following 2022, which indicate that there is not enough information to reliably observe patterns, annual trends, or measures of central tendency. Nevertheless, the number of cases cleared by arrest or exceptional means by the CGIC team appears to be stable among the available data.




Figure 6.05. Monthly Cases Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means by the PBC CGIC Team (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though missing data are prevalent early in the observational period ($n = 11$, 37%), there were 11 cases cleared by arrest or exceptional means by the PBC CGIC team between November 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024. Among the available data, there were approximately 7 cases cleared by arrest or exceptional means by the PBCCGIC team per year.

SECTION VII. STATE OR FEDERAL PROSECUTION (STEP 6)

The sixth step in the Model CGIC 7-Step Process relates to state or federal prosecution. A strong partnership and close collaboration between the local prosecuting attorney and the United States Attorney's Office are critical to the effectiveness of CGIC operations. To facilitate these collaborations, a local and federal prosecutor should be dedicated to work exclusively with the CGIC to consistently support investigators and determine the venue of crime gun prosecutions.

The NRTAC made five state or federal prosecution recommendations for the PBC CGIC:

- 6.1 Continued coordination at all phases of prosecution
- 6.2 Prosecutor involvement in the investigative stage and vertical prosecution
- 6.3 Discovery considerations
- 6.4 Proffer strategy
- 6.5 Notification of laboratory of all dispositions

CONTINUED COORDINATION AT ALL PHASES OF PROSECUTION (6.1)

To enhance state and federal prosecutions, the NRTAC encouraged the FIU to coordinate with prosecutors to ensure awareness of CGIC-developed intelligence at arraignment, bail, pleas, and sentencing. They went on to note that prosecutor attendance at CGIC meetings will significantly enhance this coordination. Moreover, prosecutors should provide feedback to law enforcement when they obtain new intelligence about NIBIN targets. At the onset of the project, CGIC lead sheets were sent to the prosecutor's office to help them understand the broader picture of NIBIN related cases and enhance coordination and communication with the PBC CGIC team.

In response to this recommendation, the PBSO clarified their coordination practices with their partners. More specifically, coordination among all PBC CGIC stakeholders was a continued point of emphasis. The FIU, for example, coordinated with the State Attorney's and United State Attorney's Offices. Program level information was relayed through the CGIC Coordinator, and CGIC Prosecutor Liaisons (see [NRTAC Recommendation 5.4](#)), including CGIC lead sheets. Where appropriate and with individual cases, VCD detectives communicated CGIC-developed intelligence directly with assigned prosecutors at every phase of the prosecution, including arraignment, bail, pleas, and sentencing. Intelligence sharing, however, was not unidirectional in PBC. New intelligence garnered by prosecutors was frequently shared with detectives, and prosecutors often sought law enforcement buy-in before pursuing cases. A similar organic communication system existed between the State Attorney's and United State Attorney's Offices (see [NRTAC Recommendation 5.3](#)). Though much of this coordination was informal and as needed contacts, more formal communication occurred during regularly scheduled meetings (see

[NRTC Recommendation 5.2](#)). This approach was vetted with the State Attorney’s and United State Attorney’s Offices and was believed to provide the greatest exchange of information, while maintaining flexibility.

Table 7.01 documents the measures collected, and their respective data sources observed for this strategic priority.

Table 7.01. Measures and Data Sources on State or Federal Prosecution (Model CGIC 7-Step Process: Step 6)	
<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
New defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the state level	Monthly NPI reports
New defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the federal level	Monthly NPI reports
Defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the state level	Monthly NPI reports
Defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the federal level	Monthly NPI reports

New Defendants in CGIC Cases Prosecuted at the State Level

The number of new defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the state level each month are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 7.01. Week-to-week, there were few new defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the state level, with a downward trend across the period of observation. Missing data is prevalent early in the observational period making patterns, annual trends, and measures of central tendency somewhat unreliable. Nevertheless, the number of new defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the state level appears to be trending downward among the available data.




Figure 7.01. Monthly New Defendants in CGIC Cases Prosecuted at the State Level (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Among the available data, five new defendants in CGIC cases were prosecuted at the state level. On average, therefore, there was a new defendant in a CGIC case prosecuted at the state level every three and a half months. There was, however, missing data throughout the observational period ($n = 12$, 41%).

New Defendants in CGIC Cases Prosecuted at the Federal Level

In Figure 7.02, the number of new defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the federal level each month is plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Like the number of new defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the state level, missing data is prevalent early in the observational period making patterns, annual trends, and measures of central tendency somewhat unreliable. Nevertheless, the number of new defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the federal level appears to be trending downward among the available data.




Figure 7.02. Monthly New Defendants in CGIC Cases Prosecuted at the Federal Level (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though missing data was prevalent throughout the observational period ($n = 10$, 34%), there were 13 new defendants in CGIC cases prosecuted at the federal level among the available data, which amounts to three prosecutions every two months (on average).

Defendants in CGIC Cases Convicted at the State Level

The number of defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the state level each month are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 7.03. Data based on the number of defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the state level was rarely available, making patterns, annual trends, and measures of central tendency unreliable. Nevertheless, the number of defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the state level appears to be trending upward among the available data.




Figure 7.03. Monthly Defendants in CGIC Cases Convicted at the State Level (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, only two data points were available (during the fourth week of June and August). More specifically, the available data indicate that there was one defendant in a CGIC case convicted at the state level during the period observation.

Defendants in CGIC Cases Convicted at the Federal Level

In Figure 7.04, the number of defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the federal level each month are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Like the number of defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the state level, data based on the number of defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the state level was rarely available, making patterns, annual trends, and measures of central tendency unreliable. Nevertheless, the number of defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the federal level appears to be trending upward among the available data.




Figure 7.04. Monthly Defendants in CGIC Cases Convicted at the Federal Level (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Like the number of defendants in CGIC cases convicted at the state level, data are missing throughout the observational period ($n = 25$, 86%). Among the available data, seven defendants in CGIC cases were convicted at the federal level, which is approximately two per month.

STRAW PURCHASES

While a strong partnership with the United States Attorney’s Office is critical to CGIC operations, straw purchase collaborations continue to be an issue in PBC. A straw purchase is an illegal firearm purchase made on behalf of another person who is unable to pass the required federal background check. In PBC, straw purchases have been acknowledged as a problem. During the site visit in March 2021, there was some discussion about prosecutorial hesitancy to adjudicate straw purchase cases. Suspected straw purchase perpetrators typically have no criminal records and are, at times, being exploited by their criminal associates. There was also a reported belief that lying about the purchaser’s intent on the Firearms Transaction Record (i.e., the ATF Form 4473 that is required when purchasing from a Federal Firearms License [FFL] holder) should not result in a felony, which is currently the only legal mechanism in place to prevent subsequent straw purchases. Finally, nearly all PBC CGIC stakeholders acknowledged that these are difficult cases to investigate/prove in court and usually require that the straw purchase case be anchored in another case where a straw purchased gun was used illegally, a reactive approach.

Later, in August 2021, the PBC CGIC stakeholders revisited this issue when National headlines reported that an officer in Chicago had been killed by a weapon that was straw purchased (Masterson, 2021). Later that year, the topic of straw purchases was discussed locally in the Miami Herald (Weaver, 2021; see Appendix N).

At the PBSO, straw purchases are worked by ATF TFOs and PBSO detectives and, to get ahead of this “hot topic,” a VCD Sergeant arranged for the research partner to talk with an ATF TFO and PBSO Detective on August 25, 2022. The following was gleaned from this interview:

There are three ways straw purchase cases come to the attention of law enforcement.

- 1) If a person makes a purchase of two or more firearms within a week, the FFL must complete a multiple sale summary form (ATF Form 3310.4) that is electronically sent to the ATF. The purchaser is not necessarily aware that the FFL is completing the form. Upon receipt of ATF Form 3310.4, the ATF sends a copy to a VCD detective that is reviewed and forwarded to an ATF TFO and PBSO detective if a purchaser is believed to be engaging in a straw purchase. First Look in the NESS system also allows agents to see who made multiple purchases daily.
- 2) When crime guns are recovered from different people but traced back to the same person.
- 3) Through Crime Stopper tips.

Building a straw purchase case, however, requires the actual gun because the same discriminant information cannot be retrieved from ballistics itself (i.e., ballistics cannot be traced to a point of sale). In response to straw purchase cases, the ATF prefers interdiction responses, as opposed to prosecution. Accordingly, they often send agents to talk to suspected straw purchasers and disclose that they are on to their behavior. Their hope is that interdiction will discourage subsequent straw purchases. When suspected straw purchasers are not discouraged, however, there is a preference for federal prosecutions. Unfortunately, straw purchase cases are rarely taken by federal prosecutors. Even when a suspected perpetrator confesses, cases have been declined for prosecution.

This prompted the PBSO to begin requesting declination letters, or an acknowledgement from federal prosecutors that they had declined to prosecute a case. Relatedly, the ATF TFO and PBSO Detective have found the ATF’s preference for interdiction to inhibit their ability to pursue other investigative tools, like search warrants but had not sought a declination letter for these instances.

As an alternative to federal prosecutions, the ATF TFO and PBSO Detective had explored with the State Attorney’s Office pursuing Florida §837.05 on false reports to law enforcement, which is a third-degree felony. Florida §837.05 may be applicable when, for example, a false address is given on ATF Form 4473. In a test case, a plea was offered and accepted for no time but a felony record, which prevented the perpetrator from buying guns again. The FAU research partner followed up with the ATF TFO and PBSO Detective in October 2021 and he reported that four additional straw purchases had been pursued by the State Attorney’s Office utilizing this approach. Other jurisdictions can learn from this ATF TFO and PBSO Detective and the State Attorney’s Office’s originality in addressing straw purchases.

Though not explicitly identified in the Model CGIC 7-Step Process, the primary goal of every CGIC is to reduce gun crime and straw purchase prosecution is critical to those efforts. In

observance of this specific strategic priority are the measures and their respective data sources in Table 7.01.

Table 7.01 Measures and Data Sources for Macro-Level Crime Measures

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Straw gun purchases	Monthly NPI reports

In Figure 7.05, the number of straw purchase prosecutions are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Missing data are prevalent throughout the observational period making reliable observational patterns, annual trends, and measures of central tendency somewhat unreliable.




Figure 7.05. Monthly Straw Gun Purchases (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Nevertheless, there were at least 16 straw purchase prosecutions during the period of observation, which is approximately one a month among the available data.

PROSECUTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE INVESTIGATIVE STAGE AND VERTICAL PROSECUTION (6.2)

According to the NRTAC, participation in regular CGIC meetings allows local and federal prosecutors to advise investigators on how to develop promising cases prior to arrest. A daily or weekly review by the local and federal prosecutors of shootings and gun-related arrests, they go on to note, enhances coordination with investigations and provides early discussions about which prosecutor's office is best suited for the prosecution. Where possible, the NRTAC recommends

that local prosecutors assign an experienced prosecutor to vertically prosecute the most prolific and significant trigger pullers and ensure that intelligence is not lost.

Information in the criminal justice system primarily flows from law enforcement to prosecutors. In PBC, there is a respectful acknowledgement of each entities' roles and responsibilities to investigate and adjudicate cases. A Chief Assistant State Attorney referred to this as "drawing a distinct line." To that end, and according to this Chief Assistant State Attorney, prosecutors are involved less in investigations; however, "if police come to prosecutors for advice, [he stated] they will help," which is often the case when a search warrant is being pursued. In homicides and organized crime, the Chief Assistant State Attorney, went on to report, "they are a bit more tied together" and can provide essential guidance.

A former VCD Captain stated they welcome prosecutor input because they "want to hand them the best prosecutable case." At times, this includes consulting with prosecutors on the nature and processing of evidence. In doing so, however, the distinct system roles of law enforcement and prosecutors should be maintained. To that end, a Chief Assistant State Attorney stated, "in Florida, we can't get involved in investigations for liability purposes." More specifically, he noted that qualified immunity does not apply the same way for prosecutors, and he has known prosecutors that have been sued and lost after it was determined that they crossed this line.

While evidence processing decision-making resides with law enforcement, it is somewhat a collaborative process. As it relates to shootings and gun related arrests, the PBSO, State Attorney's, and United State Attorney's Offices are in constant communication on individual cases. At a programmatic level, this has been facilitated by the hiring of a CGIC Coordinator ([see NRTAC Recommendation 2.3](#)) and assignment of a CGIC Prosecutor Liaison ([see NRTAC Recommendation 5.4](#)). To that end, the State Attorney's and United State Attorney's Offices balance expertise and existing workloads in their case assignments.

DISCOVERY CONSIDERATION (6.3)

New NIBIN leads and hits, according to the NRTAC, may be evidence that needs to be disclosed to defense council as potential Brady/Giglio material. More specifically, when a gun is not recovered but an arrest is made, that gun may be used in a separate incident. The subsequent incident can result in a NIBIN lead after the prior case has been charged. This is likely considered discoverable material, according to the NRTAC, and the prosecutor in these cases should turn over this evidence to defense council. In these instances, it is critical for prosecutors to receive notice of new NIBIN hits/leads in pending cases, according to the NRTAC, or they may face sanctions for failing to disclose evidence. One way to accomplish this, they reported, is to maintain a shared spreadsheet of connected NIBIN leads and their respective cases charged by the prosecutor. This allows the PBSO to see when a new NIBIN lead comes in after a case has been charged by the prosecutor.

In PBC, when NIBIN leads are related to pending cases, the intake attorney at the State Attorney's Office reviews all the relevant events tied to a NIBIN lead and shares the NIBIN lead information with defense attorneys as soon as possible, ideally during the discovery phase of court proceedings. When asked how long it takes to provide defense attorneys with this material, a Chief Assistant State Attorney stated, "they are so fast. At most it takes a couple weeks." Unfortunately, automating this process would not speed up defense attorney notifications because NIBIN lead information requires human review, which cannot be further expedited without additional personnel. Nevertheless, the PBSO tracks all NIBIN related leads (see [NRTAC Recommendation 5.5](#)), which results in timely discovery disclosures to defense attorneys relating to NIBIN leads.

PROFFER STRATEGY (6.4)

The NRTAC encouraged prosecutors and investigators to work together to develop a proffer strategy that ensures that NIBIN defendants entering into plea agreements are fully debriefed by the appropriate investigators as part of the plea process. This, they noted, is particularly crucial with NIBIN defendants who are associated with multiple shootings, gang and/or drug related cases, and cases involving the diversion of firearms out of lawful commerce. The NRTAC goes on to report that a system should be developed to ensure that the information obtained from the proffer session is disseminated to the appropriate investigators and prosecutors. In doing so, the NRTAC reported that this will amplify the CGIC/NIBIN program's impact.

In PBC, even when defendants are facing long sentences, VCD detectives and prosecutors work closely together throughout the proffer process. The mechanisms of this recommendation were, therefore, found to already exist in PBC.

NOTIFICATION OF LABORATORY OF ALL DISPOSITIONS (6.5)

The prosecutor's office, according to the NRTAC, should develop a system to promptly notify the laboratory when a case has been disposed of when there is an outstanding laboratory request. This, they contended, would save the laboratory a great deal of unnecessary work and reduce the backlog of outstanding evidence. In this context, the NRTAC reported, that prosecutors should discuss with the PBSO when guns should be swabbed for DNA and processed for prints.

The State Attorney's Office notifies the crime laboratory of disposed case in a monthly letter. At that time, outstanding laboratory requests are no longer pursued. To that end, the PBSO coordinates with the State Attorney's and United States Attorney's Offices throughout all investigative (where appropriate) and prosecution phases (see [NRTAC Recommendations 5.2](#), [6.1](#), and [6.2](#)). The mechanisms of this recommendation, therefore, were found to already exist in PBC.

SECTION VIII. FEEDBACK TO CGIC PROCESS PARTICIPANTS (STEP 7)

The final step in the Model CGIC 7-Step Process, feedback to CGIC process participants, seeks to provide information to CGIC partners when they have completed their involvement in the investigative process (Step 7). This requires that CGIC-related activities be tracked and their impact on violent crime analyzed. Feedback to process participants, including the responding officers who initially collected crime gun evidence, must be timely and consistent in order to maintain and sustain CGIC processes. As it relates to the PBC CGIC, the NRTAC made five recommendations relating to the comprehensive collection of cartridge cases and crime guns:

- 7.1 Formal internal feedback system
- 7.2 Distribute CGIC success stories
- 7.3 Analyze cases not accepted for prosecution
- 7.4 Conduct CGIC community outreach
- 7.5 Create a quarterly or semi-annual meeting of executive level stakeholders to assess crime gun intelligence in the region

FORMAL INTERNAL FEEDBACK SYSTEM (7.1)

NIBIN relies on an interdependent system of action by varying department units, from the recovery of fired cartridge cases or crime guns, through forensic and NIBIN processing, investigations, and successful judicial outcomes such as pre-trial detentions and guilty dispositions of charges. Each person involved in this process plays a critical role and is inspired through understanding positive outcomes stemming from their efforts. A good practice, according to the NRTAC, is to generate a letter of commendation or similar document containing all individuals who participated in a positive outcome. This likely begins with crime scene processing and evidence recovery through NIBIN acquisition and correlation review, investigative efforts, and prosecutorial efforts. In doing so, positive feedback is provided that reinforces the nature of NIBIN success as an interdependent process relying on the actions of many individuals.

In November 2021, the CGIC Coordinator produced the first internal success story memo (see Appendix O). The memo details how intelligence, technology, and community engagement were leveraged to identify, locate, and apprehend perpetrators of firearm-related crime in PBC. Similar memos were circulated monthly by the CGIC Coordinator.

DISTRIBUTE CGIC SUCCESS STORIES (7.2)

The PBSO, ATF, and prosecutors should, according to the NRTAC, proactively compile examples of successful NIBIN cases where trigger pullers have been investigated and prosecuted based on NIBIN leads to promote the program's impact internally, with other partner agencies, and with the public. Examples, they contend, should be written on a formalized document for distribution to all participants and stakeholders in the NIBIN program. Moreover, examples should be forwarded to Department heads and used by the PBSO's and ATF's Public Information Officers (PIO), according to the NRTAC.

Though a formal internal feedback system is underway (see [NRTAC Recommendation 7.1](#)), a wider dissemination plan for success stories had not been formalized as of the end of the grant period. Early discussions on this topic identified strengths and weaknesses for this kind of self-promotion with news media outlets. Throughout the project, there appeared to be a general sentiment to err on the side of caution and limit how success stories were promoted. To that end, there is wisdom in a SME's comments that regardless of the approach adopted, "be on the same page with how much you are going to share." This approach was also echoed in the Strategic Plan submitted to BJA in August 2021: "We understand how important it will be that all partners share the same strategy for information dissemination." At the conclusion of the observation period, this recommendation was believed to be inconsistent with PBC CGIC needs and was, therefore, not pursued.

ANALYZE CASES NOT ACCEPTED FOR PROSECUTION (7.3)

The NRTAC recommended that the PBSO consider developing a feedback assessment regarding cases with a NIBIN lead when cases are not accepted for prosecution. The process, according to the NRTAC, should clarify why the cases were not accepted and what courses of action could be taken in future cases to enhance the likelihood of acceptance. Though there were discussions of who would lead this endeavor and the entities that would aid in this effort, this recommendation was not undertaken during the period of observation.

CONDUCT CGIC COMMUNITY OUTREACH (7.4)

In coordination with the ATF, PBSO, USAO, Office of the State's Attorney, and other stakeholders, the NRTAC encouraged the PBSO to develop a unified community outreach program that explains the role of a CGIC and its successes. The program, according to the NRTAC, should highlight cases where persons associated with numerous shootings or serious crimes were identified, arrested, and prosecuted, making the community safer. Moreover, a community engagement campaign should strongly encourage the community to call 911 when they hear shots fired and emphasize the importance of fair and impartial policing through ballistics technology to ultimately disrupt the shooting cycle. Finally, the NRTAC encouraged the program to promote the idea that the NIBIN process prioritizes cases based upon the number of shooting incidents

associated with a specific firearm or suspect while identifying the most prolific, active trigger pullers in their neighborhoods.

An important lesson from the implementation of ShotSpotters in PBC is that it is an exception, not the rule, that people call the police following shootings. While there remains a host of reasons why people do not call the police (see [NRTAC Recommendation 1.4](#)), law enforcement can do more to remove community barriers from dialing 911. More specifically, communities need not continue to be collateral damage in the wake of shooting events if law enforcement are perceived as coproducers of crime-control results. When community members are empowered as partners in

their own safety, they will be more likely to share information with police during investigations, which could prevent future gun violence. To that end, several PBC CGIC stakeholders have acknowledged the importance of community outreach in overcoming engagement issues. At the forefront of community outreach is the exchange of information, which is why the VCD produced and



Image 8.01. CGIC Coordinator Engages in Community Outreach during Community Forum

published, on YouTube, video content describing their efforts to combat gun crime (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpQI7ufPth8>). Transparency, in this regard, is crucial to building and maintaining community trust. Community outreach also means being responsive to community needs. The VCD is also leaning into this charge with their initiation of a victim advocacy program (see [NRTAC Recommendation 5.1](#)). The PBC CGIC Coordinator also attended several community forums to educate the public on the CGI initiatives (see Image 8.01).

CREATE A QUARTERLY OR SEMI-ANNUAL MEETING OF EXECUTIVE LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS TO ADDRESS CRIME GUN INTELLIGENCE IN THE REGION (7.5)

NRTAC recommended that the PBSO, ATF, local and federal prosecutors, and other CGIC stakeholders meet quarterly or semi-annually to discuss areas of growth, efficiencies, deficiencies, policy differences, and personnel assignments relating to the mission of the PBC CGIC. This would, they reported, create a forum for cross-jurisdictional communication that is critical to program sustainability, especially among expansion PBC CGIC sites. Moreover, a quarterly or semi-annually meeting, the NRTAC reported, would alleviate the duplication of effort, address regional issues, and ensure cooperative efforts of the region's CGIC programs. The NRTAC encouraged attendees to be senior leadership from across PBC.

Though the PBSO regularly discussed CGI with their partners, there was no formal quarterly or semi-annual meetings of executive-level stakeholders to address CGI in the region. Rather PBC CGIC stakeholders continued to meet informally and on an as needed basis (see [NRTAC Recommendation 5.2](#)).

SECTION IX. MACRO-LEVEL CRIME MEASURES

Though not explicitly identified in the Model CGIC 7-Step Process, the primary goal of every CGIC is to reduce gun crime. In observance of this specific strategic priority are the measures and their respective data sources in Table 9.01.

Table 9.01 Measures and Data Sources for Macro-Level Crime Measures

<u>Measure</u>	<u>Data Source</u>
Town of Lake Park ShotSpotter notifications	Monthly ShotSpotter reports
Palm Beach County ShotSpotter notifications	Monthly ShotSpotter reports
Gunshot detection system alerts	Monthly NPI reports
Calls for service regarding shots	Monthly NPI reports
Confirmed non-fatal shootings	Monthly NPI reports
Confirmed fatal shootings	Monthly NPI reports

TOWN OF LAKE PARK SHOTSPOTTER NOTIFICATIONS

In Figure 9.01, the number of ShotSpotter notifications in the Town of Lake Park are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Though there are peaks and valleys, ShotSpotter notifications in the Town of Lake Park declined across the observational period.




Figure 9.01 Monthly Town of Lake Park ShotSpotter Notifications (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, the Town of Lake Park experienced the most ShotSpotter notifications ($n = 7$) during July and December 2021, whereas several months ($n = 1$) were associated with a single ShotSpotter notification. On average, however, there were three ShotSpotter notifications per month in the Town of Lake Park between July 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2022 and 2023 indicate that the number of ShotSpotter notifications grew by 9% ($n = 33$ and $n = 36$, respectively), which is inconsistent with the broader downward trend. This, however, is due to the partial annual data in 2021 and 2024 that greatly impact the overall downward trend.

PALM BEACH COUNTY SHOTSPOTTER NOTIFICATIONS

The number of ShotSpotter notifications in PBC are plotted over time during the period of observation (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 9.02. Similar to the Town of Lake Park, there are month-to-month peaks and valleys in the number of ShotSpotter notifications in the County, but they appear to be declining during the period of observation.




Figure 9.02 Monthly Palm Beach County ShotSpotter Notifications (July 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though PBC regularly experienced ShotSpotter notifications, it was somewhat sporadic and ranged between a high of 28 in July 2021 and low of 7 in the month of August 2023. On average, however, there were 16 ShotSpotter notifications in the County between July 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024. The number of ShotSpotter notifications grew by 4% ($n = 7$) between 2022 and 2023, which is inconsistent with the broader downward trend. Partial annual data from 2021 and 2024, however, greatly impact the overall downward trend that is observed.

GUNSHOT DETECTION SYSTEM ALERTS

In Figure 9.03, the number of gunshot detection system alerts are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Outside of a few peaks, there appears to be consistency in the number of weekly gunshot detection system alerts, which trended downward during the observational period. There was, however, some missing data early in the observational period.




Figure 9.03. Weekly Gunshot Detection System Alerts (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, weekly gunshot detection system alerts peaked during New Years and Independence Day, with the greatest number of alerts occurring during the fourth week of December 2021 ($n = 754$). During the third week of February 2024, there were no gunshot detections system alerts for the first time during the observational period. On average, however, there were 44 gunshot detection system alerts per week between July 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2022 and 2023 indicate that the number of gunshot detection system alerts fell by 65% ($n = 1,692$), which is consistent with the broader downward trend.

CALLS FOR SERVICE REGARDING SHOTS

The number of calls for service regarding shots are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 9.04. Month-to-month, there was little consistency in the number of calls for service regarding shots but trended upward across the period of observation.




Figure 9.04. Monthly Calls for Service Regarding Shots (November 1, 2021-December 31, 2022)

Though the public regularly dialed 911 regarding shots during the period of observation, it was somewhat sporadic and ranged between a high of 168 during December 2023 and low of 11 during November 2021. On average, however, there were 71 calls for service made regarding shots between November 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024. The number of calls for service regarding shots grew by 21% (n = 167) between 2022 and 2023, which is consistent with the broader upward trend.

CONFIRMED NON-FATAL SHOOTING

The number of confirmed non-fatal shootings are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024) in Figure 9.05. Month-to-month, there were peaks and valleys in the number of confirmed non-fatal shootings, but they were, nevertheless, trending downward across the period of observation.




Figure 9.05. Monthly Confirmed Non-Fatal Shootings (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

During the observational period, the number of confirmed non-fatal shootings peaked January 2022 ($n = 40$), whereas February 2024 was associated with the fewest number of confirmed non-fatal shootings ($n = 3$). On average, however, there were 22 confirmed non-fatal shootings per month between November 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024. Yearly comparisons between 2022 and 2023 indicate that the number of confirmed non-fatal shootings fell by 7% ($n = 20$), which is consistent with the broader downward trend.

CONFIRMED FATAL SHOOTINGS

In Figure 9.06, the number of confirmed fatal shootings are plotted over time during the period of observation (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024). Month-to-month, there were peaks and valleys in the number of confirmed fatal shootings, but they, nevertheless, trended downward across the period of observation.




Figure 9.06. Monthly Confirmed Fatal Shootings (November 1, 2021-March 31, 2024)

Though confirmed fatal shootings occurred throughout the period of observation, there was somewhat consistency month-to-month ranging between a high of 6 during November 2022 and low of 1, which occurred six times between November 1, 2021 and March 31, 2024. On average, however, there were nearly 3 confirmed fatal shooting per month. The number of confirmed fatal shootings fell by 16% between 2022 and 2023, which is consistent with the broader downward trend.

SECTION X. DATA SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the final section of this report, data findings are summarized. Thereafter, recommendations to sustain and advance the PBC CGIC are discussed.

DATA SUMMARY

The process and outcomes evaluation observed mixed results in the collection of cartridge cases and crime guns ([Section II](#)). More specifically, there were fewer crime guns recovered, lead checks (of firearms and individuals) performed, probable cause cases developed (out of video and DNA evidence), and fewer suspects identified in CGIC cases over time during the period of observation. Alternatively, more ballistics were recovered, firearms entered into evidence, firearms validated by the FIU, and a greater number of e-Traces, background returns, and NCIC corrections were performed over time during the period of observation. Moreover, the VCD/FIU saturated PBC with trainings, built organizational infrastructures (e.g., PBC CGIC POCs), and developed policies (e.g., K-9 recanvassing) to facilitate the collection of cartridge cases and crime guns.

As it relates to NIBIN entry and correlations ([Section III](#)), there were fewer inconsistencies. In fact, more casings, ballistics, and crime guns were entered into NIBIN over the course of the observational period. Additionally, a greater number of firearms were perceived to be linked to recovered and non-recovered evidence. Finally, the number of BrassTrax submissions increased, where increases were observed in 7 of the 8 jurisdictions. These achievements were due in large part to the efforts to develop a regional CGIC in PBC and hiring of a NIBIN Coordinator to spearhead these efforts.

Crime gun intelligence analysis ([Section IV](#)) was similarly advanced by a greater number of full/part-time crime analysts assigned to the CGIC. Though privately manufactured firearm seizures declined over the period of observation, Glock-switch recoveries appeared to be on the rise, which indicates a need for continued monitoring.

Additionally, NIBIN hit/lead assignment and investigations ([Section V](#)) were advanced by the development of a FIU clearinghouse form, NIBIN notification form, and web-based record management system (i.e., the Firearms Web Portal). When considered alongside an existing standard operating procedure for firearm processing, the prioritization, identification, and arrest of the most active trigger pullers in PBC has been enhanced.

Law enforcement and prosecution collaborations toward offender arrests ([Section VI](#)) have also been enhanced. The VCD, for example, received an Office of Victims of Crime grant to support the establishment of a trauma-informed and victim-centered advocacy program to advance victim and witness cooperation. Likewise, the PBC CGIC consolidated existing multi-stakeholder meetings into one regularly scheduled CGI meeting. Over the period of observation, PBC CGIC documented 53 active partnerships and 13 partnerships with MOUs. Moreover, a CGIC prosecutor

liaison, more formal tracking of NIBIN-related leads, and cases contributed to 29 suspect arrests in CGIC cases at the state and federal level.

Unfortunately, data on state and federal prosecutions ([Section VII](#)) was often unavailable in these data. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the PBSO has not been deterred by prosecutorial impediments to case adjudication. With straw purchases, for example, they sought declination letters from federal partners and leveraged Florida §837.05 with the State Attorney’s Office to prosecute (as opposed to interdict) perpetrators of straw purchases. Moreover, they are in constant communication with state and federal prosecutors, which has aided vertical prosecutions, the timeliness of discovery related considerations, proffer strategies, and notification of laboratory dispositions.

To promote the PBC CGIC among agency and community stakeholders ([Section VIII](#)), the CGIC Coordinator distributes an internal monthly memo documenting success stories. Additionally, stakeholder feedback (giving and receiving) is a key feature of regularly scheduled CGIC meetings. The CGIC Coordinator also engaged in outreach by attending community forums, discussing PBC CGIC, and fielding questions from the public during the period of observation.

Finally, the PBC CGIC had a positive effect on macro-level crime measures ([Section IX](#)). More specifically, ShotSpotter notifications fell by 65%, confirmed non-fatal shootings fell by 7%, and confirmed fatal shootings fell by 16% between 2022 and 2023. Despite fewer ShotSpotter notifications, non-fatal shootings, and fatal shootings, the public felt more comfortable calling the police in gunshot related calls for service, which grew by 21% during the period of observation.

In brief, the PBC CGIC advanced ballistic evidence processing and collaborations, which likely reduced gun crime in PBC. To that end, a SME stated, “I’m very impressed with what you have done.”

RECOMMENDATIONS

Though these results are overwhelmingly positive, sustaining and advancing the PBC CGIC requires continued vigilance. More specifically, the PBSO should continue to seek to:

1. Improve processes;
2. Track outcomes; and
3. Collaborate.

Improving Processes

As it relates to the comprehensive collection of cartridge cases and crime guns, for example, the PBSO, should consider a direct entry and/or Justice Tracks barcode-based evidence management system. Though likely cost-prohibitive, this would expedite the processing of recovered ballistic evidence by digitizing evidence collected at the district level, automate case closeout procedures,

and identify ballistic evidence past its statute of limitations. Moreover, a direct entry and/or Justice Tracks barcode-based evidence management system has the potential to minimize human error in handwritten paperwork and identify gaps in policy adherence. To that end, an evidence-based policy should be sought that expresses the investigative potential of NIBIN leads. Additionally, systematic feedback is needed to address packaging errors, create fast-track process for NIBIN eligible crime guns submitted to the laboratory, and enhance fidelity to recanvassing procedures.

Regarding the latter, a formal policy should direct deputies to recanvass shooting scenes the following day when the initial investigation occurred 1) during a challenging environmental period (e.g., inclement weather, low lighting) or difficult terrain (e.g., tall grass) and 2) where ShotSpotter alerts have occurred and no or limited ballistic evidence is recovered. Concurrent with day-after-shooting-scene searches, follow-up neighborhood canvassing is advisable. As NRTAC noted, “Potential witnesses may be more willing to speak with officers the following day, outside of an active crime scene.” Not only could neighborhood canvassing produce probative evidence, but it also serves a public relations function. More specifically, the NRTAC reported that “Engaging the community after a shooting incident can further enhance community and police communication and trust” – a worthy pursuit itself. Thus, formal and systematic feedback on recanvassing procedures is consistent with the 7-step model CGIC process’s approach to “relentless accountability.”

Tracking Outcomes

Relentless accountability also requires quality and timely data that tracks evidence, events, cases, and decision-making outcomes. In this report, there are plenty of examples of consistent and reliable data collection; however, missing data are evident throughout the model 7-step CGIC process. In developing a regional CGIC, for example, it is important for data to be inclusive of all PBC CGIC partners. Within the PBSO, there are also several opportunities to better understand gun crime through data. Yet to be recovered firearms associated with several incidents, for example, should be systematically tracked by the CGIC Coordinator, with the assistance of FIU Criminal Intelligence Analysts. Likewise, a trace study of NIBIN firearms would likely provide important localized CGI insights. To that end, results should be disseminated to PBC CGIC stakeholders, including patrol deputies who could aid in their recovery but tend to be disconnected from the investigative process.

Additionally, there were fewer measures and more missing data among measures observed in the later stages of the model CGIC 7-step process. Though measurement equitability among the steps is not required, enhancing our understanding of gun crime case processing requires greater data tracking from prosecutorial partners. Our understandings of case processing, for example, would be advanced with a retrospective evaluation of cases that are and are not accepted for prosecution, disaggregated by the state and federal systems. In doing so, a profile of successful and unsuccessful cases should be generated.

An asset in overcoming this issue is the positive working relationships among the PBC CGIC stakeholders. Nevertheless, it is important that project stakeholders periodically reevaluate communication pathways and systems to see if they continue to fit with the ever-changing landscape of criminal investigations and prosecutions. More specifically, tracking outcomes is necessary for (internal and external) feedback systems that express the impact of PBC CGIC to stakeholders.

Collaborating

Collaboration should remain a top priority for the PBC CGIC, which begins by addressing personnel needs within PBSO. More specifically, key roles had to be established and filled in the PBSO to externally promote the PBC CGIC. At the onset of the project, for example, the PBSO underwent a significant organization realignment, which brought a new Captain into the VCD in June 2021. Additionally, the State Attorney's Office has consistently reported that their caseloads have been rising but their hiring has remained stagnant despite losing several attorneys during the pandemic. Though staffing issues and departmental realignments are a natural part of organizational change, the PBC CGIC should continuously evaluate their personnel needs. In this context, the NRTAC made three staffing recommendations, including the assignment of a full-time intelligence analyst to the FIU, designation of a dedicated investigative PBC CGIC team, and assignment of an additional long-term TFO or special deputy to the PBC CGIC. Though a halftime intelligence analyst and PBC CGIC Coordinator were supported through grant funds, the PBSO has indicated that additional personnel are unlikely to be supported at the conclusion of the grant. Nevertheless, securing these positions is critical to PBC CGIC collaboration efforts.

Additionally, the greatest potential for PBC CGIC lies in garnering formal buy in from outside the PBSO. In terms of law enforcement, there are 21 other municipal law enforcement agencies operating in PBC. To galvanize the support of these entities, the strategy presented by the PBC CGIC should be carried out and begin with the PBC IACP and PBC CJC. Likewise, the PBSO should continue their efforts to train CGI stakeholders throughout the County. Training events, such as the ones hosted by the PBSO, should also gauge agency CGI needs and inform how a coordinated response could address those needs.

When an agency is ready to enter an MOU, it should:

- 1) identify CGI investigative points of contacts;
- 2) require agencies to respond with 48 hours upon receipt of CGI;
- 3) explain their investigative response to new CGI; and
- 4) provide feedback to the CGI procuring agency.

As depicted in Figure 10.01, the goals of an MOU are to enhance numerous aspects of CGIC in PBC.




Figure 10.01. CGI MOU Goals

The need for collaboration among law enforcement agencies in PBC is best exemplified by ShotSpotter information barriers. Several cities in PBC, for example, operate their own ShotSpotters (e.g., City of Boynton Beach, City of Delray Beach, and City of West Palm Beach) but few provide ShotSpotter data to the PBSO or each other. Similarly, ShotSpotter data in the Cities of Belle Glade and Lake Worth (operated by the PBSO) are not proactively shared with other agencies. Sharing data is a critical aspect of developing an effective regional CGIC. To that end, the Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC), which is one of two locations in PBC that monitors all County ShotSpotter activity, should facilitate the communication of ShotSpotter intelligence throughout the County. Moreover, the utility of the RTCC for advancing CGI should be explored

because, according to a VCD Sergeant, the RTCC has “down the road implications” for criminal investigations. Nevertheless, building countywide partnerships in the pursuit of institutionalizing CGIC best practices throughout PBC is of continued importance.

Likewise, the PBC CGIC should continue to expand their efforts to garner victim and witness cooperation. As previously noted, victim and witness cooperation requires an ongoing and steadfast commitment to enhancing public trust, for which the VCD should be commended in their efforts to provide victim advocacy. More specifically, the VCD’s victim advocacy program has enhanced trauma-informed and victim-centered practices in PBC and has been observed to aid engagement and investigations.

Finally, the VCD should continue their community outreach efforts. Though historically these efforts have followed shooting events, such as recanvassing following ShotSpotter activation, they need not be reactionary. In fact, proactive efforts to secure community buy-in can transform into law enforcement intelligence gathering operations. The VCD should also explore additional mechanisms for securing public trust, like initiating a tip line, creating educational materials, and providing after-action reports. In this regard, there is a lot the PBC CGIC can learn from peer agencies, like Wichita (KS) Police Department’s efforts to encourage gun owners to maintain two spent shell casings fired at a range in case their weapon is stolen (Operation Save-A-Casing). The Baltimore (MD) Police Department similarly promotes CGIC activities through social media. Whatever community outreach approach is adopted by the PBC CGIC, it should be mutually beneficial to law enforcement and the communities they serve.

SECTION XI. REFERENCES


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
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SECTION XII: APPENDICES


APPENDIX A: NRTAC BUSINESS PROCESS MAP FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Palm Beach Sheriff's Office Business Process Map





**Feedback
to CGIC
Process
Participants**



APPENDIX B: STRATEGIC PLAN LOGIC MODEL

This Logic Model comprises a description of Palm Beach County's Crime Gun Intelligence Center (CGIC) goals. The goals are listed as follows:

- 1) Reducing gun-related crime in PBC
- 2) Increasing the production of timely, precise, and actionable CGI
- 3) Enhancing collaboration among PBC CGIC stakeholders
- 4) Providing PBC CGIC stakeholders training
- 5) Evaluating the efficacy of PBC CGIC

Each goal is depicted with the necessary inputs (resources), outputs (activities), outcomes (results)⁶, assumptions (understandings of the project tenants), and external factors affecting or mitigating the achievement of the project's goals.

⁶ Results are further identified as short term (ST), medium term (MT), and long term (LT) outcomes.

Project Goal 1: Reducing Gun-Related Crime in Palm Beach County				
Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes	Assumptions	External Factors
<p>Personnel: PBC CGIC Executive Team, PBSO (patrol/VCD/crime analyst/crime lab), ATF (TFO/IRS), DNA Labs International, USA, SA, and the 21 additional municipal law enforcement agencies operating within PBC</p> <p>Resources: ShotSpotter, NIBIN, IBIS, eTrace, Grant funds</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Uniformly collect, examine, and investigate gun-related evidence and events 2. Increase the use of NIBIN 3. Increase the use of eTrace 4. Increase the number of gun-related investigations 5. Increase the number of linked criminal shooting events 6. Increase the scrutiny of identified repeat shooters 7. Increase the number of arrests for gun-related offenses 8. Increase the number of prosecutions for gun-related offenses 9. Increase the number of feedback reports through greater gun-related event tracking 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reduce 911 calls reporting shoots (LT) 2. Reduce confirmed shootings (LT) 3. Reduce gunshot detection system alerts (LT) 4. Reduce nonfatal shootings (LT) 5. Reduce gun-related homicides (LT) 6. Enhance case outcomes for NIBIN investigations (LT) 7. Enhance case outcomes for gun-related crimes (LT) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The establishment of a regional CGIC with buy-in from all PBC stakeholders 2. Increased use of NIBIN and CGIC-related activities will increase the certainty of gun-related offenses coming to the attention of CGIC partners 3. The CGIC will increase the connection of gun-related crimes and actors that would otherwise appear to be unrelated 4. The CGIC will contribute to disrupting the cycle of violence 	<p>PBC has a large volume of ShotSpotter alerts, gun related calls for service, and gun related crime. Likewise, this county-wide initiative necessitates buy-in from external project stakeholders.</p>

Project Goal 2: Increasing the Production of Timely, Precise, and Actionable Crime Gun Intelligence				
Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes	Assumptions	External Factors

<p>Personnel: PBC CGIC Executive Team, PBSO (patrol/VCD/crime analysts/crime lab), DNA Labs International, ATF (TFO/IRS), and the 21 additional municipal law enforcement agencies operating within PBC</p> <p>Resources: ShotSpotter, NIBIN, IBIS, eTrace, Grant funds</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase the use of intelligence generated by analysts 2. Enhance gun-related event tracking to identify process lags 3. Develop a triage system for evidence and case processing 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase in the number of ballistics/crime guns recovered (MT) 2. Increase in the number of ballistics/crime guns entered in NIBIN within 24/48 hours (MT) 3. Increase the number of crime guns traced through eTrace (MT) 4. Increase the number of NIBIN links (LT) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NIBIN and eTrace data are subjected to quality control processes and shared with all CGIC partners 2. Enhanced staff and technical capacities, coupled with routinizing collection, analysis, and communication feedback loops to investigations will enhance efficiencies and comprehensiveness of processes 	<p>Changes in the volume of ballistics/crime guns recovered may create backlogs in evidence and case processing</p>
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Project Goal 3: Enhancing Collaboration Among Palm Beach County Crime Gun Intelligence Center Stakeholders				
Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes	Assumptions	External Factors
<p>Personnel: PBC CGIC Executive Team, PBSO (patrol/VCD/crime analyst/crime lab), ATF (TFO/IRS), DNA Labs International, USA, SA, and the 21 additional municipal law enforcement agencies operating within PBC</p> <p>Resources: ShotSpotter, NIBIN, IBIS, eTrace, Grant funds</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establish a centralized PBC CGIC executive team 2. Identify inter-agency liaisons to facilitate the flow of information 3. Engage in regular communication, coordination, and intelligence sharing within and between agencies 4. Promote an environment that provides feedback to stakeholders 5. Encourage dialogs that enhance current processes/procedures for all stakeholders 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Frequency of executive team meetings (ST) 2. Agencies engaged and participating in PBCs CGIC (ST) 3. Number of MOU partnerships formalized (MT) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regular collaboration will aid in the successful implementation of gun crime reduction activities 2. Buy-in from all project stakeholders that materializes in MOUs 	<p>Staff turnover, availability, and experience could have an impact</p>

Project Goal 4: Providing Palm Beach County Crime Gun Intelligence Center Stakeholders Training				
Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes	Assumptions	External Factors
<p>Personnel: PBC CGIC Executive Team, PBSO (patrol/VCD/crime analyst/crime lab), ATF (TFO/IRS), DNA Labs International, USA, SA, and the 21 additional municipal law enforcement agencies operating within PBC</p> <p>Resources: ShotSpotter, NIBIN, IBIS, eTrace, Grant funds</p>	Develop curricular and training materials that are agency-specific and consistent with CGIC principles	Deliver curricula to stakeholders (ST)	Modifying PBSO training materials for additional PBC CGIC sites will enhance site buy in and the efficacy of CGI	Buy in from all project stakeholders

Project Goal 5: Evaluating the Efficacy of Palm Beach County Crime Gun Intelligence Center				
Inputs	Outputs	Outcomes	Assumptions	External Factors
<p>Personnel: Florida Atlantic University research team and PBC CGIC Executive Team</p> <p>Resources: ShotSpotter, NIBIN, IBIS, eTrace, Grant funds</p>	<p>1. Evaluate PBC's CGIC with the above stated outcomes in a process and outcomes evaluation</p> <p>2. Provide ongoing feedback, in alignment with the action research model, to project stakeholders to aid process improvements</p>	<p>1. Regular and ongoing communication between the research partner and stakeholders (MT)</p> <p>2. Provide data-driven recommendations based on systematically collected information (MT)</p> <p>3. A process evaluation will outline CGIC activities throughout the project, while the outcomes evaluation will assess changes (if any) in gun-related events over time (LT)</p>	The research partner has experience executing process and outcome evaluations, familiarity with the site, and an understanding of gun-related crime events. Additionally, the research partner is skilled at action-research partnerships, as evidenced by several existing undertakings with PBSO	Some PBC CGIC data are dependent upon external stakeholders

APPENDIX C: MAJOR EMAIL DIRECTING FIREARMS EVIDENCE COLLECTION

Mcafee, Richard B

From: Masri, Talal S.
Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2021 9:42 AM
To: Alexander, Mark B; Brannin, William R; Coleman, Eric T; Keane, Christopher T; Mattino, Ronald T Jr; Murray, Sean P; Vrchota, Roy P
Cc: Araujo, Antonio Jr; Allen, Robert L; Demario, Frank; McKenna, John J; Mcafee, Richard B; Doss, Mary L; Stuart, Jennifer M
Subject: Firearms and Firearms Related Evidence

Good morning Majors,

In an effort to expedite the processing of recovered firearms and firearms related evidence, please convey to your commands to have deputies recovering said items to cc all log entries to EvidenceHQ-DL@pbso.org and McafeeR@pbso.org. If no log entry is needed/done, please email the case number, firearm type, and the crime associated if applicable. This process is needed to assist us in collecting all firearms and firearms related evidence from evidence lockers outside the main evidence building as soon as possible. The goal is to have these items processed within 72 hours of recovery. Your assistance is greatly appreciated. Please let me know if you have any questions.

*Major Talal Masri
Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
Major Crimes Bureau
(561) 688-4045
(561) 629-6233
masrit@pbso.org*

APPENDIX D: FIREARM RECOVERY CHECKLIST



FIREARM RECOVERY CHECKLIST **OFFICER SAFETY FIRST-ALWAYS**

- ☐ Record stop (audio/video (if possible)).
- ☐ Separate suspects, unless in-car recorder available, then place together in patrol vehicle, with recorder activated. Ensure recording device is functional. Eliminate background noise such as in-car/portable radios, music and air conditioners.
- ☐ If gun is located, leave in place and slow down process.
- ☐ Photograph firearm(s) and illegal narcotics, in place, prior to recovery.
- ☐ CLEAN LATEX/NITRILE GLOVES ONLY (change frequently). Treat drugs same as firearms.
- ☐ Place evidence on sterile surface.
- ☐ If firearm is recovered in backpack/purse/bag etc..., recover these items, to include all contents within, and place all items into evidence.
- ☐ Determine if suspect(s) is convicted felon or delinquent.
- ☐ Interview suspect(s) post-Miranda (audio/video (if possible)).

- ☐ Complete DNA consent form. RECORD consent, preferably on video. Obtain DNA standard(s).
- ☐ Complete traffic citation, as to PC for the stop (not just a written or verbal warning).
- ☐ Do not charge for firearms offense, if you do not have substantial supporting evidence for conviction. Charge with a secondary offense, if PC exists. IE: Drugs, DL violation, Etc, plus seize firearm(s) for future prosecution.
- ☐ When applicable: Prior to arrival at the jail, have your supervisor contact the intake supervisor and request suspect(s) be placed in separate intake cells for investigative purposes. Obtain cell number and time suspect(s) were placed into the cell from the booking desk.
- ☐ Establish vehicle ownership and attempt to locate/contact the owner for an interview. Question if they had a firearm in the vehicle.
*If a rental vehicle, follow same above steps for an interview.
- ☐ Notify FIU of arrest or firearms recovery (*fill out FIU Clearing House).
***Notify NARCOTICS if significant drug seizure.**
- ☐ When filling out Property/Evidence sheet, complete in a legible manner.

NOTE: A FIU Detective or Analyst (see below) will communicate with Deputies/Officers to assist in strengthening their case(s) for successful prosecution(s).

Steve Barborini BarboriniS@pbso.org 561-688-4144
 Laurie Van Deusen VanDeusenL@pbso.org 561-688-4714
 Det. Kevin Drummond DrummondK@pbso.org 561-707-2950
 Det. Jarrod Foster FosterJ@pbso.org 561-707-5760

APPENDIX E: FIREARM RECOVERY QUESTIONNAIRE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FORM



Firearm Recovery Questionnaire and Constitutional Rights Form

Make	
Model	
Type	
Caliber	
Serial Number	

Date & Time: _____

Name: _____

Alias: _____

D.O.B: _____ Race: _____ Sex: _____

SSN: _____ Phone: _____

Interview Location: _____

Address: _____

Charges: _____

Can you read and write: (Y/N) What is your primary language of choice? _____

Employment: _____

Highest Grade Completed: _____

Interviewer: _____

Complaint Number: _____

YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

I am required to warn you before you make any statement that you have the following constitutional rights (Initial after each statement. If read by interviewer, make sure interviewer initials after each question verifying they read each right):

1. You have the right to remain silent and not answer any questions; _____
2. Any statement you make must be freely and voluntarily given; _____
3. You have the right to the presence and representation of a lawyer of your choice before you make any statement and during any questioning; _____
4. If you cannot afford a lawyer, you are entitled to the presence and representation of a court appointed lawyer before you make any statement and during any questioning; _____
5. If at any time during the interview you do not wish to answer any questions, you are privileged to remain silent; _____
6. I can make no threats or promises to induce you to make a statement. This must be of your own free will; _____
7. Any statement can be and will be used against you in a court of law; _____

Signed: _____

Date & Time: _____

Witness: _____

Post-Miranda Questions

Have you ever been arrested? (Y / N) For what? _____

Have you ever been convicted of a crime in a court of law? (Y / N) For what? _____

Have you ever served time in jail for a conviction? (Y / N) Where? _____

Have you ever been convicted of a FELONY? (Y/N) What crime? _____

Was firearm loaded when it was recovered? (Y / N) How many rounds of ammunition were in the firearm? _____

Is this your firearm (Y / N) Whose is it? _____

How long have you had the firearm? _____ Do you let others use the firearm? (Y / N) _____

When has someone else possessed this weapon? _____

Why are you in possession of the above described firearm? _____

Did you purchase the firearm from a (person / business) Who / What Business? _____

How did you pay for it? _____ How much did you pay for the firearm? _____

Are you currently under any restraining orders/ protective orders / bond requirements that restrict you from possessing a firearm? (Y / N) When was it issued? (Date/Location) _____

Are you currently under any felony indictment(s)? (Y / N) For what charge? _____

Do you have warrants? (Y / N) Did you get the firearm after knowledge of the warrants? _____

Did you know about the warrant(s) prior to your dealings with Law Enforcement today? (Y / N) _____

Do you own other firearms? (Y / N) What type? _____

Where are these additional firearms? _____ Where did you get the additional firearms? _____

Do you use illegal substances? (Y/ N) What type substance? _____

How long have you used these substances? _____

How often do you use these substances? _____

Signature of Possessor

Date/Time

Officer Signature / Badge

Date/Time



Crime Gun Investigations & Prosecutions

Hosted by PBSO
Firearms Investigative Unit
Crime Gun Intelligence Center

Instructed by PBSO, ATF FATD &
Ultra Forensics (NIBIN)

Monday, May 16th, 2022 0900-1700

Palm Beach County PBA Hall
2100 N Florida Mango Rd, West Palm Beach, FL 33409

Purpose and Objectives

The goal of this course is to familiarize both new and seasoned law enforcement patrol officers, investigators, prosecutors, and supervisors with techniques to make "solid" firearms cases. This is accomplished by learning to make "good" traffic stops, using in car video and body cam equipment effectively, properly documenting a case through photos and report writing, conducting taped interviews, properly handling recovered firearms related evidence, reviewing jail calls, using social media and working with prosecutors towards successful prosecution:

TOPICS

- Firearms ID, machinegun conversions, PMF's (Ghost Guns)
- Proper firearm, recovery, documentation, and follow-up
- Available investigative tools: DNA, etrace, NIBIN ShotSpotter
- Social Media: Proactive and Reactive
- Firearm Laws: State and Federal

To register please contact: coppink@PBSO.org
**Seats are limited

APPENDIX H: FIREARMS TECHNOLOGY AND SPECIALIST TRAINING

Firearm Technology and Specialist Training

GUNLEARN.COM® BY THE INTERNATIONAL FIREARM SPECIALIST ACADEMY

This training seminar is being hosted by the **Palm Beach County, Florida, Sheriff's Office**.

Training Goals: This is an intense course designed to teach anyone from novice to the highly-experienced, the complete picture of the firearm field, make you a competent Specialist, and put you on the pathway to becoming one of the most firearm-knowledgeable people in the country. Post-seminar online testing is included, which certifies the attendee as a **Firearm Specialist** upon successful completion.



Attendees are taught 14 aspects of the field of firearms/ammunition at a crawl-walk-run pace. Most reach the ability to pass the online quizzes shortly after the seminar but have up to 6 months to do so at their leisure, if further study is needed, using our free online videos.

Attendees will be able to encounter a wide variety of firearms and ammunition, and be able to safely clear, accurately identify, to classify, and to competently categorize any firearm or ammunition, even the oldest obscure foreign military examples, all within ATF and State guidelines. They will be confident in making determinations as to Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act status and avoid overlooking violations and items which are illegal contraband. The issues of mis-ID, unfamiliarity with obscure facets of the firearm field, and unsafe practices will be solved, avoiding the misinformation and lack of information which plagues law enforcement and the firearm industry.



The course is designed to enable one to immediately interpret what he/she sees, and to apply their knowledge in making an accurate determination as to an item's origin, its status under the law, and its method of mechanical operation. All areas of the field of firearms and ammunition will be examined and discussed thoroughly, and Federal law and ATF rulings will be cited to prove all points taught.



The latest firearm technology trends in the industry, as well as criminal-trends will be explained. These will help the professional become acquainted with technical concepts not familiar to the

beginner, and which will acquaint the firearm professional with clandestine silencers and full-auto conversions, Curios and Relics, home-built firearms, ATF Tracing, etc... There is an emphasis on understanding ammunition, the accurate identification of guns and ammunition.



Audience: This training is open to members of law enforcement, and (at the discretion of the host), to other government agencies, military, security, firearm industry, Attorneys, etc...



Methods: The course is a 3-day session. The course-author is a former ATF National Academy firearm-staff member. Attendees will perform hands-on examinations of real firearms. Numerous handouts are also provided as instructional aids, and attendees will receive a certificate of attendance. This training is also recognized by the

IAI, ABMDI, NSSF, Sonoran Desert Institute, CSI Academy of Florida, Brighton College and numerous federal and large state and local law enforcement agencies, and we are a Technical Advisor to AFTE.

Day One:

- **Firearm Safety and Clearing** (rules of safe handling, clearing procedures, safety precautions, active and passive safety devices, test-firing cautions, jammed firearms)
- **Firearm Classification** (5 categories of Gun Control Act firearms, definitions of "firearm" and "antique" [non-gun], forearm-braces, vertical fore-grips, 80% receiver blanks, dummy guns, home-made guns)
- **Markings** (manufacturer, importer, proof, obliterated serials, double serials, double importers, trademarks, ATF variances, hidden serials, Nazi codes, catalog guns, foreign military gun-ID, ATF Tracing)
- **Nomenclature** (ID of parts necessary for safety and/or location of markings)

Day Two:

- **Ammunition** (components, ID, technology, interstate nexus, chamber pressure, headspace, SAAMI)
- **Cycle of Operation** (the function of each step of mechanical operation)
- **Mechanical Types of Operation** (breech and muzzle-loaders, self and manually-loaded firearms, action types, open and closed-bolt, semi and full-auto)
- **Curios and Relics** (collector status granted by ATF, C&Rs vs. antiques)
- **NFA Rifles/Shotguns** (short-barreled rifle/shotguns, weapons made from rifle/shotgun, shoulder-stocked handguns, sub-caliber inserts)

Day Three:

- **Machineguns** (Ten most common clandestine conversions, field testing, bump-firing, Gatling guns, deactivated war trophies, re-welds, fire-on-release, methods of destruction)
- **Silencers** (recognition, soda-bottle and oil-filter adapters, solvent traps, fakes)
- **Any Other Weapon [AOW]** (disguised firearms, smooth-bore handguns, handguns w/vertical fore-grip, Marble Game-getters)
- **Destructive Devices** (bombs, mines, grenades, bores over .50 caliber, Street-sweeper, USAS-12, Molotov cocktails, IEDs, exceptions)
- **Court Testimony** (15 points on preparation, writing a Curriculum Vitae, and the pitfalls of testimony)

Seminar location:

Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Training Facility
4215 Cherry Rd.
West Palm Bch 33409

Date: February 6-8, 2023

Time: 8:00-4:30pm

Cost of the 3-day course is \$560/person, which includes post-seminar online review videos and quizzes for certification.

To register, contact IFSA at (813) 422-4674 or email: Info@GunLearn.com. The registration form is here at <https://www.gunlearn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/IFSA-registration-form-3.28.18.pdf> To learn more about IFSA/GunLearn, go to www.GunLearn.com .

Attendees are cautioned that the course includes the handling of firearms, and as a result, no live ammunition is allowed in the classroom. Prior arrangements should be made for safe storage of duty weapons and ammunition. Due to the inherent handling of firearms in the class, attendance is restricted to those who are not prohibited from possession of a firearm or ammunition under Title 18 U.S. Code 922 (g).


APPENDIX I: MAJOR MEMO DIRECTING NIBIN ELIGIBLE EVIDENCE PROCESSING



INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM Major Crimes Bureau

TO: Captain Poston and Director Yeatman

DATE: June 16, 2021

FROM: Major Talal Masri 

FILE: Major Crimes Bureau

SUBJECT: Firearms Directive

The purpose of this directive is to establish a new standard in handling all NIBIN suitable firearms received by PBSO Evidence Unit, Crime Scene or otherwise. This directive is being implemented to ensure timely processing of all applicable firearms in order to better serve our agency and our community. Additionally, it will help reduce and ultimately eliminate the current firearms backlog.

This directive applies to both, the Firearms Investigative Unit (VCD) and the Forensic Firearms Unit (Technical Services). All applicable firearms must be validated, processed for DNA, and fired no longer than 48 business hours from the time they are received into evidence. The current handling of firearms (crime vs non-crime firearms) will remain the same.

Please check that teletype is copied on all validations and proper identifications corrections of firearms to ensure proper entries. This could be accomplished by a cc in the correction email.

DNA swabbing does not apply to RPOs, restraining orders, or suicide unless requested by the submitting officer or investigator.

All deviations from this directive will require approval through your chain of command.

APPENDIX J: 2010 PALM BEACH COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION CRIME GUN INTELLIGENCE PROTOCOL

Appendix 3

Palm Beach County Crime Gun Protocol Policy Recommendations

Revised February 11 2010

Purpose:

Firearm related crime often crosses multiple jurisdictional areas and, therefore, the mutual sharing of certain types of firearm crime information is important to achieve a coordinated approach to solving these crimes. A comprehensive approach to combating firearm-related crime involves identifying, investigating and arresting armed violent criminals as well as those persons who illegally supply firearms to the criminal element.

The comprehensive and timely submission of all recovered “known and suspected crime guns,” and firearms related evidence to the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office Crime Laboratory for entry into the NIBIN program (National Integrated Ballistics Identification Network.) through the IBIS computer, or by the entry of a casing, by agencies participating in BrassTRAX, through BrassTRAX, will assist in linking and solving shooting-related crimes and generating additional investigative leads. Nothing will take the place of a thorough and well documented investigation. The more timely entries are made into NIBIN or BrassTRAX, by all participating agencies, increases the likelihood of crime linkage to obtain our ultimate goal to solve crimes.

The complete processing and documentation of all recovered guns, both “known crime guns” and “suspected crime guns” (more commonly referred to as ‘found guns’), and all firearm related evidence, in conjunction with thorough documentation of case facts and statements made by possessors, associates of possessors, witnesses, and arrestees, produces stronger cases, often resulting in multi-jurisdictional crime linkage. “Crime plus forensic, equals detection plus conviction.” Thorough documentation, processing and forensic analysis is more likely to support a successful prosecution or result in a substantial plea agreement, hence, reducing law enforcement officers’ time spent in state or federal court.

As such, the following techniques and procedures are outlined and are intended to be guidelines in the implementation of a multi-jurisdictional and comprehensive approach to combating firearm-related crimes. These guidelines are not intended to replace, supersede or otherwise preclude the application of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and/or Florida Rules of Evidence in any court hearing. They do however supersede previous recommendations and agreements by agencies regarding this policy.

Policy Recommendations:

General:

- It is recommended that agencies adopt a policy consistent with these recommendations, and protocols to be utilized when investigating firearm related crimes and incidents.

- It is recommended for all agency issued firearms, issued to personnel, be test fired with two casings maintained by the agency, for NIBIN entry or Firearms Laboratory comparison, if the firearm is stolen from a law enforcement officer, or fired in an officer involved shooting incident.
- A “known crime gun” or “suspected crime gun” is any firearm illegally possessed, used in a crime, or suspected by law enforcement to have been used in a crime. This may include a firearm found abandoned gun, regardless of circumstances, if the recovering law enforcement agency has reason to believe the firearm may have been used in a crime or illegally possessed.
- **Definitions:**
 - A “spent casing” is what is ejected from a semi-automatic firearm, or what remains in the cylinder of a revolver after a gun has been fired.
 - A “shot shell” is a spent or unspent cartridge fired from a shotgun.
 - A “jacket” is the covering of a bullet, which is may or may not be separated from a casing once the gun is fired.
 - A “projectile” is the portion of the bullet, covered by the jacket, which may separate from the casing once the gun is fired.
 - A “fragment” is a portion of the jacket or projectile which may be recovered when a projectile does not remain intact.
- All known crime guns, suspected crime guns, and other firearms related evidence and items, whenever possible, should be photographed at the crime scene, or location recovered if not a crime scene, prior to being moved, collected, or processed, as photographs may help to develop an investigation, support probable cause, and strengthen the prosecution of those charged with firearms related crimes.
- All recovered “known crime guns” and “suspected crime guns”, and all other firearms related evidence should be collected, documented and considered for forensic examination by the Palm Beach County Crime Laboratory and entry into the National Integrated Ballistics Identification Network (NIBIN), or for BrassTRAX entry by trained and qualified members of the law enforcement agencies who participate in the BrassTRAX Program. The circumstances of each case will determine if the gun and other firearms related evidence or items will initially need to be examined and worked by the Palm Beach County Firearms Laboratory, or if the gun and other ballistics related evidence will remain with the respective law enforcement agency until called for.
- NIBIN entry through the IBIS terminal will be completed by members of the Palm Beach County Firearms Laboratory.
- BrassTRAX entries will be for cases involving the recovery of guns only, or cases in which a single casing was recovered, unless otherwise authorized by the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office Firearms Laboratory manager or designee. BrassTRAX entries

will only be made by trained and qualified members of law enforcement agencies. The Palm Beach County Firearms Laboratory manager, on questionable cases, will have the final authority as to the entry point of a test fired casing or casing(s) recovered at a crime scene or location. When questions exist the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Firearms Laboratory Manager should be contacted to discuss circumstances and firearms related evidence and items submitted.

- All guns coming into the possession of any law enforcement agency should be traced through the U.S Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) National Tracing Center to assist in Identifying illegal sources of crime guns. This may be accomplished by submitting an ATF Form 3312.1 (National Tracing Center Trace Request Form) via mail or fax to the ATF NTC at the toll free fax number listed at the top of the form, or through the internet based tracing system, eTRACE.
- The tracing of all firearms and review of trace results may develop investigative leads, as guns impounded by law enforcement agencies may be unreported stolen guns or guns which are reported stolen to law enforcement but a serial number of the gun was not available by the victim or owner to provide to law enforcement, or the trace results may link individuals with no criminal history who is supplying guns to those with criminal records. Appropriate follow-up investigations of successful traces may too help crime victim in recovering their stolen property and help to solve crimes.
- To perfect a strong prosecutable case and for developing crime gun intelligence, officers at the scene of a crime, or when seizing a firearm for legitimate law enforcement purposes, should ask a series of basic questions of the suspect(s), possessor, or associates of the possessor(s) and/or witnesses to establish gun possession. Obtaining statements from everyone contemporaneous with the incident involving the gun, helps limit or prevent the potential for false alibis at a later time in an investigation, as to ownership, possession, and the source of the firearm.
- Known crime guns and suspected crime guns, when "clear" through NCIC/FCIC should be entered into NCIC/FCIC as "Recovered Guns," as this will prevent another agency throughout the United States from entering this same gun as "Stolen", when an agency already has the gun in their possession. Guns are sometimes recovered during crimes or incidents, prior to a victim or owner realizing a gun has been stolen, or before a serial number is provided to law enforcement for enter stolen into NCIC/FCIC. (See NCIC/FCIC Criteria detailing the specifics of "Recovered Gun" entries.
- Establish processes to ensure all guns entered as stolen, lost or recovered into NCIC/FCIC are accurately entered, which is part of the validation processes mandated through NCIC/FCIC Terminal Agency User Agreements, as inaccurately entered gun information will negate or minimize the opportunity for recovering a stolen or lost gun.
- A copy of teletype entries or clearances for stolen, lost, recovered, or stolen recovered guns, should be included as documents within the original offense, as these serve as excellent references and are important to case investigations.

- Processes should be in place at each agency and within the Palm Beach County to verify the accuracy of gun information entered into NCIC/FCIC. When and if discrepancies are realized, modifications should be made immediately, with copies of the modifications again verified to ensure accurate records. The modified entry, actual teletype copy, should be included in the original report.

Procedures for Processing Known Crime Guns, Suspected Crime Guns, and all other Firearms Related Evidence or Property Evidence:

- Clean latex gloves should be worn when handling any gun or firearm related evidence to prevent cross contamination. Only when exigent circumstances exist should a gun or any firearm related evidence handled without gloves. Exigent circumstances as to why gloves were not worn should be documented in police reports.
- Depending on the case facts and situation, known crime guns, suspected crime guns, and any firearms related evidence or items will be processed for latents and DNA in a manner set forth by the respective law enforcement agencies policies, which are consistent with obtaining the best forensic evidence results. Processing for latents and DNA may be accomplished by agencies Crime Scene personnel, or other properly trained personnel within the agency impounding the gun or other firearms related evidence or items, or by submitting the known or suspected crime gun(s) and other firearms related items or items to the Palm Beach County Firearms Laboratory for processing. Known case facts will determine the need to process or not process for latents or DNA. Exceptions for not processing should be documented in incident reports.
- The recovering department will be responsible for the collection and submission of all DNA suspect/elimination standards to the PBSO Crime Laboratory, when necessary and upon the approval of the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office DNA Coordinator. All requests for DNA analysis requests must be initiated by telephoning the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office DNA Evidence Coordinator in advance of any submissions.
- Known crime guns and suspected crime guns should be submitted to the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Firearms Laboratory for NIBIN entry, if the agency is not participating in the BrassTRAX Program. Law enforcement officers and agency personnel should not "test fire" any gun in the field, solely for the purpose of determining if the gun is functional; all test firing and function testing will be performed by personnel trained in the handling of firearms, in a controlled setting, such as a firearms range, with all safety practices and protection gear utilized. The "test firing" of all known and suspected crime guns may be performed by any recovering department participating in the BrassTrax program, where that capability exists, or the firearm may be submitted to the PBSO Crime Laboratory for test-firing and NIBIN entry when multiple casings exist at a crime scene or location, or when called for by Firearms Laboratory personnel.
- When submitting any gun, "known crime gun" or "suspected crime gun," or firearms related evidence to the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Crime Laboratory, the recovering department should complete a Palm Beach County Crime Laboratory Property Receipt for all guns submitted to the Palm Beach County Crime Laboratory. The Palm Beach County Firearms Laboratory Property Receipt should include, when known by the

submitting agency, all pertinent descriptive information on each gun submitted; i.e., make/manufacturer, country of origin and importer, model, serial number, caliber, type (pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, derringer), finish/color, unique markings or modifications (scope, owner applied numbers), Cyrillic or other unique markings. Information relative to the possessor and associates of possessor (name, alias, DOB, race, sex, identification numbers (driver's license, ID card, etc...), recovery date (crucial), recovery location (be specific), whether the gun is clear NCIC/FCIC or if the gun is a recovered stolen firearm.

- If a gun is known to be a 'recovered stolen firearm,' a copy of the NCIC/FCIC Teletype "HIT" should be attached to the submitting agencies Property Receipt and to the Palm Beach County Firearms Crime Laboratory Property Receipt, or document information as to the entering agency and the entering agencies case number on the Palm Beach County Crime Laboratory Property Receipt, as this information is important for eTRACE and further investigation should there be a NIBIN "HIT."
- If the recovering agency has submitted a trace of the gun to the ATF Tracing Center, the assigned eTRACE number or other method used to trace the gun should be documented on the Palm Beach County Crime Laboratory Property Receipt, as this prevents duplication of effort.
- The Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Crime Laboratory Property Receipt must indicate the type of processing and analysis requested for each gun and other items; i.e., latents, fingerprints, photographing, test firing, and/or just entry into NIBIN. Note if the submitting agency has already processed the gun for latents and swabbed for DNA and NIBIN entry only is required, or other requested Crime Laboratory examination.
- Requests for all firearms related work, to include comparisons related to other cases, should be noted specifically on the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, Crime Laboratory Property Receipt, to include the name of agency and the respective agency's case number, along with Crime Laboratory case numbers when known. Requests for firearm related comparison cases will require a call and/or email to the Firearms Laboratory Manager in advance of submissions, to discuss case facts and items impounded which may need to be compared, as it is best for all firearms related evidence to be examined and compared at the same time, rather than separately whenever possible.
- Maintaining control and care over all known crime guns and suspected crime guns, as well as all other firearms related evidence is crucial, as loss of any such items may lead to the suppression of the Firearms Examiners expert testimony which may link the firearm related evidence to the defendant(s) or to other cases dependent upon forensic examinations of firearms or firearms related evidence.
- All guns submitted, regardless of circumstances, should be checked in NCIC/FCIC for information regarding its status as being entered as lost or stolen. The status "Clear NCIC/FCIC" or "HIT", with the entering agencies name and case number noted, should be noted for every gun submitted...
- A copy of the teletype confirmation of an NCIC/FCIC "HIT" record should be included within the original case file, working case file, and a copy attached to the Property

Receipt on which the gun is documented upon submission to the respective agencies Property and Evidence Section.

- When a gun is brought to the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Crime Laboratory, note on the Palm Beach County Crime Laboratory Property Receipt if the gun is a "stolen recovered gun" or not, the name of the entering agency resulting in the "HIT" and the entering agencies case number. This serves multiple purposes. NOTE: Pertinent information is contained within each entry which may be needed for future reference and may be valuable to an investigation. Once the stolen firearm record is cleared (removed) from NCIC/FCIC, the record will no longer be available, without an arduous off-line search.

Procedures for processing all crime gun related arrests:

- Advise the defendant of his or her Miranda Rights when required.
- The arresting officer should ensure the defendant is fingerprinted if arrested. This will assist in defendant identification at a later date. Whenever possible, if no arrest is made relative to a gun or casing being impounded, a thumb print should be obtained on a notice to appear form, or field interview card/report, if circumstances dictate that a subject will not be transported to a booking facility. Adherence to this process will be of value if a gun is linked to other incidents through NIBIN, latents, or DNA, and when there may be a question as to the true identity of the person encountered and released in the field.
- Request for the defendant to provide a DNA standard. Refusal to cooperate or voluntarily submit a DNA standard should be noted in the report and probable cause affidavit (arrest report.)
- Attempt to obtain a written or taped statement from the defendant, possessor, or associates of possessor, regarding the defendant's or possessor's possession of the firearm; i.e., how the firearm was obtained, when, where and from whom the firearm was obtained. Ask if the defendant or possessor has any prior felony conviction(s). Document all statements by the defendant, whether formal or spontaneous, relating to the firearm and/or criminal record in the police report. Document all refusals by the defendant to provide information relating to the firearm(s). Gun trace results may identify an original retail purchaser. The gun may be an unreported stolen or lost gun or a reported stolen or lost gun when the serial number was not available to the victim/owner to provide to law enforcement when initially reporting.
- Attempt to obtain statements from any witnesses, associates, and accomplices; (i.e., other passengers in a car stop) of the defendant regarding the facts and circumstances of the offense. This assists in establishing the defendant's or possessor's firearm possession, by precluding false alibis by accomplices or associates, claiming ownership of the firearm post arrest.
- Prepare a detailed narrative report as to the circumstances leading to the arrest, or seizing of the firearm, including a complete description of the firearm, make/manufacture,

country of origin, importer, model, serial number, caliber, type of gun, status in NCIC/FCIC (stolen or not. Include complete vehicle information, witness/accomplice information, and a listing all officers present at the arrest. If the arrest began with or involved a 9-1-1 call(s), obtain and preserve a copy of the 9-1-1 call(s) and CAD report(s). If the arrest involved a video-taped traffic stop, obtain and preserve a copy of the recorded encounter. If the arrest involves a foot pursuit, fight or struggle which was audio recorded by the communications center, request and preserve a copy of the tape.

- Obtain a criminal history printout for the defendant and ascertain the number and types of prior felony convictions and ascertain the first date of conviction for a felony. It is important to determine the exact date of the first felony conviction, as this date could be an important factor when charging a Convicted Felon with possession of a firearm, particularly if the defendant's DNA is on a gun, and the gun was reported stolen after the exact date of the first felony conviction. Having this information will help in solidify a prosecution for this charge.
- Use the criminal history information, coupled with the defendant's actions for which you made the arrest, to determine which law violations apply and which venue (Federal or State) provides for the maximum possible sentence.
- Casings entered into NIBIN are automatically correlated to other casings and test fired casings from guns impounded and entered NIBIN, via IBIS or BrassTRAX, throughout our NIBIN Region. If the defendant or possessor is from outside our NIBIN Region, which includes Miami Dade, Broward, Palm Beach and Indian River Counties, all of which have firearms laboratories, request through the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Firearms Laboratory Manager, (e-mail, telephone call, or document on Property Receipt), for the test fired casing from a known or suspected crime gun to be "manually correlated" in other NIBIN Regions where the subject may have lived or traveled through, or investigative information suggests the gun was fired during the commission of a crime outside our NIBIN Region. By doing this on a case by case basis, will increase the likelihood of inter-jurisdictional crime linkage. This must be requested; it is not done automatically. The areas or regions of correlation can be expanded at any time after entry into NIBIN, but justification must exist. As an example, if an associate or a possessor, or confidential information says, "possessor shot the gun during the commission of any type of crime in Tucson, Arizona," you may request for the test fired casing to be correlated in those NIBIN Regions between South Florida and Tucson, Arizona (essentially the I-10 east to west corridor.) The Firearms Laboratory Firearms Examiners will handle this aspect.

On February 11, 2010 The Law Enforcement Planning Council voted to recommend to the member agencies that they review the revised protocol and implement it in their agencies.

APPENDIX K: NIBIN LEAD NOTIFICATION FORM

NIBIN Lead Notification Form

NIBIN Lead Enterer: NIBIN Lead Notification Recipient(s): (via Email)

NIBIN Lead Notification #: ATF Reference #: Tier:

Linked Previous NIBIN Lead #:

NIBIN Lead Notes:

Related Case Agency: **Related Agency Case #**:

Related Case Agency Notes:



Related Case Agency: **Related Agency Case #**:

Related Case Agency Notes:

Related Case Agency: **Related Agency Case #**:

Related Case Agency Notes:

Follow-Up NIBIN Lead Notes:

NIBIN Lead Notification Report Attachment  Related Agency Case Reports 

APPENDIX L: FIREARMS CLEARINGHOUSE FORM

Case #: **LEO Name:** **ID:** **Date:** **Time:**

Agency: **District:** **Zone:** **Incident Type:** **Stop/Found Property**

Address: **Secondary Recipient(s):** **(via Email)**

Suspect: **Name/Date of Birth/Address/Phone Number** **Arrest:** **Yes/No**

Firearm: **Description/Make/Model/Caliber/Serial Number**

- ☐ Record stop (audio/video (if possible)).
- ☐ Photograph vehicle, suspect(s), scene and firearm (in place, prior to initial collection and always wear clean latex/nitrile gloves).
- ☐ Determine if suspect(s) is convicted felon or delinquent.
- ☐ **A)** Determine if actual possession (if you or a secondary officer witness the firearm on the defendant(s) person).

OR

- ☐ **B)** Constructive possession (anything other than selection "A"). This type scenario requires further investigation prior to arrest; therefore, **DO NOT ARREST**, just properly document and collect evidence. ***For "B" scenarios a FIU Detective will contact you directly for further investigative direction and follow-up, IE DNA search warrants Etc.

- ☐ Stolen? If stolen, document on property receipt (description section): Entering agency's name (spelled out) and entering agency's case number (even if PBSO). Obtain the original theft report.
- ☐ Interview suspect(s) post-Miranda (audio/video (if possible)).
- ☐ Request suspect(s) provide a voluntary DNA standard. Have suspect(s) read, understand and sign a PBSO issued Consent to Provide Specimen form. If possible, record consent.

***View [Firearm Recovery Checklist &](#)

[Firearm Recovery Questionnaire and Constitutional Rights Form](#)

Case Synopsis:

Photo attachment 

FIU Det. K. Drummond #7454 Cell #561-707-2950 DrummondK@pbsso.org

FIU Assist Det. J. Foster #7247 Cell #561-707-5760 FosterJ@pbsso.org

APPENDIX M: FIREARMS PROCESSING STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

FA Firearms Processing SOP

Firearms Processing

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this procedure is to establish guidelines for the use of chemicals in the development of latent prints. Several technical methods have been developed for the development of latent prints on different surfaces. This procedure will apply to all analysts trained in the processing of firearms and firearm related evidence.

The analyst shall determine what surfaces may yield relevant latent prints and how the surface should be processed.

Safety precautions shall be taken when working with chemicals, reagents, and/or powder particles, when necessary, refer to the MSDS when working with these materials.

Quality Controls

During the use of any latent development chemical, a known print shall be placed on a non-test item and processed for a positive result contemporaneously with the evidence. The results shall be documented in the notes.

Visual Examination

Magnifiers may be used.

Adequate lighting shall be used, supplemented as needed with a flashlight or other type of light.

Hold a strong light source at various angles to the item being examined. Use direct, reflected, and oblique lighting during the search.

If it is necessary that a latent print(s) be photographed, CSI personnel will be notified to conduct the photography.

NOTE: Should other types of evidence be discovered (blood etc.), prior to processing evidence for latent prints, the submitting investigator should be contacted to determine which evidence is most important.

Surface Considerations

The analyst shall take into consideration the type of surface when deciding which processing method to perform. It is the analysts' discretion to select what type of powder or chemical to apply or if more than one type of processing technique is necessary.

Latent Development Methods

Cyanoacrylate Application and Fume hood

When an object is subjected to cyanoacrylate fumes, a polymerization occurs as the vapor adheres to the friction ridge residue. The cyanoacrylate fumes harden and build up the ridge detail as more particles condense on the impression. Cyanoacrylate fuming can be used on all non-porous surfaces, such as glass, plastic and metal and also semi-porous materials such as glossy papers.

CAUTION: Cyanoacrylate fumes are very toxic and extreme care should be taken to avoid contact with skin and eyes. If it becomes heated to 400 degrees, the vapors that are produced are cyanide gas.

Control the vapors by using the fume hood or a container that is as airtight as possible if used in the field.

Place the item in the container in such a manner as to expose all areas to the vapor.

Place a small amount of cyanoacrylate glue in a container, e.g. an aluminum cup, on a heating plate. The amount shall be determined by the analyst based on the size and quantity of the evidence as well as the size of the fume hood.

Check the water level in the humidifier. If it is below the level mark, add only distilled water.

Close the chamber door.

Turn on the chamber. Via the display, set the time for fuming. Do not over expose. It is better to under fume than to over fume. Exposure times vary depending on the number of items and the amount of cyanoacrylate for the size of the chamber.

The door shall unlock when the purge cycle has completed.

Powder Processing

This method works best on smooth, non-porous surfaces.

Latent processing shall be performed at the downdraft fume hood.

Use powder that shall contrast with the surface being processed.

Place a small amount of powder on the brush, and then apply the powder smoothly and evenly with the tip of the brush using short quick strokes or a circular motion. The analyst shall determine the type of brush needed for processing.

When a latent print becomes visible it should be dressed by gently brushing away all of the excess powder adhering between the ridge details.

Retrieval and Disposition of Latent Prints Developed with Powder

If practical, latent prints that are developed with powder will be lifted using tape and affixed to a black or white latent lift card, photographic paper, or sheet of plain paper. The choice of tape and the background medium on which the tape is placed is at the discretion of the analyst. In addition to the traditional lifting method, prints may be lifted using other materials such as clear glue or casting compounds. Latent prints may also be photographed if lifting is not possible, based on the condition of the print and the substrate. If lifting the print will damage the print or substrate, the portion of the original item with the latent development can be excised to facilitate the submission to the Latent Unit.

Fingerprint lifting supplies

Fingerprint tape and lift cards are stored in the Firearms Unit in a number of sizes and types. The following types are available:

- Two inch roll, clear
- Two inch roll, frosted
- Four inch roll, clear
- Latent lift cards
- Card stock, white and black colored
- Adhesive lifters

Completion and Disposition of Latent Lift Cards

The following information shall be labeled on the latent lift card, PBSO Form #0216:

- Date of latent retrieval
- Location of the lift
- Case number
- Physical address

FA Firearms Processing SOP

- The name and identification number of the investigator/technician retrieving the print(s)
- The initials and identification number of the retrieving investigator/technician across the lift tape
- Zone of incident
- The name of the victim, if known
- A sketch showing the location of the latent lift on the item of evidence, if applicable

Personnel shall seal the latent lift card(s) in a labeled evidence bag and submit it with a completed Property Receipt to the Latent Unit for evaluation, following requirements set forth in PBSO G.O. 532.00.

NOTE: The analyst shall not examine prints for identification purposes.

Safety Precautions for Collecting BLS and Other Biological Evidence

Potentially hazardous materials (chemical, physical, biological) shall be handled in accordance with the provisions of the CL safety program and/or the FA Unit Methods Manual.

Every time an analyst comes in contact with a known or unknown substance, they shall treat that substance as if it were potentially hazardous at all times.

PPE such as masks, goggles, biological suits, boot/shoe covers, protective arm sleeves, etc. may be utilized at the discretion of the analyst.

Gloves shall be worn when handling any type of substance. The analyst may determine whether more than one pair of gloves and what type of gloves are necessary to handle the substance.

Once the substance has been properly collected and stored, the PPE used to collect the substance shall be properly discarded in a biological hazardous waste container.

If the substance comes into contact with the analysts' equipment, the equipment shall be cleaned utilizing the proper cleaning agents or disposed of properly in the biological hazardous waste bins.

Dried Substance

With gloved hands, moisten a set of sterile cotton swabs with 1-2 drops of distilled water. The swab should be damp but not overly wet.

FA Firearms Processing SOP

Thoroughly swab the area until the substance is visible on both cotton swab tips. The analyst will obtain as much of the substance as possible when only a small amount of it is available.

Place the set of swabs in a coin envelope with the cotton tips pointing down toward the sealed end of the envelope and seal the opened end with evidence tape. Initial the tape. The envelope must be documented with the case number, date of collection, and description of where the sample was obtained from and the name or initials and identification number of the collector before being submitted to the CL.

NOTE: If the substance is resistant to reconstitution through the use of moistened cotton swabs, a clean scalpel or other sharp-bladed instrument may be used to gently scrape pieces of the dried substance. The scraped pieces should be caught in a new and clean piece of filter paper, a coin envelope, or other available new and clean container.

NOTE: If the dried substance cannot safely be removed from the scalpel, the scalpel can be submitted to the Evidence Unit in a sharps container.

Swabbing for the Collection of Skin Cells

Consider latent print processing prior to swabbing an object. All questions regarding the effects of the latent print processing should be directed to the FBU

With gloved hands, moisten the set of sterile cotton swabs with 1-2 drops of distilled water; the swabs should be damp but not overly wet.

Thoroughly swab the area using a set of moistened cotton swabs, making consistent contact with the item.

Place the set of swabs in a coin envelope with the cotton tips pointing down toward the sealed end of the envelope and seal with evidence tape. The envelope must be documented with the case number, date of collection, and description of where the sample was obtained from and name or initials and identification number of the collector before being submitted to the Evidence Unit.

Swabbing Firearms, Casings and Live Rounds

For small surface areas, for example the trigger or single casing, use a sterile swab with a drop of distilled water, vigorously swab the item or area (use a pen to mark the stick).

FA Firearms Processing SOP

Repeat using the second swab (do not mark the stick of this swab in order to differentiate it from the first swab).

Place both swabs in a labeled/sealed coin envelope.

Large surfaces areas or items that can be swabbed collectively may be swabbed using two swabs together. Place both swabs in a labeled/sealed coin envelope.

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*Sticky-side Powder

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*Crystal Violet

FA Firearms Processing SOP

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APPENDIX N: MIAMI HERALD STORY ON STAW-GUN PURCHASES

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Miami Herald



SOUTH FLORIDA

Straw-gun buying at licensed shops fuels violent crime in South Florida, authorities say

BY JAY WEAVER

DECEMBER 06, 2021 7:00 AM



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
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More than 18 bullet casings were found at the scene, along with a firearm believed to have been used in the drive-by fatal shooting of Dorce, who was struck in the chest. The weapon had been purchased a month earlier on April 28, 2021, at the federally licensed Gun World of South Florida in Deerfield Beach, according to federal authorities.

The buyer of that firearm was Amador Aulet III, who claimed on an official federal form that he was purchasing the weapon for himself — a lie, authorities say. [Although no one has been arrested in the North Miami murder investigation](#), Aulet has been charged federally with making a false statement on the form because prosecutors say he did not purchase the unidentified firearm for himself. He is suspected of selling it to someone else with a criminal past, possibly the perpetrator in the North Miami fatal shooting.

TOP VIDEOS



Four of Miami's favorite holiday drinks

Aulet, of Coral Springs, has pleaded not guilty to a federal indictment that carries up to 10 years in prison. His defense attorney, Michael B. Cohen, declined to comment about his case.

Authorities say that Aulet is the epitome of a “straw” gun buyer, who until now had no criminal history and could pass a background check while purchasing multiple weapons and ammunition from federally licensed firearm shops in South Florida. He is suspected of selling the guns for hundreds or thousands of dollars apiece to other people with a criminal past or possibly to others who exported them to foreign countries.

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Although it is difficult to quantify, authorities say straw-gun buying is commonplace in South Florida and fuels violent crime in the region.

Since July, there have been four false statement cases including Aulet's filed in federal court. While that number may not seem high, authorities say each straw buyer typically purchases dozens of weapons from various licensed gun stores and then sells them directly or indirectly to criminals who use them in drug trafficking, armed robberies and sometimes murders.

For example, a Miami-area man, Richard Williams, was charged in October with making a false statement on an official federal form when he bought more than 40 firearms — including Taurus, Smith & Wesson and Springfield 9mm and .40-caliber pistols — from 11 federally licensed gun stores in Florida that “he was purchasing ... for another person,” according to court records. Williams has pleaded not guilty.



Edson Dorce, 21, was killed by a gunman while walking home in North Miami on Memorial Day.

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"It's a serious problem," said Christopher Robinson, assistant special agent in charge of ATF's office in South Florida.

U.S. AND FOREIGN CRIMINALS

Robinson said straw buyers can profit substantially from selling firearms on the black market to criminals in the United States or [to gangs in the Caribbean or South America](#).

Since the United States does not have a national gun registry, Robinson said it is difficult for law enforcement to trace firearms to criminals — even when weapons are recovered at crime scenes. He said such investigations are challenging because the weapons purchased by straw buyers are routinely resold through intermediaries and the firearms often don't carry prints.

"The crux of the problem is, a lot of these people who commit violent crimes don't want [to leave] their prints on the weapon," he said. "Sometimes you may get prints and get DNA, but more often there is nothing to tie that person to that gun. It ends up being a burdensome process to determine where the gun came from" because it's either old or the serial number has been obliterated.

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Robinson said authorities rely on the false statement statute by going after straw gun buyers who lie on the required ATF form that their purchases are for them. In doing so, federal agents and prosecutors can disrupt the illegal supply chain of weapons by putting the straw buyers in prison.

Sometimes, targeting a straw-gun buyer can lead to the arrest of a perpetrator who obtains a weapon from him or an intermediary and then uses it in a fatal shooting — in which case the “ounce of prevention is worth the pound of cure,” he said.

In the federal case against Aulet, ATF agents say he purchased more than 100 guns from licensed dealers in Palm Beach and Broward counties between May 2020 and July 2021, according to a criminal affidavit. Of those, one was recovered at the fatal shooting of the North Miami man on the 12700 block of Northwest 10th Avenue on Memorial Day, while two others were recovered at crime scenes by the Riviera Beach Police Department and Saint Lucie Sheriff’s Office this year.

The Broward Sheriff’s Office targeted Aulet in an undercover operation this summer, when Aulet bought a Glock 9mm pistol, other handguns and rounds of ammunition from a licensed dealer and resold them to another person who, in turn, sold them to a BSO detective for thousands of dollars.

“Based upon the unusual volume of firearms purchases by Aulet, firearms recovered in crimes, and the purchase of firearms by an undercover detective within days of Aulet’s purchase indicates a pattern of buying firearms consistent with straw purchasing,” the ATF criminal affidavit said.

Both ATF agents and police detectives did not want to discuss Aulet’s case and its connection to the open murder investigation in North Miami.

After Aulet was charged in July, ATF agents and the U.S. Attorney’s Office made three similar false statement cases in South Florida.

Among them: Daniel Dantinor bought 81 handguns from five licensed dealers,

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from other people suspected of committing crimes, the affidavit says.

Dantinor has pleaded not guilty to a false statement charge. His defense attorney, Omar Guerra Johannson, did not respond to a request for comment.

In November, Shawn Richard Gordon, of Lauderdale Lakes, was charged with buying five pistols in his name at a couple of licensed Broward County firearm stores and shipping them to Canada over the past two years, according to a criminal affidavit. Gordon's arraignment is set for mid-December. His lawyer with the federal public defender's office did not respond to a request for comment.

HAPPENS AT LEGIT SHOPS

U.S. Attorney Tony Gonzalez said that when most people think of illegal firearm sales, they think of unlicensed gun show dealers or illegal sales on the street, which involve no federal forms and no criminal background checks. (A small number of Florida counties, including Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach, have local ordinances requiring gun show dealers to conduct background checks before completing a sale.)

"But illegal firearms sales can also happen at a federally licensed gun shop," Gonzalez said, stressing why such dealers must always require a buyer to fill out an ATF form because that paperwork can be the only traceable evidence tying a straw purchaser who resells a weapon to a criminal.

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JAY WEAVER

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Jay Weaver writes about bad guys who specialize in con jobs, rip-offs and squirreling away millions. Since joining the Miami Herald in 1999, he's covered the federal courts nonstop, from Elian's custody battle to A-Rod's steroid abuse. He was on the Herald team that won the Pulitzer Prize for breaking news in 2001. He and three Herald colleagues were Pulitzer Prize finalists for explanatory reporting in 2019 for a series on gold smuggled from South America to Miami.

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APPENDIX O: SAMPLE PALM BEACH COUNTY CRIME GUN INTELLIGENCE CENTER SUCCESS STORIES MEMO



CJIC/FIU Cases of Significance

November 2021

Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Video & DNA case

On 09/09/2020, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Detectives witnessed a live Facebook video of several Only the Zoe's (OTZ) and Green Team gang members brandishing firearms while recording a music video. Identified from the video were Desamontae **Bailey** B/M 10/12/2001, Aland **Louis** B/M 06/05/1999, Shapharn **Beldor** B/M 04/07/2003, and Thomas **Murvin** B/M 11/01/2003. Deputies responded to 402 West 5th Terrace, Pahokee, Florida to make contact with the subjects in the video but all fled on foot.

Multiple firearms were recovered on scene including a Taurus G2C pistol and Llama Comanche revolver. From the video, Firearms Identification expert FIU Detective Stephen Barborini was able to authenticate the firearm **Bailey** possessed as a Diamondback Arms short barreled AR-15, the firearms **Louis** possessed as Glock pistol and Walther (Umarex) rifle, the firearm **Beldor** possessed as a Taurus G2C pistol which was recovered on scene, and the firearm **Murvin** possessed as a Llama Comanche revolver also recovered on scene.

On 10/26/2020, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office TAC Agents located **Bailey** at his residence where a search warrant was executed. The Diamondback short barreled rifle was recovered. **Bailey** was arrested and charged with 1 count of Armed Trespassing while Wearing a Mask and 1 count of Possession of a Short Barreled Rifle pursuant to Florida State Statute.

On 12/20/2020, Detectives located **Beldor** at his residence where he was arrested for unrelated firearms charges along with several other OTZ members. Post Miranda, **Beldor** confessed to possessing the Taurus G2C pistol. **Beldor's** DNA was identified as being on the pistol. **Beldor** was arrested and charged with 1 count of Armed Trespassing and 1 count of Carrying a Concealed Firearm Pursuant to Florida States Statutes.

On 12/21/2020, **Louis** was located in Orlando and arrested for an outstanding arrest warrant regarding this case. He was charged with 2 counts of Delinquent in Possession of a Firearm pursuant to Florida State Statute.

On 11/03/2021, **Murvin** was arrested for an outstanding arrest warrant relating to this case. Post Miranda, **Murvin** denied possessing any firearms. **Murvin's** DNA was recovered from the Llama Comanche

revolver. **Murvin** was charged with 1 count of Armed Trespassing and 1 count of Carrying a Concealed Firearm Pursuant to Florida State Statute.

(*Note of interest – Detective Barborini is currently only one of a handful of court recognized experts in the field of firearms in distinguishing from social media, photographs and videos regarding the comparison of real firearms to facsimiles. Detective Barborini has been sought out all over the country due to this unique ability and has testified on numerous occasions resulting in convictions in state and federal courts.)

Currently Active CGIC/FIU/U.S. Attorney's Office Investigation

On 12/06/2020 this firearm was reported stolen under Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Case # 21-134079. A gun trace has been initiated *see T20210330453*. This unit is currently awaiting these results.

On 02/03/2021 a shooting occurred at 300 NW 11th Street, Lot 35, Belle Glade Florida. Recovered from the scene were both .40 caliber and 9MM casings. An investigation lead to the arrest of juvenile Carvonte **Freeman**, B/M, 03/15/2004. Freeman is currently pending judicial court action on this shooting. *see Palm Beach County Court case # 2021CF001685*.

On 07/27/2021 an Armed Carjacking occurred at 915 Forestiera Avenue, Wellington Florida. *See Case #21089791*. The vehicle was recovered leading to the arrest of Tavion **Warren**, B/M, 05/20/2002, a suspect in the armed carjacking He was found in constructive possession of loaded stolen S&W SD9VE pistol and ammunition by PBSO. The pistol, a S&W 9MM caliber pistol S/N FZR0535 was test fired. Its 9MM cartridge casing matched 9MM casings recovered from a Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Attempted Homicide case *see Case # 21-031942*, and an attempted Armed Carjacking case that also occurred on 07/27/2021 *see case # 21-089947*. The pistol also has NIBIN hits to an additional Attempted Homicide case captured under Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office *see case # 21-031942*. PBSO is now working this case jointly with ATF.

DNA testing of the firearm was requested by AUSA Adam McMichaels to assist in the federal prosecution of **Warren** for possible federal Armed Carjacking charges. The DNA testing is already underway funded by PBSO and transported directly to DNA International by this unit.

(*Note of interest – Sheriff Bradshaw has allocated approximately \$200,000.00 annually to the CGIC/FIU specifically for firearms DNA testing. This allocation of funds is available to any police jurisdiction in Palm Beach County who so requests it regarding a firearms case they may have. Detective Barborini will triage the case to determine if all necessary criteria is met for a successful prosecution for the requesting agency prior to submitting the firearm. Most identifiable suspects are multi-convicted felons. Once selected, this agency will allocate between \$2,500.00 - \$2,700.00 per weapon for the testing. The requesting agency will immediately turn custody of the firearm to Detective Barborini who will hand deliver the firearm to DNA International for analysis. This has produced an extremely high identification and conviction rate.)

Homicide Investigation

On 10/30/2021 at 0109 hours, Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office deputies responded to a report of a shooting within the parking lot of Fosters Shak located at 2225 Belvedere Road, West Palm Beach, Florida. Located in the parking lot was victim Vanessa **Nieves**, the victim of a homicide shot in the driver's seat of a vehicle. Agents assigned to CGIC/FIU responded to the scene and assisted in processing. Physical evidence collected at the scene including spent shell casings were processed. During the course of the investigation, Gary Lee **Leconte**, AKA "**Tyson**", was developed as a suspect.

On 11/02/2021, probable cause was established to charge **Leconte** with First Degree Murder with a Firearm, Aggravated Assault with a Firearm, 1 count of Discharging a Firearm from a Vehicle, and 1 count of Felon in Possession of a Firearm pursuant to Florida State Statute.

On 11/16/2021 I responded to the Palm Beach Sheriff's Office District 13 (Belle Glade) to meet with Analyst Julie Canavan and Captain Emory Payne to receive an overview of the ShotSpotter program. Mrs. Canavan advised the ShotSpotter program is installed onto every deputy's laptop. She further advised they also have the option of having the ShotSpotter Application added to their work cellular phones. The ShotSpotter is utilized in the Belle Glade area in conjunction with 17 "Sky view" cameras. The cameras are strategically located throughout the city and are monitored by analysts in the Real-Time crime center. During each shift there are 6 deputies and 1 sergeant assigned.

Once there is a ShotSpotter activation, 2 marked units are immediately dispatched. Upon arrival the units check for shot or wounded individuals. If none are located the deputies, then turn their attention to evidence gathering. An attempt is made to look for bullet strike marks in buildings and vehicles and shell case recovery. If nothing of evidentiary value is found, Analyst Canavan may contact a bomb/gun powder detection dog to conduct a canvas of the area.

I then joined Captain Emory Payne for a ride-along of the city of Belle Glade. Captain Payne took me to several areas where ShotSpotter is most active and areas that could be improved upon. He also pointed out several hot spot areas that in future may need an expansion of ShotSpotter due to a large increase in residency within the next several years.

On 11/22/2021 NIBIN Lead 1233 was tracked by P.B.S.O. to a Boynton Beach Police Department "shots fired" 9mm crime scene casing *case #21-043263*, a P.B.S.O. Robbery *case #21-090447* 9mm crime scene casing, which has now lead to a Taurus G3 handgun which was recovered. This weapon was purchased by Franci Joseph, B/M, 12/21/1996 who has now been charged with 1st degree Murder.

On 11/23/2021 The F.I.U. section conducted a Firearms Protocol & Investigations training for approximately 50 law enforcement personnel. In attendance were investigators from P.B.S.O., Juno Beach, Orlando, Brevard County, North Palm Beach, and West Palm Beach. The training was

approximately 5 hours and covered the topics of video evidence, D.N.A. and print recovery from a firearm, State and U.S. attorney evidentiary training, and NIBIN training. The class was well received with very positive feedback from the participants.